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The balloon of experience is, in fact, tied to the earth.
Henry James, Preface to The American
Can writers simply imagine the possible worlds they create 
without brooding over the constraints inherited from their past?
How to wed memory and imagination?
Jerome Bruner, Making Stories: life, law and literature
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I intend in what follows to contribute to study of the relationship between self, 
memory and narrative, a study which necessarily incorporates a discourse on 
imagination. There has been debate raging over this relationship for millennia. 
Perhaps 'raging' is too extreme a description of the scholarly exchange of views 
across centuries, which began with the notes and memos penned by Aristotle as 
outlines for his lectures on Poetics, and continues in the universities of the 
twenty-first century as semioticians pad along corridors in their blue suede shoes 
decoding the significance of signs on fire doors, whilst cognitive psychologists 
shrug on white coats before switching on the machines which, they claim, model 
mental acts.
I have spent the past three years reading academic texts and writing 
fiction, writing texts and reading fiction. I have encountered, during my research, 
many unexpected notions: the Pollyanna Principle, the Desire for Death, detached 
floaters, oxen being pulled backwards into caves, decagons, the Memory Bump, 
the Daughter of Memory, mens rea, the lunatic, the poet and the demolitionist, 
proairetic codes, Tootell Displays, quasi-pictorialism, and (thankfully) Sartrean 
nothingness. All this because I wondered, one day, exactly what was happening 
when I stopped typing as I wrote fiction, slumped back in my chair and stared out 
of the window and what had happened when I sat up and began to type again.
Already, there is need for elucidation. For my purposes here, 'an act of 
the imagination' means a mental act of creation; more specifically, imagination as 
is it is involved in the act of writing a novel. Not of writing a cheque to oneself 
for two million euros - an act which, to be sure, would certainly have fictive 
elements, an act which might subsequently be followed by (imaginative) fantasies 
of how to spend this windfall - because writing such a cheque would not be a 
mental act of creation. Nor am I going to consider the acts of writing a poem, a 
lyric, a screenplay, a play script or a memoir, not because these forms are 
essentially non-creative but simply because I will be focusing on the writing of
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novels. What functions do self-identity and memory play in the process of 
moving from the thought, 'I know, I'll write a novel' to holding that novel in 
one's hands, complete with author photograph, biog notes, strapline and blurb.
To elucidate further - it is a generally accepted notion that there exists a 
relationship between imagination and memory. The most cursory consideration 
of this statement will reveal its cogency. So, in order to arrive at a theory 
regarding the role of imagination in the process of writing a novel, it is incumbent 
upon me (as it has been for so many others) to comprehend what is understood by 
the term 'memory'. The sound you can hear is that of a can of worms being 
ripped open. To emerge from the cave dwellings of Palaeolithic man, and then 
slalom from the Platonic notion of self, through the Enlightenment rationales of 
Hume, Locke and Kant, only to hurtle past the dead-eyed notions of 
Behaviourism, before skirting the (possibly drug-induced) theories of 
Phenomenology, and on, barrelling through a conference of Narratologists, 
eventually to arrive at the laboratory door of Cognitive Psychology, is a hair- 
raising journey. A journey which I am prepared to re-enact in the following 
pages. But only if you come with me. With a torch. And sandwiches. And a 
bottle of Glenlivet whisky.
I intend, first, to establish the boundaries of the area I shall be examining; 
I wish it could be limitless, I wish I could explore the relationship between the 
writer's and the reader's imagination, for example, but the constraints of time and 
space do not allow this. So I shall content myself with an excursion into the 
social, commercial and personal contexts in which writers ply their trade, 
followed by an overview of the concept of self and how that concept is informed 
by autobiographical and working memory. I hope at this point to persuade the 
reader that story grammar is innate, a priori knowledge. Having established 
more boundaries, narrowing the pathway as it were, I shall examine aspects of the 
process of generating narrative, the nature of imagination and the way 
imagination performs when I write narrative. We shall be joined for this stage of 
the journey by a foul-mouthed unicorn, who will, thankfully, leave us as I 
consider the writing of Blue Earth in the light of my theories.
Sustenance will indeed be needed for this outing because I am going to 
argue that what I am doing when I slump in my chair and stare out of the window 
is dissolving the distinction between noetic and autonoetic memory, and
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switching my point of view from field to observer to field. More, I will claim 
that I collapse the barriers between autobiographical memory, working memory 
and long-term memory for my purposes as a creative writer. The route we will 
travel to arrive at these conclusions is a demanding one, ranging from the deepest 
limestone caves of Perigord, to the rabblesome/?/<2zza of sixteenth-century 
Florence, the storm-lashed beaches of Tobago and the Kensington Arms. More 
than this, the concept of the route itself illustrates, or, rather, mirrors my final 
contention: that narrative is a landscape over which swarm many possible 
pathways. When I imagine myself into the landscape of novel in progress, using 
my elaborated memories in all their forms, I imagine the view from a changed 
field perspective and I try, as best I can, to select the most satisfying route along 
which to lead the reader.
Our companions for this journey will be many and various - a matadore, 
Billy-Ray Rickman, Michelangelo Buonarotti, John Player Special, mustangs, 
Shake, Gustave Flaubert, palaeolithic cavemen, Janet and John, and the serial 
killer, Mr Candid, to name but a few ... in short, a motley crew. l
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BOUNDARIES
One obvious distinction to be made between the novel and other creative written 
works is this: novels are long. They are, in some cases, very long indeed. Not 
unreasonably, the novel is notorious for taking a rather long time to write. There 
are, of course, exceptions to both these observations - the short novels which are 
not so slim as to be novellas, and certainly not so slight as to be light-weight: Of 
Mice and Men, A Clockwork Orange, One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, 
The Great Gatsby, Where Angels Fear to Tread, for example. 2 As for the second 
point regarding the amount of time a novel takes to write, well, there are no hard 
and fast rules. 5 The Day of the Jackal, by Frederick Forsyth, famously punched a 
mere nine-day hole in the writer's diary; 4 conversely, Donna Tartt suffered a 
decade of angst, despair, elation and, no doubt, a degree of boredom as she wrote 
The Little Friend.
Despite these differences, in length, in approach, we acknowledge that 
both Jackal and Little Friend are novels. If one builder announces that he has 
constructed a four-bedroomed house in nine days, whilst another announces that 
it has taken him ten years to create a robust family home, we would be inclined to 
choose the latter in which to live. This choice would be based on our prior 
knowledge and understanding of what constructing a building involves. 
However, if, as readers, we pick up Jackal in our right hand and Little Friend in 
our left, we know that they are novels because we are sufficiently culturally 
literate to decode from the common form signs they share to determine the 
characteristics that denote them to be novels. That is, their length, layout and
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packaging: the cover, the blurb, the brooding black and white author photographs. 
Experienced readers do not even have to hold the books in their hands - they are 
able to scan the shelves in bookstores from ten feet and know that Jackal is a 
thriller, whilst Little Friend is a literary novel, such is the efficacy of the cover 
designs produced by the art departments of publishing houses and the deafening 
blare of publicity generated by PR departments. But the point is that the 
experienced reader, fishing in his pocket for a crumpled ten pound note, doesn 't 
care how long the book took to write. (This assertion does not entail, ipso facto, 
that the period of endeavour makes no difference to the quality of the writing, or, 
indeed, the reverse.)
My reason for focusing on the facts that novels vary in length from thirty 
thousand to two hundred fifty thousand words and that they can take anything 
from nine days to a lifetime to write, is to acknowledge that in what follows - 
which will be, in effect, an account of the writer's relationship with The Book in 
terms of the acts of memory and imagination involved in its writing -1 shall be 
assuming that most novels range between seventy-five thousand and a hundred 
and fifty thousand words, and take one to two years to write. 5 This assumption is 
important. It is important, I would argue, because novels occupy writers' lives 
and there is a qualitative difference between living with characters for nine days, 
one year or a decade.6 There is also the matter of the changing character of the 
writer herself- ten years of experience in the life of a reflective, intelligent writer 
(such as Donna Tartt appears to be), must surely be transformational?
Another factor which, I believe, plays a part in the relationship between 
the writer and The Book, is the degree of certainty of publication. Here we brush 
uncomfortably against the hairy backside of the beast that is commercial reality in 
2005. As Lennard J. Davis remarks, the novel is 'a strange combination of 
commodity and cultural experience'7 and never more so than now. It is hard to 
imagine what, exactly, Johann Gutenberg would make of contemporary best- 
seller lists. Perhaps, it isn't hard. Mr Gutenberg would be perplexed. He would 
have no concept of celebrity, nor of recipe books, television tie-ins or 
millionaires. (And yet he would hold Katie Price's Jordan in his hand and know 
it to be a book. 8) Many of the books which sell in hundreds of thousands are 
commissioned or ghosted, or represent merely another means of presenting the 
buying public with a well-known product in a different medium. 9 For many of
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these writers, the element of uncertainty regarding the work being published is 
removed, I would suggest that there is a world of difference between J. K. 
Rowling sitting down to write Harry Potter and the Prisoner ofAzkaban and 
John Kennedy Toole penning^ Confederacy of Dunces, Rowling is assured of a 
readership of millions, Toole committed suicide because he could find no 
publisher for his masterpiece. Does Rowling's luxury of the certainty of 
publication and commercial (if not critical) success affect the act of imagining?
In his book, The Fabulators, published in 1968, 10 Robert Scholes, an American 
literary critic, argued that the traditional realist approach to narrative was 
redundant (and this in tandem with Barthes announcing the death of the author - 
unhappy times 11). We should, Scholes suggested, stand aside and allow the 
fabulists free rein. Leave the holding up of mirrors to those who understood how 
to reflect reality - film directors. What the reader needed, according to Scholes, 
was a heady mixture of romance and allegory. To be sure, some writers have 
obliged in the past thirty years; 12 indeed, Sterne and Rabelais obliged long before. 
It is worth remembering that at the time New Journalism had arrived on the 
scene, rattling pills, waving bottles of bourbon and talking fast. In Cold Blood, 
Fear and Loathing in Las Vegas and The Electric Kool-aid Acid Test all blurred 
the distinction between fact and fiction, blending the fictional and the empirical. 13 
So what are these boundaries between fact and fiction, fable and neo-journalism?
David Lodge neatly summarises an earlier theory of Scholes' regarding 
these boundaries 14 :
the novel was generically an unstable mixture of the fictional and the 
empirical, of romance and allegory on the one hand and history and 
mimesis (realistic imitation of ordinary life) on the other. 15
And the novel still is a generically unstable mixture; if anything, it is distinctly 
more unstable, certainly in terms of marketing and marketing placement. 
Schindler 's Ark was published in the USA as non-fiction - and won the (then) 
Booker Prize in 1982 for best novel. The Curious Incident of the Dog in the 
Night was published in 2004 as a Children's Book and won the Whitbread Prize 
for Best Novel, selling to millions of adult readers. Is White Teeth fabulist? Is A
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Thousand Acres an adaptation of King Learl Is Primary Colours memoir or 
literary merry jape? Is The Cold Six Thousand Neo-New Journalism? Is Philip 
Roth the new Gore Vidal? Does it matter? Do we care? The answer to both of 
these, I hope, is no. In much the same way that the majority of readers cares not 
one whit whether a book took nine days or a decade to write, neither will they 
care where the theorists and reviewers decide to place a book on a quadrant 
composed of lines denoting aesthetic value and institutional validity (or cultural 
experience and commercial worth, come to that). 16
For the purposes of what follows, however, I do care, because it seems to 
me that the acts of imagination required for the writing of fabulist narratives, or 
of narrativised empirical research, are different to those required for traditional 
realist fiction. 17 And it is the latter on which I wish to focus, whilst
1 R
acknowledging that the 'crossover' novel is a force to be reckoned with. In 
conclusion, I am intent on examining the relationship between self-concept, 
memory and imagination in the process of writing realist, literary novels, of a 
certain length, over a reasonable length of time.
So, having laboured that point, I shall move on - to focus on a polymath who 
never penned anything longer than a sonnet...
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CONTEXT
In 1499 Michelangelo Buonarroti completed his sculpture of the Pieta, at the age 
of twenty four, a quite remarkable achievement. I was fortunate enough to see 
the work a couple of years ago, in St Peter's Basilica in Vatican City. 19 The Pieta 
sits in a pillared niche in a fabulous building designed, in the main, by the 
sculptor in his role as architect. The sculpture is in its place, nestling in the right 
context, if you like. Or, rather, it could be described as occupying the right space 
in a marbled landscape. Even more remarkable than Michelangelo's age when he 
carved the mother and son, is the fact that many of the people who cross the 
exquisite, vaulted nave to gaze at this lump of metamorphosed limestone are 
themselves changed. When I was there, I cried. Looking at the Pieta, I began to 
cry and I was not alone. How can this be? How can figures carved in stone 
evoke such a response? A photograph of the sculpture does not have the same 
effect, even though it is a direct representation of the piece. It is argued by many 
that what makes Michelangelo God-like - /'/ divino Michelangelo - is the 
emotional intensity of his work, or, rather, the products of his work. The 
terribilita - emotional intensity - which radiates forcefully from the faces and 
figures he sculpted and the ceiling frescoes in the Sistine Chapel.
The ultimate Renaissance Man lived in interesting times, as, perhaps, we 
all do. The all-powerful Medicis were his patrons during his early working life in 
Florence but in 1496 they were usurped by the fanatical ascetic, Savonarola, and 
Michelangelo fled to Rome, which was itself sacked by Habsburg mercenaries in 
1527. Against this background, following this history, thirty-seven years after 
completing the Pieta, Michelangelo began the project of painting the Last
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Judgement, the altarpiece of the Sistine Chapel. The contrast between the 
Neoplatonic humanism of the ceiling frescoes and the Mannerist (or Late 
Renaissance) figures of the Last Judgement, is significant. Michelangelo 
experienced the social, economic and religious convulsions of the Reformation 
and Counter-Reformation and these influenced his work. Compare the God who 
breathes life into Adam, to the vast Christ-figure casting the damned into hell and 
the observer might conclude that Michelangelo's life experiences transformed his 
interpretation of the reflection in the mirror he held up to his world. 20
It is, perhaps, unfair to refer to the work (poetry, architecture, painting, 
sculpture) of one who may be the most accomplished artist ever to have lived, in 
order to discuss the relationship between memory and imagination for mere 
mortals. Michelangelo was an artist who, surely, exemplified the Aristotelian 
concept oftekhne, that is, the productive capacity to create, informed by an 
understanding of that capacity's intrinsic rationale (which might explain 
Michelangelo's design for the Campidoglio in Rome but, I would argue, hardly 
explains the terribilita). My point here is that even /'/ divino was not immune to 
the effects of the shifting political and social landscape of the time in which he 
lived. And neither are we. I am aware that in a hundred years' time a social 
historian or political commentator may refer to this time as the Neo-Conservative 
Period, or the Age of Creationism, or the Evangelist Age, or the Bush Empire, or 
the Fifty Years War on Terror. 21 I cannot know what it will be, because I cannot 
climb to that privileged, perspectival high ground but nevertheless there are, 
without doubt, meta-forces working on me as an individual living within a social 
group, meta-forces of which I am only subliminally (yet, paradoxically, 
uncomfortably) aware. And these forces operate on me, whether as a consumer 
(when I select a pack of Fair Trade coffee and a pint of organic milk) or a writer.
So much for the socio-political context in which I sit in my study and write. 
There is, also, the personal context. That is, the facts of my existence. I am a 
white woman, born in 1958 in Bristol, England, a country where I have lived ever 
since. I could elaborate on these skimpy facts by giving details of my education 
and professional life but I'll resist the temptation. And yet I know if I were to 
furnish the reader with some of these dull facts, they would be able to make fairly 
accurate deductions about my life - grammar school for girls in Epsom, Surrey +
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university + current postcode + preferred national daily paper + contents of fridge 
= snapshot of a life lived. (This illustrates neatly the concept of inferential 
knowledge, which is discussed at length in the section on autobiographical 
memory, below.) To decontexrualise Wittgenstein, 'We make to ourselves 
pictures of facts'.22
Surely, it makes more sense to speak of individuals as being the results of 
their experiences - the 'you are what you experience' school of thought - rather 
than products of their biographical facts? Perhaps it does. But there is no 
escaping the observation that what I experience will depend to a great extent on 
those bare facts given above. An Aborigine living in one of the derelict plywood 
houses provided for him by the state on the outskirts of Alice Springs, whose 
days are spent drinking sweet, cheap mosel wine, will not expect to have the 
same life experiences as a middle-aged, white, English woman. Age, culture, 
gender, education - all of these properties dictate to a great extent what the 
experiences are that fashion the concept of self. (This notion of 'self and the 
various theories regarding the coding of memories will be the basis for a lengthy 
exposition later.) Writers are affected, sometimes even compressed, by the meta- 
forces of cultural and social change, as well as being acted upon from within by 
their personal experiences and the constant realignment of the sense of identity 
the memories of these experiences causes.
I have attempted, so far, to establish the boundaries of the area of literature I shall 
be exploring and the issue of the context in which the writer writes, in terms of 
both the social and the individual pressures and constraints acting on the writer. 
It's now time to address the problems of the identity of 'self. At this point, an 
excursion into the fields of psychology and cognitive psychology is called for, in 
order to establish what, exactly, memory is and what role it plays in generating 
'self history'.
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SELF
The Philosophers' Wall
Any inquisitive student attempting to make sense of mental acts sets off, sprinting 
enthusiastically, in the quest for knowledge and runs, almost immediately, into a 
brick wall. This wall is quite an obstacle - the foundations laid by philosophers 
when they averred, hundreds of years ago, that we can have no access to the 
minds of others. We can speculate, we can infer and deduce, we can even now 
calibrate neural impulses and measure the movement of eyeballs in sleep, in order 
to arrive at the conclusions that if A's lover has left her, she will be upset; that 
B's tears and the blood spurting from his nose means he must be in pain and that 
C's rapid eyeball movement means she's dead to the world. But the fact remains 
that the only mind to which we have direct access is our own, and as a result any 
conclusions we may arrive at concerning mental acts are based, substantially, 
precisely on introspective mental acts. Some philosophers went further, piling 
brick upon brick on the wall. Descartes famously doubted everything around him 
and found all that was left was the mental act of thinking. This is not to say that 
all that was left were his doubts (a common fallacy);23 rather, Descartes arrived at 
the conclusion that he could not doubt that he was experiencing his doubts; more, 
that he could not doubt the subjective experiences of feeling the chair's back, the 
table's hardness, as if they were there. If these experiences could be described as 
'his', then he must exist in order to experience them. Sadly, this says nothing 
about the existence or otherwise of the mind of his chamber maid or wig-maker. 
But this is not the place to analyse the arguments of the Sceptics, the
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Reductionists, the Existentialists, the Behaviourists and so on, regarding the 
existence or otherwise of others' minds.
There remains, however, the charge of the sin of solipsism - are the 
sciences of psychology and cognitive psychology the Hamlets of the academic 
world? The incomparable Gilbert Ryle answers the charge:
Sometimes we idly fancy that the whole world is merely our dream. 
Solipsism is a theory rather like this fancy, but based on argument. If 
asked why I believe in the existence of stars, trees and people, I have to 
reply 'My sight, hearing, touch, in short, my perceptions are sorted and 
supplemented by memory, inference and conjecture, but without 
perceptions such thinking has nothing to work on. Now perceiving is 
having sensations. But you cannot have, for example, my visual or tactual 
sensations, any more than you can have my toothaches. So you cannot 
perceive anything that I perceive. The world that my senses acquaint me 
with is private to me. Even the you that I see and hear could no more 
exist without my existing any more than my toothaches could. I hanker to 
believe that independently existing, unperceived things tally with the 
perceived contents of my private world, but I ought to believe that I alone 
(solus ipse) exist in my own right, all else depending on me as my 
toothaches do.' No important philosophers accept this repellent 
conclusion. But many, accepting the argument for it, have to postulate 
non-perceptual reasons for believing in independently existing things and 
people. We should, instead, reject the step in the argument 'perceiving is 
having sensations'. 24
This last sentence refers to Ryle's theories concerning mental concepts; he 
considered the portrayal of these concepts as events occurring in a ghost lodged 
in a machine (the mind located in the brain) to be mistaken. Rather, he believed 
that mental concepts refer to dispositions to behave in certain ways in appropriate 
circumstances. Before leaping to the conclusion that Ryle is a closet 
Behaviourist, take note:
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As the human body is a complex, organised unit, so the human mind must 
be another complex, organised unit, though one made of a different sort of 
stuff and with a different sort of structure. Or, again, as the human body, 
like any other parcel of matter, is a field of causes and effects, so the mind 
must be another field of causes and effects, though not (Heaven be 
praised) mechanical causes and effects.25
Ryle has been labelled as many things, Reductionist, Behaviourist and 
Demolitionist among them, and it is this last label I prefer. When discussing acts 
of remembering, Ryle denies that memory consists in 'hearing' or 'seeing' copies 
of visual or auditory objects, because no event has simultaneously occurred. That 
is, if you imagine a loud thud, no auditory event has simultaneously occurred, so 
no copy has been made of it. Ryle, effectively, demolishes the copy and posits 
instead a direct relationship between the event or object and the memory of it, 
unmediated by analogues or copies. 26 There is another reason I am drawn 
towards the notion of demolitionist tendencies. I suggest at this point that the 
argument for the existence of others' minds is accepted for our purposes, and we 
allow the philosophers to continue the debate off-page. In order to demolish the 
brick wall they have built, I suggest swinging at it with the sledgehammer of 
common sense rather than slashing at it with Ockham's Razor.
The Psychologists' Shock
In 1978, the eminent psychologist Ulric Neisser, addressed an audience of 
colleagues attending a conference, presenting a paper titled 'Memory: What are 
the important questions?' and shook them all to the core by announcing that the 
work done in memory research for the past century was all bunk. I was not there, 
so I can only speculate about the response to this statement. Did papers fly? 
Were ashtrays thrown? Probably not. Perhaps the psychologists sat in respectful 
silence, because Neisser had a point. For a hundred years or more, the majority 
of psychologists involved in the study of memory had adopted a 'traditional 
laboratory research' (TLR) approach. Subjects were placed in rooms and shown 
nonsense syllables and unrelated diagrams, or random facts were given them,
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stripped of context. Their response times, the rates of short-term memory decay, 
recall delay periods were all assiduously logged - and all of these data were 
controlled, calibrated and measured in clinical conditions. Marvellous stuff - but 
what, Neisser was asking, does that have to do with the man who mouths an 
obscenity in the bank as he realises he's forgotten his cheque book, or the woman 
who pauses on a threshold because she's convinced she's lived this scene already, 
or the unbidden memory which occasionally surfaces in my mind, of snapping 
my ankle and falling, as a result, into a bush of poison ivy? Neisser's answer was 
'nothing'.21 What he wanted was 'a new approach, concentrating on the detailed 
examination of naturally occurring memory phenomena in the real world, which 
paid particular attention to individual differences.' 28 In short, Neisser was 
demanding that research into memory be driven primarily by the ecological 
validity of its findings;29 that is, the research should apply to naturally occuring 
behaviour in the natural context of the real world.
The Cognitive Psychologist's Dream
The methodological concepts underpinning cognitive psychology are surprisingly 
simple to grasp, given the daunting name given to this field of study. Psychology 
was recently birthed by the union of medicine, physiology and philosophy, a neo- 
science of the late nineteenth century. It has had considerable impact on our lives 
- vide the developments in advertising, the Hollywood dream machine, the 
growth of counselling services, the queues stretching down Harley Street, the 
cheques made out to compensate for PTSD. Yet during its short life, the study of 
psychology has morphed again and again, spilling over the ever-growing map of 
human knowledge, fluid and tricky as a puddle of mercury. At its inception, it 
was described variously as the 'science of the mind', the 'science of mental life' 
and 'the science of behaviour'. Sir Frances Gallon determined in 1883 that 
investigations into human memory required observation and interaction; at the 
same time, Hermann Ebbinghaus decided that behaviour was the key, informed 
by TLR and experimental control. Perhaps it was the muscularity, the rigour of 
Ebbinghaus' theories, the sheer science of the approach which appealed to the 
Victorian mind? Whatever the appeal, it proved to be the more attractive 
approach, and the study of psychology was (with a few exceptions -Paivio,
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Brown, McNeill, Mandler) conducted in the laboratory until Neisser leaped to his 
feet and called the psychologists' conference to order.
Since Neisser's intervention, psychology has changed yet again, as the 
ranks of cognitive psychologists have grown. Some of these researchers focus on 
internal, covert mental processes, which include mental events, mental 
representations and, of course, everyday memory (a study almost forgotten since 
Gallon) and they do this without recourse to the study of animal behaviours, 
psychometrics, neural-imaging, or neuro-physiology. 30 Instead they are 
interested in developing theories which adequately explain the functions of 
memory to describe, if you like, Ryle's 'complex, organised unit'. The cognitive 
psychologist has moved away from the 'tradition of studying memory for items 
of information stripped, as far as possible, of meaning, context and personal 
significance'. 31 Rather, he examines naturally occurring memory phenomena in 
the real world, and any findings must, as such, have ecological validity. That 
said, the cognitive psychologist likes nothing more than to generate models to 
represent findings, in an attempt to map the mental world, and many of them are 
relying increasingly on drawing analogies between the workings of the human 
mind, and the storage of data and its manipulation by computers. All this 
endeavour is supported by work in the field of Artificial Intelligence. Cognitive 
psychologists studying everyday memory concern themselves with such functions 
as memory for intentions, places, events, eyewitness testimony, flashbulb events, 
personal experiences, knowledge, expertise, conversation, texts, narratives, 
thoughts and, interestingly, dreams. In short, the areas of concern for any writer 
- particularly a writer examining the relationship between memory and narrative.
It should be said here that I have exaggerated the schism between 
experimental psychology and cognitive psychology; the attitudes of the various 
practitioners are not as deeply entrenched as I have suggested. My purpose is to 
emphasise the attractions of the latter's focus of study being in the real world. As 
Alan Baddeley remarks of his text, Human Memory, 'The particular chapter 
topics are not very different from those adopted by virtually every other text book 
on memory.' 32 The topics may not be different but the methodologies are.
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The Hammer of Introspection
Many people, if asked to describe their memory processes, refer to filing 
cabinets, boxes, file card systems etc. They talk of filing memory events, putting 
them, as it were, in particular places so they can later send out their retrieval 
scouts to scurry around and dig out the dog-eared mental papyrus headed 'Stinks 
on a scale of 0 -10' when confronted with the choice between cheddar and 
camembert. Traditional laboratory researchers model memory in much the same 
way - 'the store house metaphor' as Koriat and Goldsmith call it. 33 These 
experimental researchers are primarily concerned with the quantity of 
information stored, for how long it is stored and what factors cause it to be lost or 
modified. Cognitive psychology, however, is concerned with the quality of the 
experience, the method of encoding and what correspondence the consequent 
memories have with reality. In short, how does the quality of the memory 
correspond to reality ...
... here it comes again. My intention when planning this section was to 
summarise various aspects of current everyday memory theory and lay them out 
in a neat row of nutshells. However, another problem has arisen; a thorny one at 
that, springing precisely out of the notion of the correspondence to reality. To 
reprise: I am concerned with exploring the relationship between self, memory and 
narrative in the process of writing a novel. I had planned to present an overview 
of past and current theories of memory, followed by observations on imagination 
by the great and good. But having smashed the wall of solipsism, another 
obstacle appears on the horizon - the hammer of introspection which is poised 
above my nutshells. Impossible to ignore.
In private correspondence with Professor Gillian Cohen, I described my task as 
attempting to ascertain what is happening when I slump back in my chair in my 
study, as I work on a novel, and stare unseeing out of the window. More, what 
has happened when I cease to slump, sit up and begin to type again. In short, I 
intended to analyse my own mental acts.
It is an accepted fact that an observer changes the event observed. My 
study is small, dark and smoky. If three experimental psychologists in white 
coats stood behind me, having attached neuro-sensors and cardiac pulse monitors
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to my body in order to assess my stress levels and areas of increased activity in 
my brain as I wrote, I would feel a tad uneasy, not to say, claustrophobic. Indeed, 
I can say if my writing process was so observed, it would be adversely affected. 
In the light of these problems and recognising the limitations of experimental 
work, cognitive psychologists rely heavily on introspective evidence amongst 
other accounts. That is, subjects report their current, covert thought processes, 
and they are also invited to introspect and describe the mental strategies they 
adopt, in decision-making or problem-solving, for example. Or writing novels, 
come to that.
Many psychologists (and practitioners in other fields - behaviourists, 
doctors, teachers, for example) distrust introspective accounts, and for good 
reason. Here are a few of the caveats regarding the instrospectionist approach:
  Some (Nisbett and Wilson, for example), 34 maintain that there may in any 
case, 'be little or no direct access to higher order cognitive processes'. As a 
result, many cognitive processes may not be available for scrutiny by 
consciousness.
  There exists the problem of the inadequacy of language to describe - and 
certainly to explain - some cognitive processes.
  Connectionist theorists argue that there are patterns of activation across fields 
of neural structures and these patterns fire and connect at levels of which we 
cannot be aware. So, we may be conscious of the end product of a mental act 
but it is not possible to discern the activations of which that end product is a 
result.
  It would certainly be impossible to give an introspectionist account of these 
activations - and, further, one is tempted to say it is impossible even to 
theorise about their properties (there are, after all a near-infinite number of 
ways of mapping possible pathways between A and B), and as a result we 
could question even the existence of such patterns of activation.
  There are, also, problems with widely reported memory phenomena, 
experienced by nearly all of us, for which activations no amount of 
introspection can account. For example, 'floaters', the fragments of memory 
which present themselves with no apparent trigger (see above); passive
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memories, which are triggered by unexpected stimuli (smell being the main 
culprit); and the curious problem-solving mental act which follows the 
sensation of something being on the tip of the tongue and which precedes 
someone leaping up in a crowded pub yelling, 'Fire!' in response to a 
question regarding Arthur Brown's most famous song asked three days 
previously.
  Any introspection which takes place concurrently with a mental activity 
almost inevitably distorts that activity, usually by slowing down the process. 
For example, if someone with only a conversational grasp of Spanish is asked 
to report what exact mental acts they perform when translating the statement 
'La corteza de algunos arboles es muy util al hombre', then their awareness of 
the task will distort that particular translation - they will, indeed, be self- 
conscious. 35
  However, the obvious solution to this last problem - to ask the subject for 
retrospective introspection reports - also produces distorted accounts, since 
the rate of decay of memory causes some elements to be soon forgotten.
  It is worth noting that recent developments in methodology have eliminated 
one other problem that used to arise with introspective accounts of mental 
acts or states. Psychologists now commonly use large control groups and/or 
computer models etc. However, in the late nineteenth century, some 
psychologists felt uneasy using any subjects other than themselves. This led 
to an unfortunate situation in the case of Sir Francis Galton, who 'managed, 
by dint of considerable effort to induce in himself feelings of paranoia such 
that every person or even horse he met in the street was imagined to be spying 
on him'. 36
All of the above (and indeed, every question ever uttered since 
palaeolithic caveman stumbled into the light grunting 'who am I?' and every 
answer subsequently given), makes certain assumptions, not least of which is that 
it presumes an understanding of consciousness. Which, according to 
psychologists, we don't have. That is, psychologists and neuroscientists are still 
investigating which acts of memory and learning take place consciously and 
which do not. Implicit learning/memory is 'unconscious learning', or 'learning
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of which we are not consciously aware'. The usual example given of this activity 
is the acquisition of language skills in young children; they are able to construct 
grammatically correct sentences without being able to articulate the rules of case 
grammar. Explicit learning is stored in such a way as to be available to 
consciousness - thrust your hand into a pile of burning embers and it is unlikely 
you will do it again. Theorists and experimental researchers are still trying to 
define the boundary between implicit and explicit memory/learning, still trying to 
explain consciousness.
Each of the above objections as to the validity of introspective accounts of mental 
processes holds water. Worse: there is still no consensus regarding the definition, 
or even the purpose of consciousness. In response it might be said that we all 
appear to share some notion of what it is to be self-aware and appear all to 
experience sense data in much the same way and appear to encode the data in 
some way (amnesiacs, those suffering from blindsight, neglect, anarchic hand 
syndrome etc. notwithstanding)37 which enables us to retrieve the data encoded at 
a later date. Yet there appears to be evidence that mental events occur of which 
we are unaware - perhaps we do not possess the faculty to apprehend this 
subconscious activity (or, come to that, superconscious activity; there is no 
reason to suppose that this activity occurs below the pitch, as it were, of our 
consciousness. We may be ignoring the dog whistle of the universe.). This 
scenario reminds me of a scene in Altered Land. John, the main character, is deaf 
and when he is a schoolboy he remarks of the experience of trying to sleep in the 
dormitory, as he remembers his father:
Many nights I'd lie there crying, mourning him, and no one could hear 
me. That is the one privilege of the deaf- there is privacy in the dark, 
when we are sightless. Often I wondered if all the boys were lying there
70
crying, wailing even, and no one knew it.
Before anyone suggests that this is simply a version of the 'if a leaf falls and no 
one sees it, has the event occurred?' school of thought,39 I (either as Jules Hardy 
or John Player) emphasise I am not doubting the wailing, and neither am I 
doubting implicit memory.
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Here is hypothesis to explain the fact that homo sapiens learns and 
memorises without being aware of it:
Janet and John and the Alpha Mind
(Scene: Janet and John sitting in a crowded, smoky pub. John is staring vacantly 
at a television showing a football match. Janet is frowning, turning her glass in 
her hand. She speaks suddenly.)
Janet: If there can be mind/body dualism, then there may be mind/mind 
dualism.
John: Excuse me?
Janet: Well, we speak of the mind as a single, unified but multi- 
functional40 entity but perhaps it is not? Perhaps there is the mind that 
knows how to buy a drink in the pub, that is, it reminds us of the protocol 
of the act, and it also knows facts, such as the accepted dates for the 
Peloponnesian War being 431-404 BC. This mind we could label the Beta 
Mind.
John: If you say so.
Janet: So, developing this line of thought, we could conjecture that there 
exists an Alpha Mind. 
John: Yeah? What's that do then?
Janet. The Alpha Mind is responsible for those higher order concepts the 
genesis and maintenance of which the Beta Mind has no direct access to. 
This is not to say that the Beta Mind is not a complex, sophisticated entity 
- but what do I mean by sophisticated? 
John: Don't ask me.
Janet: The question is rhetorical. We describe the Beta mind as 
sophisticated because we compare it to a chicken's or an ape's. Or a 
computer's.
John: Computers don't have minds. They're only as good as the 
programs, which means as good as the programmer. And if he's using his 
Beta Mind, like you call it, coz that's all he thinks he's got...
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Janet (looking at John with some surprise): Exactly. Which is all he can
think he has because it's all he is aware of, and that's why I have a caveat
about the activities of the newly instituted Oxford Centre for Science of
the Mind.41 Lady Greenfield has announced that 'the time is ripe for the
machinery of scientific method to come to bear on the most profound
questions of the human condition'. These are, apparently, the nature of
consciousness and how religious beliefs manifest themselves in our
brains.
John: Blimey.
Janet: They're going to use functional magnetic resonance imaging to
investigate the boundary between consciousness and unconsciousness.
John: What, like those photos you see with brains all different colours?
Janet: Something like that.
John: And that's going to tell us what's goin' on in our brains when we
believe something? Or have faith?
Janet: So they hope.
(The two of them sit in silence, Beta Minds working furiously.)
John (comprehension dawning)'. You're not sayin' that...
Janet: Yes, John, I am. They're making a Rylean category type mistake.
Just as did the foreigner who asked, when watching a cricket match,
whose role it was in the team to exercise the esprit de corps given they'd
all been bowled out.42
John: Ryle? Didn't he nick the title of that Police album?
Janet: He did refer to the fallacy of the 'Ghost in the Machine', yes.
John: But you're saying there are two ghosts ...
Janet: No, I'm not. But interesting you should bring up ghosts. As St
Augustine in his Confessions remarked, it's extraordinary that we can use
our memory to represent to ourselves scenes which appear to be rich with
colour and sound, and yet memory itself is colourless and silent -
John (excited): Jus' like ghosts!
Janet (with asperity): You've never seen a ghost.
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John: Well, you've never seen a unicorn and you're always bangin' on
about them.
Janet: That's not the same thing.
John: Why not?
Janet: I'll tell you later. Anyway, as I was saying, I'm not asserting there
are two ghosts in the machine. I am, if you like, saying there may be two
or more systems operating when we perform mental acts and of some of
these we are unaware. Systems, much like ghosts, have no colour, they
make no sound, they have no scent, and they have no extension. Systems,
in short, resemble Euclidean points.
John: So?
Janet: Do I have to explain everything?
John: Yes. You can't say systems have no extension - I've seen maps.
I've seen flow diagrams. They're systems.
Janet: No, they're representations of systems. 43 And if constructs such as
'Alpha Mind' and 'Beta Mind' resemble Euclidean points (mutters to
herself) but does it make sense to talk of Euclidean pointsl In the plural?
(collects herself) does it make sense for Lady Greenfield to talk of
locating the nexus of these phenomena?
John: You've lost me.
Janet: I can't lose you. Your sense of self, your self-history, your
identity is constructed from your experiences. You are not mine to lose.
You are what you remember. You are not what I remember.
Jack: What d'you mean? I'm the same as I always was. I haven't
changed. Like I said last week, it's you that's changed, you're not the
same woman as -
Janet: Let's not go into that right now. What I'm saying is that you are
the sum of your experiences. Your experiences. They are the only things
you truly own. But if we allow that there might be an Alpha Mind
operating concurrently with the Beta Mind then there may be mental
events occurring when you construct your sense of self to which your
Beta Mind has no access. Strange as that might seem.
John (frowning): All sounds like bollocks to me. Just the usual fancy
words you always use to make sure I don't understand.
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Janet: Your incomprehension is not my goal here. But you have a point,
John, about words, or language as I would prefer to say. You accuse me
of playing word games. I'm not. I'm monolingual. I only have one
language with which to describe concepts of mind, or minds.
Interestingly, neither the concept of mind, nor the concept of
consciousness is represented in the Ancient Greek language. 44 But no
one, surely, would suggest that Plato or Aristophanes were not conscious
when one wrote The Republic and the other The Frogsl
John: The what?
Janet: The Frogs, but that's not important right now. What I'm saying is,
the naming of a thing may make a difference to its epistomological status
but not, surely, to its ontological integrity.
John (wearily): And your point is?
Janet: I'm making more than one point here.
John: Too bloody right you are.
Janet: One - it is accepted that mental events occur of which we are not
consciously aware. It may be that we do not have the language skills
necessary to describe these events, or we do not have the faculty to
discern mental events which take place at such speed, or in such ways.
Two - scientists have tried to model the mind, either by 
highlighting analogies with the brains or behaviours of other mammals or 
by developing computer programs which attempt to model the processes 
of memory. I object to the first approach because I cannot accept that a 
rat electing to choose one path to a food source rather than another path is 
in any way analogous to my ability to experience grief or my ability to 
imagine a unicorn. As for the computer models, well, there are many 
problems with this and not merely the instinctive reaction that computers 
have no soul. I'm white so I haven't got soul either, but I still object. 
OK, in the past digital computers could only operate serially, whilst the 
neurones in the human brain operate in parallel, but apparently they've 
solved that problem now.45 But, computers find the storage of data 
stupidly simple and retrieval unproblematic. Computers don't forget. We 
do. Computers do not exhibit the characteristics of 'graceful 
degradation', a beautiful phrase which describes an unpleasant state of
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affairs - the loss of brain cells through ageing. But despite this loss, the 
human mind is still capable of remembering a great deal and performing a 
vast number of functions. The computer is not. If the fuse blows or the 
data processing system develops a fault, the whole ceases to function.46
Three - scientists may have no truck with the notion of 'soul' and 
feel they have no need to appeal to some mysterious element of the world 
to explain the complexities of the human mind, but the philosopher and 
just about everyone else in the universe does. In De Anima Aristotle 
moved away from Plato's monism to posit the theory that the essence of 
what it is to be human is to be found in the psyche, which for the Ancient 
Greeks meant 'soul'. So, for him, psychology would mean the study of 
the soul. He argued that there exist both 'form', which is, if you like, the 
essence of an object; and 'matter', which is the material, the substance of 
which an object is made. The matter of Michelangelo's Pieta is 
metamorphosed limestone from Carrera, the form is the sculpture that is 
Michelangelo's representation, terribilitd translated into a grieving mother 
cradling her dead son. A more basic example would be that of a shelf- 
its function dictates that it must be flat, solid and horizontal; that is the 
form of the shelf. It may be made of wood or of metamorphosed 
limestone but the point is that the form implies the matter - a shelf made 
of jelly might be attractive but it would have no function - yet the matter 
cannot imply the form. So, Aristotle argued, the 'soul' is the form of the 
human being. A corpse has no psyche, it is therefore not a human being, 
it does not have the form, the essence of human being just as the jelly 
does not have the form of the shelf. This results in the Aristotelian 
assertion that form and matter always co-exist but he denies that there is 
therefore unity, that the mind and body are one. Bearing in mind that the 
Ancient Greeks had no word corresponding with the English word 
'consciousness', it is interesting that Aristotle referred to the nous 
poetikos, the 'active mind', which is not reducible to mechanical accounts 
of matter. This, of course, leads one to ask whether he is suggesting that 
there is a 'passive mind'. 
John: What? Like your Alpha and Beta minds?
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Janet (shrugs): Maybe. Many cultures make reference to base and higher 
thoughts. For example, traditional Chinese religion refers to the dual soul, 
the lower, material soul, p 'o, and the higher, mental soul, hun. (Sighs.) 
It's impossible, isn't it? 
John: What's that, love?
Janet: Any attempt to define what the mind, or consciousness is. We 
take it for granted, but all of them - the Gnostics with their 'divine spark', 
the behaviourists with their mechanistic accounts, the phenomenologists, 
the cognitive psychologists, the neuro-scientists, the reductionists, the 
functionalists, the mysterians - none of them manages to answer the 
question. Even Wittgenstein came over all misty in the end: 'There are, 
indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves 
manifest. They are what is mystical. ' 47
John (sympathetically): Maybe it's just that we can't know. Y'know, 
that it's jus' something we'll never understand.48 What makes us human, 
like. Maybe to get it we'd have to think in a way we don't know how to 
do. Maybe it'd be like that bloke in that movie the Lawnmower Man, or 
that book The Black Hole by that geezer Fred Hoyle. Just too much 
information - our brains and our minds would explode. D'you want 
another pint?
... And there we shall leave Janet and John, sitting at the bar, nursing their drinks 
and thinking their higher order thoughts. Janet could talk all night, rehearsing 
and revisiting the various theories, both philosophical and scientific, regarding 
the nature of consciousness and never coming to a conclusion, because there are 
no answers to the questions what is consciousness and what is the mind? Perhaps 
it would be as well here to accept David Papineau's summary of Thomas Nagel's 
philosophy of mind: that consciousness inheres in the subjective element of 
mental acts and is not an objective phenomenon to be explained in physical
49terms.
Or, to put it more succinctly, if one were to ask 'What am I talking about 
when I talk about my "mind"?', the answer might be the same as Louis 
Armstrong gave when asked what 'What am I talking about when I talk about 
jazz?': 'Man, if you gotta ask, you'll never know.' 50
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MEMORY
As we have seen, there exist many fundamental problems inherent in any study of 
mental acts (such as remembering and imagining), not least the issues of the 
existence of both one's own and others' minds, the nature of consciousness, the 
ontological status of higher order thoughts and the validity of introspection. 
Effectively, my position regarding these issues is: both my mind and the minds of 
others exist; the nature of consciousness cannot be adequately explained, yet 
enough of us appear to understand the concept sufficiently well to accept (tacitly, 
as it were) that many higher order thoughts occur in such a way as to be 
accessible to our consciousness and we appear to be able to employ a language 
sufficiently well to discuss shared mental experiences; and, lastly, despite the fact 
that retrospective introspection has many problems as a methodology for 
describing mental events, I intend to adopt the approach here as it seems the most 
appropriate, whilst acknowledging the problems outlined above.
Why switch my focus now to the subject of memory? Because if I adhere to the 
'you are what you experience' school of thought - and I do - then I cannot ignore 
the role that memory has played/plays in my development of my sense of 'self. 
And by 'self I mean 'self as grown child, student, carpenter, traveller, lover, 
insurance policy holder, tobacco addict, writer ... the list is seemingly endless. 
The 'there, then' informs the 'here, now'. And this is why it is cogent to write 
'memory plays' despite the fact that this phrase seems inherently contradictory - 
the past encoded in the present or vice versa. 'Here, now' is sitting at my desk in 
my study in my house at 12.58 a.m. on 19 January 2005. And now it's not - it's
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12.59 a.m. and am I different? Changed by memory? Perhaps. I'know'Iam 
changed since 12.59 p.m. on 18 January 2005 because I have encountered in the 
intervening twelve hours ideas I have not encountered before - for example, the 
fact that no other European language has a word which directly corresponds to 
the English word 'mind', and that Cox's Orange Pippin apples are ready to eat 
only when they are shaken and the pips rattle. I hesitate to say that my changed 
self is merely an accretion of facts. But I can say with a great deal of certainty 
that my concept of 'self has changed since 12.59 a.m. on 19 January 2004; I 
have been variously disappointed and surprised by my own actions and thoughts 
and have 'learned' from these experiences to act differently (when I remember to 
do so).
So what is this powerful tool called 'memory'? It is, to be sure, a 
complex entity. As Baddeley says, 'The use of a single term might seem to 
suggest that memory is a unitary system, albeit a complicated one ... [but] ... it is 
not one system but many.' 51 Perhaps more pertinently, memory is not simply 
many systems, these systems also serve multiple functions. A glance at the entry 
for 'memory' in the Dictionary of Psychology confirms this, giving, as all 
dictionaries must, a concise, dry definition:
Memory refers to one of the following: 1. The mental function of 
retaining information about stimuli, events, images, ideas, etc. after the 
original stimuli are no longer present. 52 2. The hypothesised 'storage 
system' in the mind/brain that holds this information. 3. The information 
so retained. 53
The entry goes on to remark that 'memorial processes are extremely complex and 
different memory tasks recruit different ones' 54 and as a result the term 'memory' 
frequently has an adjectival qualifier. For example, associative, autobiographical, 
biological, declarative, echoic, episodic, explicit, false, flashbulb, genetic, 
holographic, iconic, implicit, inaccessible ... the list is extensive. What are the 
functions of these theoretical mental processes?
Most psychologists, in whichever camp they have raised their flag, are 
agreed that there are many systems and sub-systems within 'memory'. This, of 
course, makes perfect sense, as even the most cursory examination of the mental
The Unicorn is driving a Mustang 34
processes of memory will show. The same meta-system that enables me to 
remember the Chip and Pin numbers for my credit cards, enables me to pick up 
cards and play Pinochle for the first time in thirteen years. The same meta- 
system that enables me to look at a collection of plastic squares and think 
'keyboard', enables me to recall the exquisite taste of a 'bug' 55 1 once ate on the 
island of Zanzibar. And the same system that breaks down and leaves me 
speechless when asked what my mobile telephone number is, provides me with 
vivid images of Charlie "Chum" Kane, who (or which? To write 'who' implies 
that Chum has an Aristotelian-style soul, that he has attributes which are not 
enjoyed by a corpse ...) is nothing but a fictional construct and as such I have no 
direct sensory stimuli data to retrieve when I think 'Charlie "Chum" Kane', j'ust 
as I had no stimulus when I encoded my images of him 56 Complex indeed, and 
certainly not unitary.
Modelling Memory
How to represent this myriad of functions? Model, model, model as the estate 
agent of the mind might say. (For examples of some of the models developed by 
psychologists to account for the possible relationships between the systems and 
sub-systems of memory, see Appendix 1.) These systems are, obviously, 
theoretical constructs which attempt to map what happens when I recall 'taste of 
bug' or 'PIN number'. They are three-dimensional representations of a two- 
dimensional entity, or, to quote Janet, a Euclidean point. The human desire to 
name and map, to establish spatial or temporal relations between things, it strikes 
me now, is in itself a higher order thought and as such, is perhaps an essential 
element of the thing it is trying to explicate. As a result it might be that the 
exercise is nothing but an exercise in tautology (as futile as the activity of 
dancing to architecture).37 The psychologists who devise these models are 
presenting representations of memory in which they construct networks of inter- 
relationships between the systems serving the different functions of working 
memory. What is interesting, for example, in section (a) of Johnson's MEM 
Model (see Appendix 1), is that it so clearly represents the spatial characteristic 
of memory, which appeals, I believe, to the 'folk'-concept of memory. That is, 
that some memories are 'buried', they lie deep within us, whilst other memories
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skitter about on the surface of our consciousness, serving fleeting purposes and 
then falling off and disappearing. (The 'storehouse' metaphor, mentioned above, 
also makes appeal to this desire to give spatial dimension to concepts of 
memory.)
A swift trawl through current theories of memory, or a glance at the 
dictionary entries mentioned above, or an examination of sections (b) and (c) of 
Johnson's MEM model, will reinforce the validity of the statement that memory 
serves many functions, yet has the characteristics of a discrete, unified entity. 
This leads, ipso facto, to the acknowledgement that these functions must be in 
some way co-ordinated, otherwise each act of memory would be reduced to a 
serial succession of simple, atomic or sub-atomic events, rather than the rich, 
textured, parallel representations that are conjured in various circumstances. 
Upon walking into a room where a vase of lilies sits on a table, I order (but not, 
apparently, serially) my visual perception data 'flower -nvhite -nvaxy -+lily 
but it's not all I do. Rosch et al. 58 have suggested that the memory performs 
categorical organisation at the point of encoding, and there exists a conceptual 
hierarchy within these categories. For example:
Conceptual 
hierarchy
Degree of cognitive 
accessibility
Flower
Lily
Tiger lily
Superordinate level
Basic level
Subordinate level
High
Low
So far, so obvious. This recollection may involve a number of functions of 
working memory, but it can hardly be called a rich, textured mental experience. 
What of the fact that if I walk into a room where there is a vase of lilies the words 
'death', 'grandmother', 'dust' immediately present themselves to me as signifiers
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of affective (emotional) mental states? I am not saying that I have not performed 
the retrieval tasks outlined above as I trace (the route of?) the conceptual 
hierarchy of 'lily'; of course I have. But I have also performed a number of other 
memory acts involving my episodic memory, my semantic memory and my 
associative memory at the very least, in order to arrive at the bundle of ideas and 
mental states that the visual perception of a vase of flowers triggers in me. 
('Triggers in me' - now, there's a get-out clause.) In terms of cognitive 
accessibility, it might even be said that these mental states are not accessed at all 
but constructed (or successively reconstructed) at the point of retrieving 'tiger 
lily'. So what is co-ordinating these acts and outcomes?
The Elf, the Homunculus and the Sharp-suited Executive
There are many interesting theories regarding this co-ordination but the 
constraints of time and space demand that I focus only on a few of them. Here, 
again, the 'folk' or popular concept of memory is relevant. I mentioned earlier 
the common notion of a Tolkienian mental elf scurrying around in the memory 
room, rootling about in image-filled boxes and mental filing cabinets. (There's 
no reason for there to be only one elf; it could be that there are many elves, 
hanging about, waiting to dig out one recollection or knowledge fragment or 
another, much like the sperm who hang about in Woody Alien's film, Everything 
You Ever Wanted to Know About Sex ..., waiting to be called upon.) This 
scenario is not only comforting in some strange way, but it is also conceptually 
manageable to those with only a passing knowledge of psychology - it answers 
the question 'what happens when I have a bundle of thoughts' without the 
interlocutor believing the answer. But for our purposes, we must leave the elves 
well alone.
The question remains: who or what is bundling up our perception data in 
such complex ways? Thomas succinctly summarises the problem which is 
looming, yet again, as the ever-present 'legitimate temptation to dualism'. 59 He 
goes on: 'I (as a whole person) am conscious of the things around me, but who is 
there to be aware of the things in me, to register my thoughts, and who 
manipulates my mental representations when I am actually thinking with them?60 
[. ] How can some inner I, some homunculus, be avoided?'61 Here we have a
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theory of elf as homunculus. Obviously, Thomas is deliberately employing 
'who' rather than 'what' in order precisely to appeal to the sense that there exists 
a dualism - the 'me' who experiences the 'outer' world, and the 'me' who 
experiences/reflects/generates the 'inner' world. Why? Because to ask 'what' 
manipulates/reflects/generates the inner world seems to be absurd, although the 
cognitive psychologist might answer 'a subsystem of memory', or the neuro- 
scientist might suggest that it is the stimulation of C-Fibres which results in the 
representation 'pain'. (And yet, I suspect, that this will not be a satisfactory 
answer to someone with seventy percent burns to their body as a result of being 
caught up in a terrorist bomb blast; the uttered word 'pain' would have cultural 
and semantic properties for the burns victim which is hardly reflected in this 
definition.) But this answer does not address the question of 'who' is aware of a 
representation, for, as Thomas remarks, 'a representation can scarcely be aware 
of itself, so someone must be aware of it. It cannot be the same 'person' who 
actively perceives the world - sees colour, tastes lemon juice etc. - because these 
representations and perceptions are an element of the person perceiving them. 62 
As Thomas says, 'a person is not just the container for mental representations'.63 
It would make more sense to say that the person is the accretion of those mental 
representations (which brings us back to the 'you are what you experience point 
of view') but this assertion fails to answer the question, who is bundling up my 
mental representations? The answer cannot be 'me', because that assertion fails 
to explain the causal relationship between my material body (eyeball - sight - 
rabid dog) and my mind (sight - rabid dog - fear). My mind says? instructs? 
shouts? 'run!' and a muscle system or two springs into action. What is the causal 
relationship? Could I just as usefully suggest: {material body (eyeball - sight - 
keyboard)} <->  {mind (sight - keyboard - creative writing)}? But I get ahead of 
myself...
Thomas suggests adopting Paivio's theory of Dual Coding64 as a way out 
of this mess. This theory proposes that there are 'distinct and quasi-independent 
formats for mental representation, two "codes" or representational systems',65 
verbal representation and representation in mental imagery. According to Paivio, 
mental imagery represents what an image is of, and in verbal representation, the 
mental word represents whatever it is a word for. In my opinion, the problem 
here, of course, is the description 'distinct and quasi-independent', otherwise
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known as having your cake and eating it. To propose two distinct codes - a 
dualist account of mental acts - and then collapse them into one by suggesting 
that they are 'quasi-independent', whatever that might mean, at one (or two) 
stroke(s) presents us either with two homunculi (or elves) and/or fails to explain 
who or what is aware of my mental acts.
For the cognitive psychologist, the question of who (or what) is bundling 
my mental images and representations into rich, texrured mental experiences, is 
easily answered: the central executive. If this answer seems to the reader to lack 
poetry, well it might. Particularly when the reader is informed that the central 
executive, in his Armani suit and sharply pressed Paul Smith shirt, is in the 
business of co-ordinating subsidiary slave systems in order to control working 
memory. 65 Baddeley67 outlines the current theories of what these slave systems 
might be - short-term memory, long-term memory, primary memory, short-term 
store, long-term store, buffer store ... one could go on. But one won't, for the 
simple reason that these terms and the theories and models they represent do 
indeed lack poetry. (An interesting point here is that Baddeley's seminal text, 
Human Memory, does not itself lack poetry. For example, the suggestion made to 
a subject with short-term memory dysfunction, that 'archbishops are made in 
factories', or the exchange between a researcher and a patient suffering frontal 
lobe damage: A: 'Can you think of anything you made at school that is striking?' 
B: 'An Australian wombat.' )68 The explicanda of the system theories to which 
these labels apply may well be cogent and workable explanations for how 
memory works, and there are many experimental findings which have been tested 
and retested to exhaustion and which can be said to arrive at proofs. I accept that 
these systems are involved when I am given a list often nonsense syllables to 
memorise and repeat at intervals, and that the rate of my memory decay can be 
measured as a result. However, I cannot accept that these accounts explain fully 
what is happening when I imagine Billy-Ray Rickman. 69 The slave systems may 
well play a part in this mental process of imagining but I cannot accept the 
argument that a combination of the outputs of these systems alone constitutes the 
elements of imagination, nor that this explains higher order conceptual acts. And, 
to be fair, Alan Baddeley acknowledges this:
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Suppose we accept that the process of remembering is accompanied by a 
rich and complex set of subjective cues. Does it matter? ... Is there not a 
danger that we are returning to the old swamp of introspectionism, with 
theory depending upon finer and finer distinctions that can only be made 
by the trained introspectionist? That is clearly a danger, although the 
success of studies using many subjects and simple discriminations 
suggests that it is not at present a major problem. Furthermore, even if the 
approach to the subjective aspects of cognition is full of pitfalls, it cannot 
be avoided if we wish to develop a psychology of cognition that is 
complete ... We have a long way to travel before we fully understand the 
fascinating but elusive phenomenon of conscious awareness, but the 
journey has begun. 70
The Benevolent Conductor
Science has, to an extent, failed us, so where to go from here? Having dismissed 
the elf, the homunculus and the sharp-suited executive, we come face to face with 
the flamboyant conductor, in his tails and cummerbund. Professor Nicholas 
Humphrey, in his article 'One-Self: A Meditation on the Unity of 
Consciousness' 71 , provides an elegant and - for me - satisfactory account of the 
subjective experience of consciousness (how could it be anything other than 
subjective?). Humphrey describes the experience of watching his days-old baby 
son flailing about in his crib, and the questions that experience triggers in him, 
the central question being, 'What kind of experience is he having of himself!' 11 
He watches his son and he imagines an orchestra tuning up ('a medley of single 
notes and snatches of melody, out of time, out of harmony'), waiting for the 
conductor to appear. Looking at his son once more, he sees hands clutching at 
the air, sees eyes trying to focus - and Humphrey reaches the conclusion that his 
son's 'conductor' is nowhere to be seen as yet; 'the sub-systems that will one day 
be a system have as yet hardly begun to acknowledge each other'.73 But if there 
is no conductor, then perhaps the baby has no sense of self, and if there is no self 
there can be no experiences, since there is 'someone' who has to experience - the 
experient. Yet Humphrey, unsurprisingly, rejects the sceptic notion that his son 
is non-conscious. The baby is, after all, seeing, hearing, touching and so on, and
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representations of these perceptions will be being encoded in his memory (as the 
psychologist might say). The father thinks of Frege's observation that 'the inner 
world presupposes the person whose inner world it is'. Fair enough, says 
Humphrey, but 'it seems to imply that all those "someones" that I recognise 
inside this boy - the someone who is looking, the someone who is acting, the 
someone who is remembering and so on - must all be genuine subjects of 
experience'. 74 Which leads to the conclusion that the baby is a collection of sub- 
selves - he is not yet one person, 'perhaps he is in fact many 1 . Which notion, 
Humphrey suggests, is not unfamiliar (I could say there is the someone who is a 
dimension of me who flicks open my Zippo and lights yet another Marlboro, and 
there is another who knows this is definitely a bad move). 75 However, this does 
not help Humphrey understand his son, since he believes that these sub-selves 
only come into existence when plugged into 'the main me\
And here's the nub of the matter for Humphrey: 'I won't say that, merely 
because I can't imagine it, it could make no sense at all to suppose that the baby 
has got all these conscious selves within him. But I will say I don't know what to 
say next.' 76
He is saved, however, by the realisation that 'the reason I can't imagine 
the baby's case is tied into that very phrase "I can't imagine it'". Every time the 
father tries to imagine the son as many sub-selves, the concept of 'baby' draws 
the sub-selves into one. Because each time he tries to imagine the baby's sub- 
selves, he imagines each set of experiences as his, Humphrey's. And as he says, 
'just to the extent that they are all mine, they are no longer separate'. 'Mine' - a 
possessive pronoun denoting ownership. 77 Humphrey then encounters the 
startling thought that whilst his experiences belong to him, are owned by him 
(just as Descartes' cogitationes belonged to Descartes), the baby's are not. 
'Maybe with the baby every experience that any of his sub-selves has is not yet
his.'
But then, in one of those familiar (and often agonising) clashes between 
sub-selves, Humphrey-as-father demands of Humphrey-as-philosopher, what the 
hell does he mean, that his experiences belong to him but his son's experiences 
do not belong to his son?
And this is when the conductor steps into the limelight and taps the stand 
(I 'see' a von Karajan-like creature, austere and Teutonic, wielding the baton).
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Yet Humphrey now begins to move away from his initial idea of the conductor 
as 'dominant authority', citing the fact that professional musicians (the sub- 
selves) often describe the conductor's role as being 'decorative'. He or she may 
well influence the interpretation of a symphony - "but that is not what gets the 
players to belong to each other'. We have returned to the notion of belonging, 
which is crucial to Humphrey's theory. 'What truly binds them into one organic 
unit and creates the flow between them is something much deeper and more 
magical: namely, the very act of making music - the fact they are involved 
together in creating a single work of art.' More, he now poses the question:
What makes the parts of a person belong together - if and when they do? 
The clear answer has to be that the parts will and do belong together Just 
in so far as they are involved in the common project of creating that 
person's life. 8
In Humphrey's words, the sub-selves (of which we are, interestingly, aware to 
some degree, at various times) 'have become co-conscious through "co- 
laboration'"79, a common project directed by a benevolent conductor, whose 
purpose it is to oversee the development of a conscious human being. It is the 
conductor who binds together the strands of thought pulled from the skein of 
active perceptions and mental representations which constitute our experience of 
the world. He can influence the style and interpretation of those strands, but he 
does not produce or modify the raw materials - the perceptions, if you like.
I can well imagine that scientists would balk at the notion of recourse to 
the 'magical'. My riposte is that anyone who can accepts what is essentially a 
flow diagram:
Living being
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right to snicker. If we concede the cognitive psychologists the right to attempt 
to map and model the unimaginable, then they must allow Humphrey his 
'magical', and (just in case Humphrey isn't scary enough) Ludwig Wittgenstein - 
a dominant Teutonic authority if ever there was one - his 'mystical'. In short, if 
we accept - as many psychologists do - that there are many higher-order mental 
events which occur of which we are unaware (that is, that we are not conscious 
of), then the theory regarding the benevolent dictator is as attractive an 
explanation as any other to answer the key question: who or what is bundling up
89my perception data in complex ways?
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AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY
Having slapped the cognitive psychologist on the wrist, I now have to go to him, 
cap in hand, and ask if I can borrow some of his theories and terminology 
regarding everyday memory, simply because they are commonly accepted by 
those who are interested in mental activity at this point in time, and remembering 
and imagining are - without doubt - mental activities. For my purposes here, I 
intend to focus on those established aspects of memory which, I believe, 
influence me as a writer. Why write'influence'me? I could also describe them 
as 'directing', 'informing' and 'guiding' me. It seems, prima facie, that to 
address only certain aspects of memory rather than the whole is erroneous - 
surely it makes sense to consider memory as a unitary (if complex) concept, 
particularly in the light of the fact that I am what I remember (that is, my concept 
of 'self and 'self-history' is generated by both long-term and short-term memory, 
and the various sub-systems existing within them)? Maybe it does - but then, it 
could be argued that to speak of 'autobiographical' memory is an absurd notion. 
If Janet cannot lose John because he is not hers to lose, and if no one can 
experience Gilbert Ryle's toothache other than Gilbert Ryle, then it is seems that 
to write of memory being anything other than autobiographical is absurd. (This 
argument extends the point made in the last section regarding the notion of 
possession.) My point being that my memory is precisely that - mine, just as 
Humphrey's sub-selves are his. But, as I argued above, 'we appear to be able to 
employ a language sufficiently well to discuss common mental experiences', and 
that is what I am doing here. My memories may be mine alone83 but I am 
confident that you will know what I mean when I talk about 'regretting', 'loving'
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or 'despising' because I believe that you have memories of experiencing similar 
affective mental states/feeling the same emotions* (*delete as applicable, 
according to your dispositions, which dispositions will exist as a result ofyour 
experiences - yes, we've wandered into a hall of cognitive mirrors...).
The term 'autobiographical memory' is commonly accepted to refer to the 
memory of experiences and events that form our personal history, our sense of 
self. As I have said, there seems to exist the problem that everything we 
remember could be described as autobiographical, but this is not what is meant by 
cognitive psychologists. Cohen provides a succinct definition:
The defining characteristic of autobiographical memory is its relationship 
to the self: The remembered events are of personal significance and are 
the building blocks from which the self is constructed. Paradoxically, the 
self is both the experiencer and the product of the experiences. 84
(This last sentence brings us back full circle to the problem of who is there to be 
aware of my thoughts, and at this point it might be best to wave to the conductor.)
Dimensions
Four main dimensions (yet another quasi-spatial concept) of autobiographical 
memory have been identified:
• First, the memory may consist of autobiographical facts ~ date and place 
of birth, given name, location of first school, etc. Interestingly, this 
dimension is often referred to as 'biographical' fact, which draws 
attention to the relationship between self and fact. I may know the date of 
my birth but it would be fanciful to suggest that I have a memory of the 
event, even though I was present and must have experienced it. And this 
is where Humphrey's theory of dispersed sub-selves is useful.
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The vividness of autobiographical memories may vary and, according to 
Brewer85 and others, this variation reflects the properties of the memory - 
is it a copy or a reconstruction? Copies are the more vivid and detailed, 
whilst reconstructions may incorporate elaborations and inferences 
which were not there at the point of encoding and thus they cease to be 
copies. Interesting to note here that Conway86 has suggested that 
autobiographical memories are 'actively reconstructed at retrieval and 
thus have a dynamic, changeable quality', bearing in mind that Cohen 
maintains that autobiographical memories are 'long-lasting, perhaps 
because the self-reference that is characteristic of these memories is 
known to promote recall'.87 Taken together, these characteristics imply 
that autobiographical memories are vivid, long-lasting, changeable and 
frequently recalled or revisited but, unlike the flashbulb memory (which is 
discussed later), this revisiting seems unlikely to be for the purposes of 
rehearsal.
Autobiographical memories may be specific or generic. For example, I 
may have a memory of sitting in a library and being disturbed by a dog 
which enters the building and selects my right foot on which to throw up a 
half-masticated blueberry muffin, which is a specific memory. I also have 
a generic memory of studying in libraries (a close relative of the schema 
we employ in everyday memory, which are also discussed later).
There are two potential perspectives from which autobiographical 
memories can be represented to ourselves: field and observer. The 
former perspective means that the memory is recalled from the point of 
view of the experiencer, in the field as it were. In the latter scenario, the 
memory is recalled from the perspective of an observer of the event; 
inevitably, these memories are going to be reconstructions because the 
experient is 'watching' the experient experience. Recent experiences are 
more likely to be recalled from a field perspective, and as such more 
likely to be copies. Temporally distant memories are more likely to be
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recalled from an observer point of view, and as such the emotional impact 
of these is diminished, as is recall of detail.
Functions
It is important to remember that 'memory', whilst it may be a unitary entity, is 
also extremely complex and a multitude of systems is involved even in the simple 
task of putting the cat out at night. To speak of autobiographical memory having 
a discrete set of functions is effectively to ignore the inter-relatedness that exists 
and the collaboration that occurs between the different sub-systems of memory as 
whole. Imagine a champagne fountain - the glasses are the sub-systems/sub- 
selves/subsidiary slave systems, each bearing a different load and tolerating 
different forces; the champagne bottle is the external world; the champagne that 
pours from it is the cascade of perceptions we have of the external world. The 
flow of liquid is the glittering, ever-changing account of the world and self we 
make to ourselves, constantly changing, constantly revised (re-seen, literally) but 
retaining a sense of whole. And each glass plays a part in creating that fountain. 
The analogy is a sound one: for (vide Rylean categories), if one were to ask 
'where is the fountain?', the answer could not be 'there, in the bottle', or 'there, 
in the champagne', or 'there, in the glasses'. The fountain is the sum of its parts 
and more - the Aristotelian notion of Form perfectly realised. Such is the form of 
'autobiographical memory' - autobiographical memory is (if you like but most
OQ
psychologists won't) to memory what champagne is to champagne fountain. 
However, despite the fact that it is a near-impossible task to disassociate 
autobiographical memory from the Gordian knot that is 'memory' in order to 
describe its functions, that's precisely what I shall attempt now to do.
As Baddeley remarks,89 'Relatively little research has been done on the 
rich and complex strategies and tactics we use every day to interrogate our 
memory systems', and as a result there are few hard and fast rules regarding it. 
Nevertheless some functions are universally agreed upon:
• Autobiographical memory is essential to developing both intrapersonal 
and interpersonal relationships; it is the central generator of personal 
history and identity. Total amnesia (a rare condition) leaves the patient
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without history and, thus, without identity. Baddeley describes the 
appalling effect of this condition on a patient, Clive Wearing, an 
accomplished musician and conductor, which resulted from a case of 
encaphalitis. Not only does he have no past, he is also unable to learn 
anything (as if the champagne has frozen in a moment), because he has no 
memory. He describes (he has not completely lost his language) his 
condition as 'Hell on earth. It's like being dead - all the bloody time'. 90 
His wife recently wrote an account of their life together for the past 
twenty years, and was interviewed on BBC Radio 4 about the book 91 She 
described the effect of the amnesia as 'overnight he lost his mind' and 
later she said 'his "now" is gone'. With no memory Clive Wearing has no 
past, present or future and no sense of self. However, he has not lost his 
musical ability, which is but slightly impaired.
(An aside here: When Clive Wearing was in hospital during his 
illness, the doctor would say to him, 'Mr Wearing, please open your 
eyes', over and over again but there was no response. However, when his 
wife said, 'Darling, look at me', the patient opened his eyes. His wife's 
fascinating interpretation of this is that 'the heart and the mind are entirely 
separate entities'.)
Autobiographical memory is also essential to establishing and 
maintaining relationships with others, in the realm of the inter-personal. 
As Cohen says, 'People become friends by exchanging narratives'. 92 If I 
meet with a friend for a drink, and he asks 'What are you doing now?' I 
don't answer 'Having a drink with you in the pub'. I say, 'Writing the 
next novel', or 'Decorating the bathroom', or 'Despairing of my life'; of 
the three answers only the last refers to 'now' (most likely as a result of 
doing the first two). Experiences are compared and/or shared, stories are 
told, states of mind are disclosed. It is unlikely I would say 'I am 
unhappy' without going on to explain what has happened to bring about 
that mental state. (This relates closely to the subject of scripts and 
schema, discussed below.)
If the notation 'intrapersonal and interpersonal' seems familiar, it 
may be because you are reminded of intranet and internet networks, and 
you would be right to be so. Cognitive psychologists, interested as they
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are in modelling and creating computer programs to model the mind, 
often make direct analogy between computer and mind. Indeed, a great 
deal of the research that has been done regarding memory has sprung 
from the investigation of the storage properties of mind and computer.
• Autobiographical memory is also used for problem-solving. 
Problems, as we all know, come in many shapes and sizes.
1. You stay overnight with a friend who asks in the morning, 
'Tea or coffee?' and you remember that you like both but you 
prefer to drink tea first. A simple choice with few 
consequences.
2. You return home on a freezing evening and manage to snap 
your front door key off in the lock. After a bout of cursing, 
you try to recall if this has happened before and what you did - 
wait next door for your partner, look for an open window, 
punch out a pane of glass, and you act accordingly. Perhaps 
you cut yourself the last time, breaking the glass, so you elect 
to wait it out next door. A practical problem of short duration 
with a limited number of possible solutions.
3. You are aware of sinking ever deeper into the quicksand of 
financial debt. Having decided to halt the slide, you are then 
faced with a number of choices and to solve the problem you 
plan a series of meetings with various advisers. A complex 
problem the solution to which will involve a review of how 
you have arrived in this state, the setting up of repayment 
schemes and quite possibly a change of behaviour over a long 
period of time.
4. You are married with children and realise that you are deeply 
unhappy; you can stay in a loveless marriage, or leave. A 
yes/no state of affairs. You are likely to spend a long time 
arriving at a decision. You may disclose your state of mind to 
friends and discuss possible outcomes. You may recall past 
years and to try to trace the deterioration of the relationship. 
You may attempt to imagine what your future will be like, as a
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single parent, but you only have the memories of being a 
married parent to help inform these imaginings. You may try 
to recall articles you have read, conversations you have had 
with friends who are single parents. You arrive at a decision. 
A complex problem the solution to which is a simple binary 
decision, a decision informed by past experiences and future 
projections.
Autobiographical memory plays multiple roles in all these scenarios, 
which involve recall, planning, disclosure etc. It gives us our past and our 
possible futures, whilst working furiously in the present. The woman 
planning on leaving (or staying with) her husband uses her fund of 
memories to project into a possible future (unknown) landscape. In the 
distance is a trig point named 'happiness' and there are an infinite number 
of possible paths to reach that point. The path she chooses will be 
dictated by her autobiographical memories (with the possible exception of 
other's accounts of being single parents -1 shall return to this situation, 
that of appropriating other people's experiences later).
Planning is another function of autobiographical memory, not unrelated to 
the case of the unhappy wife mentioned above. Most people would argue 
that there is a qualitative difference between planning a route through a 
shopping mall to purchase a bayonet light bulb and an OS map of Latvia 
in the shortest possible time; planning a family holiday in Latvia; and 
planning to leave your husband before the plane flies to Riga. These 
plans may be in some way qualitatively different (when measured by the 
consequence of failure, possibly. If it takes three and a half hours to 
complete the trip to the mall only to discover you've forgotten to buy the 
light bulb, that is irritating. If you wake in a hotel in Riga and realise you 
forgot to leave your husband, well, that would be intriguing. 93 ) 
Nevertheless, whilst there may be qualitative differences, all acts of 
planning involve autobiographical memory. 'Planning depends on 
memory. Knowledge derived from past experience and stored in long-
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term memory must be retrieved and used in formulating possible plans, 
and in constructing representations of hypothetical events.' 94
Belief systems, prejudices, likes and dislikes are also dependent on the 
operations of autobiographical memory. If you are what you have 
experienced in the past, then how could it be other? If you were once 
violently sick after eating a live oyster, it is unlikely you'll eat another. 
(Behaviourists will describe this as learned avoidance behaviour - fair 
enough, but the lesson had to be learned and knowledge stored.) 
Interestingly, memories of enjoyable events, the eating of bugs in 
Zanzibar, for example, not only will encourage me to eat seafood should I 
ever find myself in Stonetown again, but will also be recalled more 
vividly than unpleasant events. This is outcome - of favouring the 
positive - is governed by the delightfully named Pollyanna Principle.
Noetic and Autonoetic Memory
Without memory we would be bereft. We would have no sense of self, no 
language and no means of ordering and systematising thoughts and experiences 
to arrive at value-laden concepts of the world. Memory is the tool we use to 
construct identity, culture and comprehension. Two memory systems which are 
central to generating these skills are episodic memory and semantic memory. In 
your episodic memory filing cabinet (or subsidiary slave system) you store your 
memories for events (time, location, encounters, outcomes etc.), objects, people 
and so on, and these are sorted by chronological (you have a lifetime for this) and 
spatial (as Spike Milligan said, 'everyone has to be somewhere') criteria. These 
memories have you as their source - your experience of the world. Semantic 
memories are stored in the cabinet labelled 'General Knowledge About The 
World' and these inter-related concepts are distributed amongst the various 
schema (see below) and categories of memory. 95 For example, 'boiling water' 
could be stored in your framework of understanding of physics, and/or your 
understanding of pain, should you spill it on your bare foot. Thus, semantic 
memory is abstracted from experience, it is not the experience itself. As such its 
source is not you, the source is the world, or objective reality, if you like. (The
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episodic memory of the boiling water would be 'the time I burned my foot'; the 
semantic memory could be 'caution', or 'burned skin blisters' and so on.) 
Obviously, if the source of semantic memory is the world, then encounters with 
other people is a part of that world and knowledge derived from those encounters 
is stored in the semantic cabinet.
Tulving has identified within episodic memory a further distinction. 
Memories about which we have no knowledge of when or where they happened 
to us, he calls noetic. So, for example, my falling through a cucumber frame and 
cutting my eyelid open when aged three is an episode I know happened (because 
I have a scar, because my mother told me so), but I have no context in which to 
put it. I can't remember anything about it. But ask me about my dinners in 
primary school, and I can conjure the smell, the noise, my uniform, the strange, 
wildly coloured aluminium water jugs... it's an experiential memory, set slap- 
bang in my context. This is an autonoetic memory.
This distinction, between autonoetic and noetic memories, is, for me, an 
important one. In order to illustrate the finer qualities of each memory system, I 
have taken it upon myself to modify Tulving's model slightly (see over, page 52). 
What attracts me to this model of memory is the stress Tulving places on the 
degree of consciousness involved in the encoding of autonoetic and noetic 
memories. In effect, he is saying that we have a high degree of awareness when 
we encode the experience of specific events, of meeting people, of highly 
emotionally charged moments, etc. Inferences from these memories filter 
through to semantic memory, and our awareness of the origin of these memories 
can become blurred, as we are less aware of this genesis of new interpretations of 
the world. As always, with any discussion of memory, it must be remembered 
that the word 'distinction' is misleading because the interrelatedness of the 
various categories of memory mitigates against clearly defined boundaries to 
each system. As Cohen says of episodic/semantic memories, 'the two forms of 
knowledge are not separate, compartmentalised structures, but are in an 
interactive and inter-dependent relationship'. 97 Hence the arrows denoting the 
interaction between different systems of memory; gateways through which 
information flows, constantly changing, reviewing and modifying itself.
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RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MEMORY SYSTEMS AND 
CONSCIOUSNESS
MEMORY SYSTEM CONSCIOUSNESS DEGREE OF 
CONSCIOUSNESS
EPISODIC:
Dependent on 
awareness
AUTONOETIC
Dependent on 
awareness
PROCEDURAL:
Ability to perform task
with no evidence of
awareness of source of
information
ANOETIC:
No awareness; no need 
to remember how: e.g.
riding a bike
ADAPTED FROM A SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM OF THE RELATIONS 
BETWEEN MEMORY SYSTEMS AND DEGREE OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
(TULVING, 1985).
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(Nota Bene)
It is important to stress here that autobiographical memory is defined as being 
'distinct from memories of other people's experiences, memories of public 
events, general knowledge, and skills', in short it is purely autonoetic. The 
reason I stress this is because I will later be challenging this notion, in terms of 
myself as writer.
Schema and Scripts
Since the early 1930s, following the publication of Remembering, by Frederic 
Bartlett, there has been agreement amongst psychologists that schema play an 
important role in the organisation and structure of the subsystems of memory- 
or, to put it differently, how we order our thoughts. Because order them, we do. 
We all know we do, we do it all the time. We spend our days, morning, noon and 
night, shuffling from bed to kitchen, to car, to office, to pub, to bed, and all the 
time we experience the world and we order it. We sit with a coffee in the kitchen 
and make lists of 'Things to do/buy', 'People to email/phone' etc. We sit in our 
cars in traffic jams, ejecting sexual fantasy tapes from our mental video 
machines. We march into the lecture theatre, face the students and our minds 
empty of all thought. We write letters to friends who have been bereaved. Some 
of us write novels. And we have schema for all of the above. Schema are 
frameworks which impose organisation and grouping on received information 
and knowledge and they serve a number of functions: they ensure that we store 
information economically; they enable us to conduct social lives; they are 
essential to our semantic memory; and they provide us with story grammar.
(I have an image of a dodecahedron of chicken wire - let's call it 'schema 
for going to a restaurant' - and as I experience all the chicken tikkas and pigeon 
roulades of years, I slap strips of experience, papier mache-style, over the mesh, 
and the dodecahedron becomes increasingly substantial. The facets of the object 
are known yet variable - Italian food, paying with credit card, search for taxi etc., 
and if they are not, there are default values on which I can rely. For example, if 
someone tells me he ate a Macdonald's the night before, I know he didn't use a
linen napkin.)
Economic storage of pre-stored and new knowledge is important because 
it makes retrieval of knowledge faster and more efficient, as well as enabling us
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to infer. As Cohen points out, we do not need to store the knowledge that 'Julius 
Caesar had a mother', we infer the fact from our semantic knowledge store. 98 
More, we assume others would agree with the assertion. Indeed, Platonic 
syllogism relied on precisely this form of manipulated knowledge.
In my autobiographical memory there exist vast numbers of schema - for 
watching a play, for seduction, for writing a PhD thesis, for doing my laundry ... 
the list is endless. Schank and Abelson" label some of these schema as 'scripts' 
which represent social interaction. If someone were to ask me to join them for 
lunch at the Hotel du Vin in Bristol, I would not appear at the table dressed in 
swimming costume, snorkel and fins. If they asked me to join them at the beach 
bar in the Coco Reef Hotel in Tobago, I just might (although the fins would be, if 
not entirely inappropriate, inconvenient). These scripts suggest that we are, as it 
were, actors playing on well-known, well-worn stages in familiar scenes, reading 
from well-known scripts. 10°
Schema do not represent semantic knowledge, they are not the knowledge 
itself but without them it would not be possible to acquire an understanding of the 
meaning of higher order concepts and language because our semantic knowledge 
is derived by extraction from personal experience, governed by experience. The 
understanding of words and concepts such as 'plot', 'theme', 'style', 
'hermeneutic', can only be arrived at, I would argue, by a process of distillation 
followed by reduction rather than by pure abstraction alone. For example, there 
is no point asking me when I understood the word 'phenomenological' (if indeed 
I do), because the process took place over time. 101 There is no moment in time I 
could point to and say, 'I remember understanding the word "phenomenological" 
therf; rather, my understanding is the result, I would argue, of repeated 
encounters with the word in various contexts. These encounters lead to an 
accretion of small understandings, if I may call them that, which have as much to 
do with my understanding what phenomenology is not as understanding what it 
is. Interestingly, a semanticist would describe her work as investigating the ways 
in which meaning influences how people think and what they do, as well as 
determining what is culturally significant about the semantics of a language. 
Which is a pretty good definition of the function of schema in autobiographical 
memory when we are discussing words such as 'phenomenology', 'theme' or
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'style'. It is as well to remember, however, that schema also enable us to perform 
simple, repetitive tasks, such as making a cup of coffee.
MOPs and TOPs
Not everyone considers the theory of schema and scripts adequate to explain the 
phenomenon of how we retrieve memories to enable us to cope (usually 
faultlessly) with thousands of situations. For example, Schank102 argues that the 
sheer number of scripts and schema we would have to store to deal with such 
disparate scenarios as writing a novel or dealing with a burglar, is uneconomic. 
As a result, he has generated (yet another) model for working memory, which he 
claims reflects its dynamism, flexibility and efficiency. I intend to focus only on 
two aspects of his theory: MOPs and TOPs. 103 Essentially he argues that 
memories are stored at many levels of generality, and the higher-level generalised 
event representations he labels Memory Organisation Packets (MOPs). Each 
MOP is related to others, and draws upon them to create a memory of an event. 
If you recall your car breaking down on a motorway, the memory will involve 
recall of weather MOPs, communication MOPs and so on. This is evident from 
the way conversation uses cues to remind us of events: 'The time we broke down 
on the M4 and it was snowing? Remember? When neither of us had our mobiles 
with us? And the AA man was caught up in the jam from that accident we 
passed?'
Operating at even higher levels, Schank proposes, are Thematic 
Organisation Points (TOPs). These representations are effectively abstract 
concepts, such as 'avoiding failure', 'achieving success', 'supporting your 
partner', 'making judgements' etc. They enable us to recognise similarities and 
establish analogies between events. If you were to read in the paper that a rapist 
had been sentenced to eighteen months in prison, and on the same day a woman 
who had robbed men after sedating them with a date rape drug had been given a 
five year sentence, then your TOPs would kick in and arrive at an opinion about 
this state of affairs and the state of the judicial system. TOPs are unconsciously 
developed in tandem with the development of semantic knowledge (and are, 
therefore, anoetic) which, in turn, is derived from personal, subjective experience 
of the world. It seems to me that they also have a motivational aspect to them, as
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if they are developed in order to try to close the gap between what you are and 
what you aspire to be (pulling together past, present and future, as it were).
Story Grammar
Finally, there is the role that schema play in the generation of story grammar. 
Neisser104 maintains that schema 'govern the format for story-telling' and that 
many of our memories are encoded according to narrative conventions 
generated by schema. Let us not forget Cohen's statement that 'people become 
friends by exchanging narratives', that we tell stories of our lives to enhance 
inter-personal relationships. This certainly seems to be the case; consider the 
following telephone conversations:
Andy: Hi, how you doing?
Bob: Oh, alright, considering I wasted an hour this afternoon waiting to
see a doctor.
Andy: Oh - what's wrong?
Bob: I've got an itch in an embarrassing place.
Andy: And?
Bob: Nothing wrong, really. I've got some cream and it should clear up
in a week.
And:
Andy: Hi, how you doing?
Bob: Oh, alright, considering I wasted an hour this afternoon waiting to
see a doctor.
Andy: Oh-what's wrong?
Bob: I've got an itch in an embarrassing place.
Andy: And?
Bob: Well, he's not sure what it is. He's made an appointment for me to
see a specialist.
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Two different simple stories are being told by Bob, the first is resolved, the 
second is not. Even with these simple stories, a lot of schema work is going on. 
At a meta-level (activated MOPs), both Andy and Bob understand how to have 
conversations on the telephone and the staccato-style sentence structure that is 
used. Andy knows that it is irritating to waste an hour at the doctor's and - 
because of the default values of his schema - he also knows that Bob probably 
spent the time texting on his mobile, reading old, tatty magazines and glancing at 
every person who entered and left the surgery. Andy knows Bob was bored. 
Andy also knows that there might be serious consequences relating to the itch and 
he understands that it is a delicate matter. (Perhaps he has suffered something 
similar?) If Andy is a good friend, then he will be relieved that Bob will recover 
in a week, or he will be worried about the scenario of the specialist. And he will 
remember to call again when Bob has seen the specialist - because the story is 
unresolved. I'm not suggesting that Andy will call because he wants to hear a 
ripping yarn, involving hypodermics and STDs, but, rather, that he will call 
because Bob's story isn't finished and he has some emotional investment in the 
outcome. 105
In the context of memory, most cognitive psychologists agree that there 
are two kinds of schema which operate when stories are read (or told) - event 
schema and story schema. The distinction between them is plain: event schema 
activate knowledge about subjects which will inform understanding of a 
narrative. If I read Zola's Germinal, prior knowledge I have about mining, about 
France's turbulent political past, about the trade union movement and the 
bourgeoisie will all be activated. Story schema, on the other hand, support and 
inform our understanding of how stories are structured. They are abstract and 
content-free schema and their role is to shape our expectations of a story as they 
'incorporate knowledge of story structure that reflects the existence of a story 
grammar'. 106 Because of this last, they are only useful when the reader 
encounters traditional stories or novels; they cannot function when experimental 
text is encountered. And by experimental text, I don't mean A Clockwork 
Orange, which may be demanding as a text, but only at the level of 
decoding/learning (hmm, interesting ...) Burgess' neologisms, the language of 
nadsat. Story schema do not support or inform the reading of Joyce's Ulysses, 
for example, because Joyce is operating with a story grammar - or, rather
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operating in the absence of conventional story grammar - that the reader doesn't 
recognise.
What is interesting about theories of narrative schema as propounded by 
psychologists is that they are exactly the same as the theories propounded by 
literary theorists, literary critics, primary school teachers, linguists, semioticians, 
semanticists, creative writing lecturers ... and so on. We agree. We all agree. A 
rare convergence amongst so many academics, each pursuing their own agenda. 
Roughly, story grammar is:
Story (setting + theme + plot + resolution)
Setting (characters + location + time)
Theme (goal)
Plot (episodes)
Episode (event + reaction)
Resolution (event or state)
Goal (desired state)
As it happens, J. M. Mandler, a cognitive psychologist outlined these 'rewrite 
rules' as he described them,107 but I am sure we all recognise these elements of 
narrative, even if we prefer to call them 'titles for lectures to be given in 
undergraduate creative writing course'. Cohen maintains that these rewrite rules 
'generate a hierarchical tree structure with subordinate nodes branching out from 
the superordinate node (Story)'. 108 And this is where I must part company with 
Cohen because the focus of her scholarly attention (memory for texts) is different 
from mine (memory for writing texts). But it would seem that there is a 
consensus for the view that we all recognise a good story when we hear one. 
One aspect of any theory concerning grammar that intrigues me is the 
debate (OK, there isn't complete consensus) between those who consider 
grammar to be an element of innate or a priori knowledge (Chomsky being the 
heavyweight in the blue comer) and those who consider it to be learned or a 
posteriori knowledge (see Piaget limbering up in the red corner). The two points 
of view are most succinctly summarised as being that either we are born with a 
deep grammatical structure in place, or our understanding and eventual command 
of the rules of grammar are learned as a result of developing cognition. I have to
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say here that I am drawn towards the nativist (Chomskian) point of view, 
although I could not say why. Perhaps because if it is possible to argue that we 
are born with an innate knowledge of grammatical structure, then it might be 
possible to say that we are born with a knowledge of story grammar? This 
appeals to me. I know that there are those who will point to Miss Smith, the 
primary school teacher, repeating the mantra 'A story must have a beginning, a 
middle and an end' to a classroom full of seven year olds, as if the children don't 
realise this. But they do -just because the class has produced twenty-nine 
different stories that don't conform to the rules of story grammar (and, q.e.d., 
twenty-nine stories which are unsatisfying, as well as being unsatisfactory) it 
doesn't follow that the children don't understand story grammar. They do, they 
simply don't have the capacity to translate the rules into successful narratives. 
In his Aspects of the Novel, E. M. Forster describes the story as a 'low 
atavistic form', which seems a little harsh yet may be true. He argues that the 
story (for which read, awareness of story grammar),
is immensely old - goes back to neolithic times, perhaps to paleolithic. 
Neanderthal man listened to stories, if one may judge by the shape of his 
skull. The primitive audience was an audience of shock-heads, gaping 
round the camp-fire, fatigued with contending against the mammoth or 
the woolly rhinoceros, and only kept awake by suspense. What would 
happen next? The novelist droned on, and as soon as the audience 
guessed what happened next they either fell asleep or killed him. 109
At first it would seem that there are problems with this - not least Forster's 
eliding of hundreds of years of research by anthropologists and sociologists to 
arrive at the conclusion that Neanderthal man enjoyed an innate knowledge of 
story grammar. Forster compiled the series of lectures which were eventually 
published as Apects of the Novel in 1926 and things have moved on a little since 
then. But interestingly he may have had a case. Recent research indicates that 
one of the significant differences between Neanderthal (Middle Palaeolithic) and 
Upper Palaeolithic man was the development of Broca's area in the brain, which 
became 'a vital part of the human brain's "language organ'", as Matt Ridley 
points out. uo A theory is beginning to evolve, amongst neuro-scientists,
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psychologists and linguists alike, that 'human language was originally transmitted 
by gesture, not speech'.' l ' At first this may seem to be no big deal but consider 
this: hand gestures can mimic both objects and motions, can mimic 'bird' and 
'stone thro wing'. Nouns and verbs. The former are found in the temporal lobe, 
the latter in the frontal lobe of the brain and it is Broca's area - the language 
organ - that bridges them, across the Sylvian fissure. 'It was their coming 
together that transformed a prototype of symbols and signs into a true 
grammatical language.'' 12 Indeed, it would seem that speech did not occur in 
human beings until 70,000 years ago (a comparatively recent development in 
anthropological terms), perhaps in response to the desire to communicate in the 
dark (although even this conclusion is being challenged; see the developments in 
the theories concerning Homo neanderthalensis) 113 So, given the ability to 
mimic, to develop tools (with our new, long, oppositional thumbs) and to speak 
we could make to ourselves symbols, 'so that the mind could represent within 
itself. Linguist Terence Deacon argues that 'early human beings combined their 
ability to imitate114 with their ability to empathise and came up with an ability to 
represent ideas with arbitrary symbols'. 115 Ridley remarks of these combined 
abilities, that they
brought the thoughts of other minds together: they externalised memory. 
They enabled people to acquire far more from their social surroundings 
than they could ever hope to learn from themselves. 116
Or, to put it another way, they began to develop a (shared) semantic memory. 
Which brings us back to Forster and his shock-heads. Forster made the point that 
story-telling involves an understanding of the notion of'there, then' as well as the 
'here, now', an awareness which, surely, would have developed in tandem with 
the externalisation of memory, that is, semantic memory.
Taking as a starting point Forster's here/now and there/then maxim, I 
would like to suggest that the following might adequately illustrate the 
development of the capacity for semantic memory over thousands of years 
(perhaps as a result of the bridging of the temporal and frontal lobes).
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AUTONOETIC
EPISODIC
NOETIC
SEMANTIC
UNDER-DEVELOPED 
EPISTEMC
AWARENESS
HIGHLY DEVELOPED
EPISTEMC
AWARENESS
HOMO SAPIENS 
NEANDERTHALENSIS ——— *
PALEAEOLITfflC
MAN
—— *> HOMO SAPIENS SAPIENS 
HOMO SAPIENS FICTUS?
One last excursion into the realm of Upper Palaeolithic man is needed 
before returning to the twenty-first century. The art of the era, in fact, takes many 
forms but the best known is cave painting. In the caves of Cantabrian Spain, the 
French Pyrenees and the Perigord area there exist many extraordinary panels 
depicting animals and humans in charcoal and pigment-based media. Not only 
these, but also non-figurative representations either carved or painted (strangely 
reminiscent of Australian Aboriginal art - echoes of Jung's collective
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unconsciousness...). The caves chosen for the art work appear to have been 
selected for their acoustic properties and it has been suggested that some of these, 
such as the Salon Noir at Niaux, may have served as sanctuaries, or places of 
communal activity. Indeed, there is speculation that Upper Palaeolithic man 
sang, perhaps vocalising cosmogonic myths.' 17 At this point we must seek out 
the anthropologist rather than the psychologist for illumination.
The cave paintings have been minutely studied, and many anthropologists 
and linguists believe that there is a narrative grammar to be found in the 
depictions. The structure of the narrative may not immediately be obvious to us, 
accustomed as we are to the conventions of DC Marvel comics, the narrative 
continuum of the cartoon panel in Japanese Manga comics or Anime epics, or, 
come to that, Renaissance frescoes (for example, Michelangelo's 1504 cartoon 
'Battle of Cascina' - inevitable, really, that // divino would reappear). The word 
'cartoon', from the Italian cartone (pasteboard), originally meant not saccharine 
Disney but a sketch of a full-sized scheme used as a model (which sounds 
familiar) for a work to be executed. Notwithstanding our changed expectations 
of story grammar, there is both meaning and narrative structure to be found in the 
cave art of Upper Paleolithic man. How do the anthropologists account for this?
In the nineteenth century Sir Edward Burnett Tylor (1832-1917), an 
expert in archaic cultures, argued that myths are based on a form of psychological 
delusion because archaic man could not distinguish between subjective (ideal or 
autonoetic) and objective (real or noetic) reality. 118 Tylor therefore described the 
mentality of the cavewoman wielding her hairy brush as she mixed spit and 
pigment, as pre-logical - which seems fair enough, given Descartes, Leibniz and 
Spinoza, the herald angels of the Enlightenment, were still thirty thousand years 
down the time-line. Tylor, however, insisted that despite the fact her 
understanding of the world was illogical, the myths and stories the cavewoman 
shared with her peers nevertheless had moral value. (This assertion seems, at 
first blush, itself to be an illogical step. But consider the fact that the Palaeoliths 
performed burial rituals, as did Neanderthals before them. From this we can infer 
that they had a concept of after-life, possibly a simple cosmology and - in order 
to justify the effort expended - empathy for those bereaved.) Friedrich Max 
Miiller (1823-1900), a German academic also writing in the nineteenth century, 
developed a theory about the historical development of language in the light of
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his studies of the Vedic texts of ancient India. 119 He concluded that the 
mythologies of ancient man did not represent real heroes, real Gods or real 
actions; rather, myths were the product of a confusion of human language arising 
from the attempt to give expression to natural phenomena (storms, thunder, 
drought, birth etc.) through visual and sensual images. Again, the sense of 
delusion/confusion reflects pre-logical understanding. The British 
anthropologist, R. R. Marett, writing in the twentieth century, argued that myths 
and their associated symbolic ceremonies arose from emotional responses to the 
environment, which was manifested in dance and ritualised gestures, and these 
birthed oral narrative myth. 12°
I would like to suggest here that these 'confusions' can be accounted for if 
we accept that at that point in time - roughly 30,000-10,000 years ago - the 
distinction between episodic memory and semantic memory was not as strong for 
archaic man as it is for us. Or, to put it another way, his faculty for epistemic 
awareness (that is, knowing what we know and being able to make judgements 
about the accuracy of what we know) was not fully developed.
Turning to Claude Levi-Strauss, we find that he says of myth that it 
represents a third level of linguistic usage beyond surface narrative and its 
underlying structures (are we encountering once again Janet's notion of the Alpha 
mind? The higher order concepts of which we are unaware?). More, Levi- 
Strauss thinks that language patterns and the repeated structure of myths 
demonstrate that there is a common framework underpinning all human life 
across thousands of years and this belief has much in common with the nativist 
point of view expounded by Chomsky - that we are born with deep grammatical 
structures in place, which inform our understanding of narrative. The fact that we 
cannot discern a familiar (post-logical) narrative pattern in the cave paintings 
does not entail that the paintings do not have a story grammar. Perhaps it is 
simply that we no longer have the capacity to imagine pre-logical mentality?
There is, finally, one last aspect of Palaeolithic man's art that makes me 
consider the possibility that the cave artist understood the rudiments of 'story' if 
not plotting, as we know it. Because it would seem that not only did he have a 
grasp of 'there, then' as well as 'here, now' (given there would hardly have been 
herds of bison and ibex roaming in his darkened cave, acting as models for his 
representation), he was also able to toy with the notion 'what if?', which is a is
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far more sophisticated notion. In order to answer the question 'what if?' it is 
necessary to be able to construct representations of hypotheticals, and as we 
know, that requires the retrieval and manipulation of semantic knowledge and 
noetic memories derived from past experience. How can we say that the cave 
artist must have squatted on his haunches and pondered what ifs? Because not 
only did he represent the figurative and non-figurative in paint on rock, he also 
represented the imaginary (or, as Sartre might say, the not-given). In the Lascaux 
cave system, near Montignac in south west France, there's a unicorn painted on 
the wall. 121
Perhaps Plato was right when he opined that humanity is trapped in a 
cave, mistaking shadows on the wall for reality?
Schema-Plus-Tag
Most of the examples cited both by psychologists and myself, in order to provide 
evidence to support the theories of schema and scripts, are deathly dull. Putting 
the cat out at night, making a cup of coffee, writing a list, yawn, yawn, yawn ... Is 
this life? you may ask. Well, yes, sadly it is. Which is why cognitive 
psychologists concentrate on such things, because, guided by Neisser's ecological 
validity principle, they are trying to establish how memory works in everyday 
life, rather than exclusively in the laboratory. As we know, schema are 
frameworks which impose organisation and grouping on received information 
and knowledge; they help us to get through the day. Many actions we perform 
become effectively automatic because we have faith in our schema. How many 
times have you driven to a distant destination and had no memory of driving? 
I'm not saying you have no memory of the journey itself but that you have no 
memory of driving. But - thank goodness - there is an exception to this 
relentless monotony of recourse to well-worn schema. The tag.
A few years ago I sat in an Indian restaurant with a group of five friends 
and we ordered ... what we always order. Six beers arrived, we drank, we began 
to exchange narratives. So far, so schema. I am, unfortunately, rather deaf, so I 
was unaware of a commotion behind me and the first I knew of it was a chair 
flying past my left ear and crashing into the window. Non-script event. I turned 
to see a man being wrestled to the floor, as a chef of South East Asian appearance
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flew up the stairs from the basement, brandishing a meat cleaver. Definitely non- 
script and no default values kicking in. The Asian man clambered on the back of 
the victim and began to whack him with the meat cleaver. I'm watching this 
scene and no amount of frantic retrieval of past experiences is helping me decide 
what to do. Blood begins to flow and other waiters are drawn into the violence. 
Interestingly, reflecting on that incident now, I begin to think that perhaps past 
experiences did inform my decision to stand up and go over to separate the Asian 
man from the blood-spattered ex-customer (as it turned out), then to separate the 
Asian man from the meat cleaver. I think now, that my belief systems (informed 
by my TOPs) encouraged me to believe that, being a woman, it was unlikely that 
I would be hurt. Also, I think I believed that the situation was fundamentally 
unfair - if you want to fight, put down the axe and put up your fists. A very 
British view, I suppose, and one that might be described as culturally significant.
The point is, I recall this event in detail, right down to the tear in the 
ornate waistcoat worn by a waiter. This event is a fine example of schema (going 
to a restaurant with friends) plus tag (near-murder).
If all this sounds irritatingly over-familiar, I apologise. 'It's not schema 
plus tag!' I hear you cry. This is all stale buns. Aristotle did it years ago.' And 
of course, he did. Because schema-plus-tag is but a variant on the Aristotelian 
notion ofperipeteia, that is, a sudden reversal of circumstances. So in what way 
does the account of schema-plus-tag vary from peripeteia, if indeed it does? 
What exactly is the relationship between self, memory and narrative? The time 
has come to reverse the dialectic and address the effect narrative has on memory 
and self.
The Unicom is driving a Mustang 66
SO?
In his Making Stories: law, literature and life, 122 Jerome Bruner, suggests that we 
'should not write off [the] power of story to shape everyday experience as simply 
another error in our human effort to make sense of the world, though cognitive 
scientists are sometimes wont to do this.' 123 Bruner goes on,
Nor should we shunt it off to the philosopher in the armchair, concerned 
with the age-old dilemma as to whether and how epistomological process 
leads to valid ontological outcomes (that is, dealing with how mere 
experience gets you to true reality). In dealing with narrative reality, we 
like to invoke Gottfried Frege's classic distinction between 'sense' and 
'reference', the former connotational and the latter denotational, and we 
like to say that literary fiction does not refer to anything in the world but 
only provides the sense of things. Yet it is the sense of things often 
derived from narrative that makes later real-life reference possible. 
Indeed, we refer to events and things and people by expressions that 
situate them not just in an indifferent world but in a narrative one ... 
Eventually we ask how story, eo ipso, shapes our experience of the 
world. 124
And of course, he's absolutely right.
For months and days and thousands of words and hundreds of pages and 
piles of text books, I have been sitting in a mental comfy chair, full glass at my 
elbow, reading and thinking furiously and, quite possibly, making precisely the
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error Bruner outlines. I could stand accused of disregarding the role that 
narration plays in the interpretation of the world, and our expectations of it. Je 
m 'accuse. I deny the charge and genuinely believe it's not the case. I have, thus 
far, examined in some detail the theories, both ancient and modern, about what it 
is to be human, the nature of self identity and the locus of our thoughts and 
memories. Why? Because I believe that if I am to write with any authority 
about the role memory plays in my creative writing, then I must furnish myself 
with a working knowledge of what the mind is and how it works. So I have been 
sitting in my chair, wearing a number of (ill-fitting) hats: philosopher, 
psychologist, cognitive psychologist and - of course - writer. Perhaps it was the 
dizzying effect of switching so much headwear that encouraged me to focus thus 
far on the relationship between the world and the writer from the point of view of 
the effect the perception of the world has on the writer and not the reverse. Well, 
I have now tossed all hats in the cupboard, except for the one that fits most 
snugly: the novelist's fedora.
I spent the years between 2001 and 2004 working on a novel, Blue Earth. I must 
have done other things too -1 must have enjoyed good food, must have sat in the 
sun with friends, taken shopping lists with me to supermarkets, wrestled with my 
central heating timer system ... But when I try to recall doing these things it's 
near-impossible because the writing of Blue Earth was so difficult, so demanding 
that all I hear - and almost all I can see - when I look back is the white noise of 
creativity. It filled my life and as I write this, I am preparing to do all those 
things writers do when their books are launched - interviews, readings and so on 
- and I am, of course, reminded of the drafting and grafting of writing the novel. 
In what follows, I shall be reflecting on what I did during those years (and in past 
years, working on other novels and short stories) in the light of what I now know 
about self-identity, memory and narrative.
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NARRATIVE
Fresh from playing the central character in the Bridget Jones novels, 
actress Renee Zellweger is to turn her own hand to writing. Zellweger, 
33, said she planned to write 'fiction, non-fiction, whatever I'm feeling 
when I pick up the pen'.
Metro Magazine, 
Quoted in Private Eye, no. 1125
I experienced a number of reactions when I read this snippet beamed in from La- 
La Land. Stupefaction at the extent of Ms Zellweger's arrogance, despair about 
the current state of publishing (because you can be sure that should she actually 
write something - anything - it will be published), and the feeling that she's old 
enough to know better. Joubert once opined that 'To write well, one needs a 
natural facility and an acquired difficulty' 125; in Ms Zellweger's case one might 
remark that she has an acquired facility and a natural difficulty. To be fair, Ms 
Zellweger is in good company if she thinks that the writing of a novel is with 
regard to degree of difficulty akin to the task of changing one's socks. Disraeli 
apparently once said, 'When I want to read a novel, I write one' and I recall 
Jeanette Winterson, interviewed a few years ago, famously saying that she wrote 
so that she would have something good to read.
The point here is that these remarks make no acknowledgement of the 
difficulty of writing traditional realist fiction, no acknowledgement of the sense 
of vulnerability it can induce, the commitment it requires and the potentially 
debilitating effects of being locked permanently into self-critical mode. When I
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was a child sometimes I would write a word, such as 'where' and then look at it 
and think, that's not how it's spelt. I'd try again and again. 'Were', 'whur' 
'whir' - what? And I'd try again. The more I stared at the word 'where' the 
more insane it became. Imagine doing that with a two-hundred-thousand word 
typescript - the more you stare at it, the more insane it becomes. That is what 
happened to me. Traditional realist fiction must have at its heart implausible. 
Once the writer begins to wonder whether the work is in fact plausible, then 
doubts creep in and this, as we know, can be a dangerous catalyst. It may lead 
the writer eventually to believe that he has nothing but his doubts and that way 
lies madness. I'm not saying, as Red Skinner once did, that 'Writing's easy, you 
just sit down and open a vein'. (Although there are writers - Raymond Carver, 
James Ellroy, Anne-Marie Macdonald? - who might have, and those who appear 
to have opened others' veins - Brett Easton Ellis, Edward Bunker, Annie Proulx?) 
And I am not saying that writing is difficult in the same way that being a cancer 
nurse, or a worker in a Brazilian open cast coal mine, or a forensic scientist must 
be difficult. But nevertheless, it makes demands of the writer that are unusual.
Even the great authors of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries found 
writing a tad trying. Tolstoy observed that 'one ought only to write when one 
leaves a piece of one's flesh in the inkpot each time one dips one's pen,' which 
seems a little extreme. Flaubert described the artist, and thus himself, as 'a 
monstrosity, something outside nature' and in trying to disprove this axiom, the 
artist 'suffers from it and makes others suffer too'. Dostoevsky worked 
'nervously, with pain and travail of soul' and Conrad later spent twenty months 
working on Nostromo, 'to the exclusion of all that makes life really loveable and 
gentle'. Flaubert went so far as to suggest that the writer should not even attempt 
to alleviate these dark moments with a little socialising: 'If one gets mixed up 
with life, one cannot see it clearly; one suffers too much, or enjoys it too much'. 
Heaven forfend. 127
I have been bandying about the phrase 'writing a novel' with abandon. 
What, exactly, do these three words involve and what, exactly, are the demands 
this process makes of the writer?
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Processes
As with the cases of story grammar and functions of memory, there may be a 
great deal of debate about the finer points of theories regarding creative thinking 
but there exists a rough consensus of opinion as to the general framework of the 
process of creative acts. 128 One might call it The Act of Thought, as Wallas 
did, 129 or Process Approach Theory, as Graves and Murray do, 130 or P/H- 
Creativity, as Robertson does. 131 No matter the appellation, the nature of the 
progression, or procession, is essentially the same. 132 Wallas' account is clear 
and simple:
• Preparation
• Incubation
• Illumination
• Verification
Graves' and Murray's Process Approach Theory is essentially an elaboration of 
Wallas' account:
• Pre- writing (collecting of thoughts)
• Drafting (focusing of thoughts)
• Revision (ordering of thoughts)
• Editing (re-drafting)
• Publishing (clarification of thoughts)
Interestingly, this last account focuses entirely and specifically on the mental 
rather than the physical aspects of writing; it ignores the tap-tap-tap of the 
keyboard and the scratch-scratch-scratch of the pen. 133 And I intend to do the 
same, because whilst the actual typing or writing of the script does take time and 
is necessary to the process, it is not my hands that write, it is my mind. As A. L. 
Kennedy says, 'I think it would be useful for me to point out one thing straight 
away. I write with my mind. This is very obvious, of course, but its implications 
are, perhaps, not.' 134 So, let us consider the ghost, not the machine. 
But all this begs the question 'Why write anything at all?'
The Unicom is driving a Mustang 71
Why write fiction?
If you are hungry, you eat; if dirty, you wash; if starved of physical affection, you 
drink. But what is the source of the impulse to narrate? The desire to narrate? 135 
To return to Joubert's 'acquired difficulty': what does he mean here? We can 
assume he does not mean the acquired difficulty of returning from IKEA with a 
flat-pack desk. No one in her right mind would rip open the box and then say, 'I 
must go and write a novel'. (Although, I have made that excuse in precisely 
these circumstances ...) Considering Joubert, it becomes apparent that by 
'acquired difficulty' he may mean the difficulties the characters in the novel may 
encounter. But this is, surely, getting ahead of ourselves? Can characters exist 
independently of a narrative framework, however vague? 136 Surely the 'acquired 
difficulty' is an allusion to 'overcoming the monster', 'rags to riches', 'the quest' 
and so on - yes, the famous Seven Stories theory, that is, the theory that all plots 
can be slotted into one of these frameworks. 137 I even make reference to the 
theory in the opening lines of 'La Corrida':
We have forgotten more than we remember. We have forgotten the swooping flight of 
birds which are no longer named, the thoughts of the Barbarian Visigoths as they swept 
through Iberia. We have forgotten why callused hands pushed at the stoic monoliths of 
Easter Island, the first steps of pilgrims as they trekked the globe. We have forgotten the 
terror and cunning of those who paced the Medici Corridor, the words spoken at Ararat. 
We have forgotten more than we remember.
But there is something I remember; something. A summer. A moment. I pace this 
room, raging, trying to forget more than I wish to recall.
There are seven stories in this world and this one is mine. 138
'La Corrida' is written within a classic 'overcoming the monster' framework; in 
this case the gladiator is a female Spanish bullfighter, Cristina, the Goliath is the 
bull, el toro bravo. (However, the character who says 'this one is mine' is not the 
bullfighter but a photographer who shadows her. His is the narrative voice telling
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another's story; a familiar technique, Fitzgerald's Nick in Gatsby being an 
obvious example.)
But the question remains - why did I write it? What impulse or 
compulsion makes me write fiction? I believe in the case of 'La Corrida' the 
answer is relatively simple. I wanted to subvert the 'overcoming the monster' 
model by having a sexy, blonde woman standing centre-stage, dressed in flashing 
traje de luces, facing el catedral-the black bull. This is not good-versus-evil 
because the bull has made no moral choices as he rushes through the barricades; 
it is an unequal fight between woman and bull, progesterone and testosterone, 
casa and calle. Was I aware of this as I wrote? No - I'm aware of it now as I 
deconstruct a short story I finished six years ago. But this still doesn't explain 
why I wrote it. I know now that what made me write was my desire to change 
the world, the physical world, to rewrite it, to reinvent space and re-people it. 139 
What do I mean? Consider these excerpts:
Santiago de Compostela has many near-forgotten, narrow streets. It is a dark city, 
darker even than Venice; it breathes more deeply. At this summer's end the city appears 
to be falling in on itself with a long-drawn-out sigh. I sit in a cafe in the Praza da 
Quintana, camera on my lap, Herald Tribune open on the zinc-topped table. The arcades 
of the nia Nova had blinded me as I walked from sheets of white light to rhomboids of 
deepest shadow, but here, in the square, the light is kinder as it reflects from stone 
buildings mellowed by centuries. Surrounded by gesticulating, stocky Galician men, 
sipping Ribeiro from small ceramic cups, their hands signalling the state of their hearts 
and minds, I sip my sherry, dry as packed ice, and bite into a manzanilla olive. I turn 
back to the paper but the text dances in the sunlight. Closing my eyes I lean back, out of 
the shadow of the umbrella, to feel the sun on my skin. I don't know what impulse 
makes me open my eyes and look across the square towards the via Sacra, squinting in 
the glare.
At first she is a silhouette, a black mannequin moving against flat light, walking 
down the steps into the square. The shadow of the clock tower falls across her and she 
swims into colours and dimensions, broad shouldered and narrow-hipped, her walk easy, 
almost a lope. I try to look away but find I can't. She walks towards the cafe, scanning 
the packed tables for a vacant chair. She looks at me.
A cloud passes silently in front of the sun and the colours of the Galician praza leach 
away. I find I can now remember the afternoon in Venice with shocking clarity, can 
remember spending hours at the gates of the Arsenale, waiting for the light to change,
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waiting for the fish-scale wake of a vaporetto in the lagoon of the Arsenale Vecchio. 
Waiting, as ever, for the elusive to present itself, my stomach tight with the fear of 
failure. I can picture Gambello's arch, can see the lions of Piraeus, the small square in 
front of the arch. But in the corner of the square, where the tables of the cafe should 
spill, there is a darkness, a smear of images.
After the light of midday in the praza, a light as sharp as broken glass, her hotel room is 
dim, seems to waver in shuttered gloom. In the corner is a vast, black trunk, padlocked 
and seemingly immovable. The room is small and cluttered, dominated by a rumpled 
bed. Cristina slams the shutters and closes a torn velvet curtain across the window. She 
pulls me down on the creased sheets and begins to push at my clothes. I have slipped 
from one world to another, from one state of being to another. I can see nothing. I am a 
photographer without sight and my world is reduced to the sense of scent and touch as if 
I am moving in a black velvet sack, at once luxurious and sybaritic.
A waiter pushes through the crowd around us, carrying a broom. He holds it in one hand 
and pushes at the fabric canopy over the road. A cascade of rain water bellies out, 
smashes on the cobbles. The crowd around us jumps back, shouting at him, jostling our 
table. Thunderous roars break out above our heads as lightning sizzles into a nearby 
hillside. A young woman screams. The static in the air tastes of copper; the atmosphere 
is singed. The crowd is becoming restless, sensing danger, and laughter has stopped. 
They shift uneasily, leaning into each other.
A few days later we hire a four-wheeler and drive up through Mijas before dawn, into the 
scrub-blasted, water-fractured foothills, passing through small, contained villages, 
shuttered against the rising heat. We see groups of hunters, long-barrelled guns slung 
casually over their crooked arms, eyes glinting in the shock of the rising sun. They lock 
far-distant looks on Cristina as she drives, their eyes accustomed to tracking moving, 
unpredictable prey from a distance. She drives as she eats - like a man, aggressively, too 
fast on the tight, joint-squeezing curves, one arm casually slung over the open window. 
And she chain-smokes for the entire journey, dropping one cigarette and lighting 
another. She does not speak, she only smokes and drives us deeper and deeper into the 
hills, and in the ever sparser villages people watch us as we speed through, their eyes 
never settling on me, following only her. Old men with glasses of cerveza, slices of 
tortilla poised between plate and mouth, seem posed for eternity as they watch us pass, 
clouds of white silica dust billowing behind the jeep. I ache to ask her to stop so that I 
can photograph them but this journey, this summer, belongs to her.
As we drive to Ronda I tell Cristina that I have already seen the Plaza de Toros in Ronda 
when it was empty of people, seen the tendidos, the stalls, tilting towards the sky in
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ordered harmony, seen the pillars supporting the sculpted roof of the arena, stretching to 
heaven. I tell her I have stood at the vast wooden dog-leg gate, arrastre de toros, where 
the bull bursts into the ring, and she smiles faintly. I have even walked to the centre of 
that dusty bowl and turned full circle, trying to people the seats, conjure the sounds, feel 
the burning heat, imagine the bull. Trying to turn the kaleidoscope of images, of smells, 
of sounds and tastes in my hands until they form a pattern I can understand, and now she 
laughs aloud. But I do not tell her that I failed. For nothing in my imagination could 
conjure the bedlam, the sensory coruscation that is la corrida.
We walk through the labyrinth of white-washed tunnels beneath the ring and come to a 
ramp leading to a square of blinding Andalusian sunlight. Shading our eyes we walk 
through the doors to find a mess of trucks and dollies, men running back and forth, 
calling to each other. Loops of chains clank overhead, strung from pulleys. The chrome 
and steel of the vermilion trucks bum and the white walls, scarred with strange, dark 
markings, dance on my retinas.
'Where are we? I mean, who are all these people?' I ask, view-finder snapped 
to my eye, my fingers adjusting shutter speed.
'Monsabios. The butchers'boys.'
Cristina is walking slowly away from the bull, her back turned, with the same lonely 
near-lope I saw in the square at Santiago. She stops in the centre of the arena. La hora 
de la verdad has arrived - the moment of truth, and a pall of silence descends on the 
crowd. She is not walking towards this maddened, stinking, ebony animal, streaked with 
the blood pouring from its massive neck; she is waiting, armed only with a short sword, 
for the beast to come to her. Ariadne and the Minotaur are locked in combat. Cristina 
drops the glorious, dusty muleta to her side and turns to face el toro. The bull's legs 
buckle for a moment and then recover as it gazes at her. I catch its eye in the lens once 
more and still see the uncomprehending black-blood-red rage there. I focus on one of 
the horns - asta - and see that it is as pointed, as sharp as intolerance. El catedral gathers 
himself like a wave breaking and charges for the last time, scattering a trail of blood.
I quote at length here, because I believe that in these short extracts can be found 
the key to answer the question, what do I mean when I say I want to change the 
world? I mean I want to change my memory of it in such a way that my 
characters live in a surprising, sensual, dangerous landscape. If, as Raymond 
Carver said, good fiction is indeed 'the bringing of news from one world to 
another', 140 then the news I am bringing (to lay on top of the 'real' one, like a 
sheet of gossamer) is 'this is what the world could be like, this is what the 
landscapes of lives could be like'.
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(Cristina is gored and dies as the bull's bloodied body is dragged from the 
ring by the monsabios and their mullilas. But you knew that already, didn't you? 
Because the shadow of the clock tower falls across her when the photographer 
first sees her. Anyway, it's a short story, of course she dies.)
Beginning to draw together the threads ...
In the previous section of this paper are words and phrases printed in bold 
typeface. At this point, it would be useful to list them:
Narratives
Narrative conventions
Story grammar
Stories
Scripts
Traces
Landscape
Personal history
Field and observer points of view
Identity
Empathy
Constructing representations of hypothetical events
Problem solving
Cultural significance
These words and phrases appeared in an exegesis on the processes and functions 
of autobiographical memory. But it occurs to me that, with a little tweaking, this 
list could represent an elaborated model for the process of creative writing ... it is 
not substantially different from Graves' and Murray's Process Approach Theory. 
So, narrative grammar and functions of autobiographical memory could be said to 
mirror each other. As Bruner would say, 'self is a product of our telling and not 
some essence to be delved for in the recesses of subjectivity'. 141 In other words, 
our faculty to construct self-history, self-identity, is dependent on the ability both 
to understand and employ narrative conventions.
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Here it is useful to point out that there exists evidence other than 
Palaeolithic cave art that understanding of narrative grammar is innate. Both 
Alzheimer's and Korsakov's syndrome, degenerative diseases of the brain, are 
associated with a disorder called dysnarrativia, 142 as Bruno has highlighted. 143 
This disorder is associated not only with a loss of memory but also with the loss 
of the ability to understand causality or affect and the sufferer can no longer 
comprehend or tell stories. (For observations regarding dysnarrativia, see 
Appendix 2.) The result of these appalling neural conditions is that the sufferer 
loses not only himself as he has no sense of identity, but also the ability to 
empathise because the sufferer is unable to understand that other people have 
minds or feelings; all sense of inter-subjectivity is lost. (So it would appear that 
Janet can, to some extent, lose John.)
To return to autobiographical memory and 'La Corrida': I have been to 
Santiago, and whilst I was there, a violent storm passed overhead, setting 
buildings rumbling and triggering car alarms. I have been to Venice and drunk 
coffee in the cafe by the Arsenale; I have been to Mijas and driven the hinterlands 
of Southern Spain; I have walked to the centre of the bullring in Ronda and 
marvelled at the beauty of the arena. I have not witnessed a bullfight; I have not 
stood sweating in the centre of a bullring as el toro runs at me; I did not see the 
tools of the monsabio's trade at Ronda but at Mijas. It is obvious to me that my 
episodic and semantic memory and knowledge have contributed hugely to this 
project of writing about a female bullfighter.
Which brings me to the extract about the hotel room and, strangely, I hear 
a memory echo across more than twenty-five years. I have suddenly, quite 
literally, now remembered a novel I wrote when I was at university. 144 Five 
minutes ago, I rummaged through a cupboard and found the battered manuscript 
of Imogen's Dream, which I haven't looked at for two decades, and I unearthed 
what I wanted: throughout the narrative there runs a thread, references to 
someone (the One) waiting in a hotel room (see Appendix 3 for the text). I can 
see, re-reading, re-visiting my twenty-year old self, that already the desire to 
emphasise the sensuality of setting was in place. More explicitly, so was my 
desire to construct hypotheticals: 'How it might have been? This is how it might 
have been.'
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Is this an adequate explanation for my impulse to narrate? Some might 
accuse me of tautology, since 'how it might have been' is, arguably, the 
Aristotelian-style Form of the matter of fiction. But that does not preclude me 
from claiming it as the source of my impulse to write. Others might accuse me of 
mistaking theme for impulse but I reject that accusation. The theme of the 
excerpts from Imogen's Dream is that of longing, a longing for passion, a longing 
to be claimed. Standard stuff for a twenty-year-old undergraduate with too much 
time on her hands. I yearned for an encounter in the faded glory of a belle- 
epoche Parisian hotel room, and instead I found myself in the Queen Vie. Now, 
of course, I have memories of hotel rooms (episodic memory) and what goes on 
in them (schema), which is why 'La Corrida' is published and Imogen's Dream is 
not.
Meta-TOPs
Thematic Organisation Packets (TOPs) are, we remember, representations of 
abstract concepts, unconsciously developed in tandem with developing semantic 
knowledge. I would like to suggest that the impulses to write experienced by 
different writers are lodged as a form of meta-thematic organisation packets, 
which share much in common with those mental activities of which we are 
unaware (a function, possibly, of Janet's Alpha mind). As I mentioned, I am 
struck by the motivational aspect of TOPs and the value-laden abstract concepts 
they generate. It is difficult to articulate exactly what the impulses are but not 
impossible. I would like to suggest that these self-generated meta-themes govern 
culturally verified themes in narrative.
In Writers in Conversation,™5 playwrights, poets and novelists talk about 
what compels them to write, and reading their interviews it becomes apparent that 
there are many and varied motivations. The majority of Jewish writers (Auster, 
Miller, Richler, Wesker, Steiner, for example) cite the fact of their Jewishness as 
the source of their impulse to write. Others refer to a sense of alienation or 
marginality (Le Guin, Alice Munro,) the need to escape (Theroux), or the 
persecutions of discrimination (Alice Walker). Timberlake Wertenbaker cites the 
fact that she had two passports and four nationalities (an English mother, 
American father, brought up in France, but in the Basque region). This led her to
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become absorbed by the question of identity and her work often revolves around 
the quest for self-identity. Some writers make parallels with other creative 
media, most notably music; for example, John Earth talks of being 'most 
comfortable as a writer taking, as it were, a received melody ... and then 
orchestrating it to my present purpose'. 146 Robertson Davies points to the 
influence of theatre, Tom Wolfe to the cadences of southern rhetoric. The 
account that most intrigues me is that of W. G. Sebald. Essentially he says that, 
on the one hand, he is noise phobic, he loathes the sounds of machines. He 
attributes this to the silence of the under-developed, rural Austrian village in 
which he grew up. But the reason for his revisiting the 'problematic' past is 
precisely because of the all-enveloping conspiracy of silence wrapped around 
Austrian and German families at the time, the 1940s.
George Steiner, as a survivor of the Holocaust, is driven by the need to 
explore language, because, he says, it 'seems to reach to that unknown land, that 
active shadow land' (which reminds me of Plato's remark about the cave walls) 
'between the nervous system and consciousness'; for Steiner, imagination and 
the mind are shaped by language. (This idea is shared by many linguists, that 
thoughts are shaped by the language learned. 147) More than this, precisely 
because he is a Jewish survivor, Steiner has spent his writing life trying to answer 
the question: 'Why did the great culture of Europe not resist more effectively 
when the inhuman came?' He writes because he is compelled by the need to 
answer this question, even though he realises that 'imagination trained to 
imagine, to fictionalize, is somehow lamed in the face of actual, concrete 
inhumanity'. This, to me, is the perfect example of a meta-theme; perfect in the 
respect that it acknowledges the inadequacy of waving a novel at the gates of 
Auschwitz in the hope of changing history (not in the hope of erasing memory), 
and yet Steiner is striving still to distil experience and situate it, as Bruner says, 
'not just in an indifferent world but in a narrative one'. 'The multiplicity of 
human tongues ... has been the enabling condition of men and women's freedom 
to perceive, to articulate, to "redraft" the existential world in manifold 
freedom'. 148
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After Goliath ...David
I mentioned the Goliath that is el toro bravo above and it is but a short, semantic 
soft-shoe-shuffle from Goliath to David. Michelangelo's David, which he carved 
between 1501 and 1504. 149 Michelangelo carved stone, he subtracted from a 
block of marble, using hammer and chisel. Unusually, he did not often use small, 
clay models to guide his work on the larger piece; it is claimed that il divino 
could look at a block of marble and see within it the Form. 150 His chisels simply 
revealed the slave, the Christ, the saint. Indeed, the unfinished sculpture, the 
apparently ghostly Awakening Slave (see Appendix 4), shows precisely this, 
almost as if the slave is embedded, literally, within the marble, as if he will soon 
yawn and rise, becoming whole and polished as he stands.
Writing, however, appears to be a different endeavour. Surely it is the 
business of writers not to subtract but to construct - one chapter after another, 
one character appearing after another? A serial development, which has a 
beginning, a middle and an end. And of course, this is what happens but not at 
this point, the point of preparing to write. I suggest that the meta-theme is 
Joubert's 'acquired difficulty', and the themes the writer elects to develop within 
the framework of innate story grammar dictate the shape, the landscape of the 
work that emerges. I believe that each writer's meta-theme is discernible, not in 
each novel, perhaps, but certainly across a lifetime of writing. The meta-theme is 
there, always - the engine that drives the impulse to write, an engine which bums 
elaborated memories as fuel.
Preparation
Having finished Mr Candid I did not think, I must write another novel. Instead, I 
tended my garden, taught some classes and indulged in a little carpentry. But all 
the time I was doing these things, the engine was turning over, grinding out its 
strangely punctured ticker-tape. As I yanked weeds out of my laughable lawn, a 
theme suggested itself: nature versus nurture. As I prepared lecture notes, 
formless characters stood at my shoulder, saying nothing. As I planed lengths of 
wood, landscapes hovered at the edge of my mind's eye. The engine was 
humming and, much like the fridge in my kitchen, sometimes I heard it, 
sometimes I didn't, but I knew it always hummed whether I was aware of it or
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not. (This humming, I fear, is something the audacious, overly optimistic Ms 
Zellweger may never hear.)
Once the lawn was weeded, the shelves built and the semester was over, I 
went through those rituals that denote: beginning a novel. The buying of a 
particular make of pen, the tidying and dusting of the study, the purchase of 
reams of A4 and boxes of blank floppies. But these actions are actions performed 
by the machine and not the ghost. What was the ghost doing meanwhile? It was 
toying with Leibniz' idea of Monads - a notion I encountered as an 
undergraduate. The identity of indiscernibles. 151 If I was going to write about 
nature versus nurture, and I wanted to avoid the hackneyed theme of identical 
twins ...
Incubation
The opening of Monad:
One early evening in the year of 1684, Gottfried Leibniz, a gaunt, grizzled man with soft 
brown eyes and insubstantial beard, sat back in his chair in the Royal Library of Hanover 
and stretched. The bones in his shoulders cracked at the same time the chair cracked. 
The sounds were the same, indistinguishable. The sounds were, he decided, 
indiscernible. For two years he put aside his history of the House of Brunswick, instead 
writing his thesis; a thesis which rested on the principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles, 
a thesis which later became famous. 'The monad,' Leibniz scratched on yellow, feather- 
edged paper, 'has no windows.' Space, he argued, is nothing but the appearance of the 
order of possible co-existences; time nothing but the order of possibilities which are 
inconsistent. Monadology blew the Newtonian concept of spatio-temporal relations out 
of the water. For Leibniz knew, all those years ago, that the principle of Sufficient 
Matter applied equally to acts of God as to the acts of men and women. For each matter 
of fact with which we are presented there must be sufficient reason why it is so and not 
otherwise.
I often think of Leibniz and I see an unloved, unkempt man, his eyes weakened 
by hours of writing by oil lamp. He spent his youth wandering around Europe, meeting 
Tschirnhausen, Boyle, Malebranche and Spinoza. What, I wonder did he make of 
Amsterdam and Paris? Did he look back and think of those cities as he later sat for years 
in the library in Hanover, developing the Infinitesimal Calculus? Could he hear the 
snickers of the Rationalists as he imagined his windowless monads?
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I think of Leibniz because I reckon he was right and I should know because I 
am the embodiment of his principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles, After all, I was 
born twice.
(September 2001)
I spent weeks trying to build on this passage, trying to use it as a foundation for 
the development of two characters, Evelyn and Frances, identical twins/monads 
living in different places, in the same time. I set Frankie in the snowy wastes of 
Alaska, Evelyn in the bland suburbs of Worcester Park, Surrey. I furrowed my 
brow, I knuckled my forehead but it was no good - nothing worked. And why 
would it? I was, if you like, breaking an essential rule of story grammar. My 
main character was in two places at the same time. Either she was two characters 
with one mother, or two characters with two separate mothers. But one thing was 
sure: she couldn't be two characters with no mother, at least not in realist fiction.
I did not think, I must write another novel. Instead, I tended my garden, 
taught some classes and indulged in some carpentry. But all the time I was doing 
these things, the engine was turning over, grinding out its strangely punctured 
ticker-tape. As I yanked weeds out of my laughable lawn, a theme suggested 
itself: nature versus nurture. As I prepared lecture notes, characters stood at my 
shoulder, then faded away, to be replaced by others.
Pages from the opening section of Monad (second draft):
PART ONE 
CHILDHOOD
Evelyn often tastes blood in her mouth these days. She swallows it, of course, not 
knowing that it is blood. If she knew what caused the tang of metal on her tongue she 
would be disgusted; would rinse out her mouth with water and spittle. Not that that 
would help because there is a constant, tiny trickle of bright red, oxygenated blood 
spilling from her gums. Evelyn is beginning to lose her milk teeth and as she sits in class 
the world shrinks to the sensation of her tongue rasping on a ragged edge of thin enamel. 
This is what is happening right now. Evelyn Sharpnell is staring at her teacher, 
unseeing, her tongue (that underrated, muscular organ) pushing and pulling at a rounded
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molar. There is a tiny grating sound in her head as the tooth tears away from the gum. 
Evelyn, who is losing her first tooth, is amazed. She feels the tooth as a boulder in her 
mouth and spits it out on the desk where it rolls across the lined paper of her maths book. 
Her eyes screw up, her bloodied mouth opens and she bawls, causing the teacher to whirl 
round, leaving a streak of chalk howling on the blackboard.
'Good grief- it's only a tooth. Why's she making such a fuss?'
'Is that what you think? That she's making a fuss?' Alice looked up from the 
pastry she was rolling out. 'She's in pain, so she cries. It's natural.'
'Everyone goes through it. You spoil her.'
'I love her.'
lan sighed and left the kitchen, ignoring the whimpering floating down the 
stairs. He crossed the hall and went into his study in which there were no books. From 
the ceiling hung Airfix models, dangling on catgut, swinging lazily en masse like 
frogspawn in water as the door slammed behind him. Over the years he had created a 
squadron, a fleet, a national asset of moulded plastic and Humboldt's enamel paint. For 
a few minutes he watched the planes spinning slowly, watched until they near-stopped, 
and then he switched on an angle poise lamp and pulled a box from a large paper bag. 
On the cover of the box was a picture of a Spitfire, miraculously surviving the 
incandescent flak bursting around it. The flaps of the pilot's cap flew like beagle's ears 
and his comfortable smile was broad and reassuring. lan opened the box and spilled 
green slats of moulded pieces onto the desk. This was the moment he savoured, when he 
scanned hundreds of curiously moulded pieces and - without even looking at the plan - 
proposed to himself a manner of proceeding, a logical route which would take him from 
his current state of staring at an unrelated, disparate mass to the state of watching a 
perfectly modelled, faultlessly decorated aircraft swivel on catgut from his study ceiling.
lan - who sold, first, fear and then insurance - wondered sometimes about this 
fixation of his. He considered, occasionally, the meaning of it. Why did he spend his 
evenings constructing models of aircraft designed, patented and produced by other 
people? Where, exactly, was the root of his satisfaction?
Where indeed?
(Monad, pp. 1-2)
Frankie's first memory was of darkness. Occasionally she tried to people this darkness 
with faces or objects - a snowshoe, a husky, a puffin - but failed. This didn't worry her 
because she liked the dark. Frankie would lie in her bed beneath layers of blankets, lie
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on her back, her arms straight at her side, and stare into the night. She believed that the 
night was a thing, a substance which crept into her room through the hairline cracks 
beneath her door, pushing the day out. When she was older and she was taught the 
principles of osmosis, she thought of herself as little girl picturing the night making its 
way into her bedroom and thought it a better explanation. Because night, she knew by 
then, didn't fall - it muscled its way in, forcing everything else to leave.
Frankie was a silent child, a watchful child. She would sit at the table and 
watch her mother's every move as meals were prepared, following her mother's hands as 
they filleted, sliced and butchered. Sometimes her blue eyes would flick to her mother's 
face as if to register any disgust her mother might feel as she pulled the guts from a king 
salmon. Frankie's black hair was snipped short, tufty, and her mother often felt she was 
being watched by a mute, skinny rodent as she went about her business. But if Dorothy, 
Frankie's mother, was being honest she would say that this suited her for she was hardly 
verbose herself. It suited them both: this silent domestic world, their quiet, endless days.
(Monad, p. 29, March 2002)
The characters at my shoulder had resolved themselves into two camps, two 
families. The identical twins were in place: Evelyn and Frankie, leading different 
lives in Alaska and Surrey, each with their own mother and father. They were 
twins, now, who had been adopted. Both had to be adopted otherwise my 
'experiment' with nature and nurture would not work. So Maggie Regan came 
along - a young, Irish maid, 'uneducated and delicious', possessed of a keen 
native intelligence. I needed sperm, so to speak, so I introduced a William 
Raymond Franklin Reeves:
William Raymond Franklin Reeves sailed from New York to Southampton on the day 
that Dylan Thomas died. Billy-Ray leaned on the railings of the liner, watching 
Manhattan slip away (due to the curvature of the earth discerned by Gallileo's eye) 
unaware that the Welsh poet was lying dead-/drunk, yet-to-be-found, in room 314 of the 
Chelsea Hotel. The sun was sliding down like a melting butter pat on a steaming sweet 
potato, as Billy-Ray noted, this being his notion of poetic license. It was, perhaps, his 
unconscious homage of sorts. The wind kicked up harbour water as the ship breezed 
away from the city and Billy-Ray pulled his heavy, double-breasted coat close and 
buttoned it against the cold. Once the ship made open water it began to buck in a storm 
moving in from the east and he made his way down to the bar.
Settling himself at an empty table, Billy-Ray ordered a bourbon and watched 
the barman steadying himself as he moved among glass, appreciating the economy of
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movement, the grace of the man. Once he had drunk his first bourbon and motioned for 
a second, Billy-Ray looked around himself and caught a glimpse of his own face in the 
mirror - florid and square, small-eyed and freckled. It was not a face of which he was 
proud but it served its purpose: it seemed an honest, open face and bamboozled others 
into thinking he might be a trust-worthy, amiable human being. A woman in a short, 
sleek black dress and wavering stilettos weaved her way towards him, near-falling as the 
liner shuddered and lurched to the left. Billy-Ray stood to steady her and she fell 
awkwardly onto the banquette, next to him. [... ]
Five days Billy-Ray spent with Jacqueline O'Toole on the QE2 that second week of 
November 1953; five days of sybaritic pleasure funded by her absent husband. Billy- 
Ray realised he had underestimated her within moments of attempting to wrap his arms 
around her naked body in her cabin. Jacqueline - for all her lack of balance and co­ 
ordination - gave as good as she got. They parted at Southampton, deprived even of the 
chance of a short but tender adieu by the appearance of Sir Sidney O'Toole on the deck 
of the berthed liner. The two men shook hands after being introduced, each thinking the 
other was a fine example of Irish manhood, and then Billy-Ray turned and walked away 
into his next life. William Raymond Franklin Reeves, Sir Sidney thought as he watched 
the younger man strut along the dock, was not necessarily a man who realised that 
payment was always due for goods received.
The memory of Irish life, the concept of Irish manhood - robust, quick to anger but 
always, always charming - shared by Billy-Ray and Sir Sidney were views with which 
Maggie Regan would eventually disagree. But then, why wouldn't she?
(Monad, p. 12 and p. 13, March 2002)
I spent some of my childhood in Worcester Park, Surrey (unfortunately); I have 
spent time in Alaska. I remember the taste and obsessive tongue-wiggling of 
losing a tooth as a child; I had a step-father who spent a great deal of time putting 
together Airfix models. I have not sailed the Atlantic* I have not watched my 
mother slice, fillet and butcher. But I have been a fishmonger. I soldiered on 
with my fictional families and their mundane existences, the Irish-American 
William Reeves beaming drunkenly from the margins.
But it appeared that I couldn't resist it, couldn't resist the urge to refer to 
the wider landscape. Dropped into the narrative, were the following:
There is no edge to the world any more. In centuries past people pointed to the horizon 
and where fingertip, sea and sky met there was the edge, the end, the limit of the world. 
Everything they could see in front of them which had not tipped over that distant,
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wavering line was the world. The extent of experience. But now we know differently 
and I am not sure that knowledge is a useful tool. I am not convinced that knowing what 
we know now has liberated us or refined us. I do believe that it has excised the wonder 
from our lives. When Gallileo stood back from the galaxy, took stock and scratched his 
notations on rough, fibrous paper, he eviscerated European beliefs. Dragons and white 
whales tumbled into the ether and disappeared; sirens cooed their last; skulls and bones 
slid away and were sent spinning into eternity.
Where did these dream creatures wash up? In Alaska - the edge of the world.
***
The Aleut Indians named the archipelago on which they lived, the sea swirling around 
them and the world they could see 'Alashka' - the Great Land. And so it was. These 
Indians lived in forests, catching fish and birds, hunting mammals, gathering what 
berries and grasses they could during their brief summers, during their brief lives. There 
were hazards - ice and shifting glaciers, quakes, tidal waves, infinite winters and 
Russians. The Bering Sea was too small a moat to keep the Russians at bay. They must 
have sailed south from Cape Olyutorskiy and headed south, making landfall on one of 
the volcanic islands. Within fifty years of that landing the Aleutian Indians were 
decimated, reduced to fishing for their masters, salting and packing tarpon and cod for 
the dining tables in Moscow and St Petersburg.
The Russians felled trees and slaughtered bear, beaver and otter before moving 
on, moving south, clearing the spruce as they explored the coast. Hamlets grew, 
straddling the clear waters of glacial rivers running to the Gulf. Wooden houses built on 
stilts, painted green, cherry red and arctic blue, were built in what became Sitka, 
Ketchikan, Petersburg. The Russians turned stones, pebbles and moraine, trawled the 
seas and climbed the mountains searching for wealth, but found only fur, fish and wood. 
Eventually bored by salmon and sitkas they sold the land - the Great Land, Alashka - to 
America, for seven million dollars, and sailed for the Gulf of Anadyr, leaving behind 
them only intricate gabling and Indian resentment.
The Russians had searched long and hard, hunted for decades, but they never 
uncovered the wealth of Alashka: coal, copper, platinum, silver. Nor did they find the 
gold. As for the black gold - that took a little longer.
Seward's Folly - his payment of seven million dollars for the The Great Land - made him 
the butt of all jokes, the senseless Secretary of State who might as well have burned the 
dollar bills and flung the ashes in the ocean. Urbanites strutting the fledgling streets of 
New York, Washington and Philadelphia, shielded themselves from fierce afternoon sun
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and snickered at this waste as they sweated. These sophisticates could not guess that the 
plains were about to dry up and the rains would not be seen again for five years. 
Families loaded carts and creaked their way west, or worse, back east, in search of food 
and land, in search of living cattle. Those men who did not have - or had lost - women 
and children, those men headed north, on and on, over the border, walking, sledding, 
climbing mountains to reach Turnagain Arm and the Kenai Peninsula. When they 
reached their destination they were met by more snow-covered mountains, glaciers, 
desolate landscapes and clear, melt-water streams. The men drank in tent cities, visited 
freezing whore houses, then bought picks, buckets and jerky before disappearing deeper 
into the wilderness. Driven by rumours, hounded by the memory of death they hoped 
they had left in the Plains, they went in search of gold. Some found it; most did not. 
These last lived alone for months on end, drinking rot gut as they sifted through the 
purest water on earth, or digging and swigging as they created warren-like tunnels in 
rock and icy moraine, swinging the oil lamps to catch a glimpse of metal. These men 
became hollow with earth-lust. The greed for gold ate away their guts, thinned their 
flesh and they howled at the moon, at their empty hands.
Occasionally they returned to the tent city, each time noticing that tarpaulin was 
being replaced by timber and glass, that streets had appeared where before there had 
been mud or ice. If they had been lucky they filed their claims, if not, they sold tiny 
dust-like scraps of gold and spent the money they received on the pursuit of the dream. 
What was this dream? To be rich, that was all. To be rich and to sit on soft chairs 
feeling a woman's thigh, to wash in hot water, to eat until their hollows were filled. To 
be rich, having stripped the earth, having torn it apart at its edge.
Many of these men died alone, their hands still empty, palms facing the empty 
sky, preserved intact until the thaw arrived. Preserved intact but for the dream which no 
longer existed for them.
On the evening of 27 March 2002, having ditched Leibniz and his Monads, and 
replaced them with the Sharpnells, the O'Tooles and Billy-Ray Reeves, I wrote a 
note to myself on the typescript: 'Billy Ray discovering Swanson reserves - 
change from someone who is indifferent about the earth to someone who rapes 
it'. I remember the moment well. I poured myself a large whisky and thought, 
'Bloody hell'. Because I knew it meant an exhaustive re-write and I knew I was
right.
I did not think, I should write a different novel. Instead, I tended my 
garden, taught some classes and indulged in some carpentry. But all the time I 
was doing these things, the engine was turning over, grinding out its strangely 
punctured ticker-tape. As I yanked weeds out of my laughable lawn, a theme
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suggested itself: nature versus nurture. But now I knew how that was to be done. 
Frankie, growing up in untouched wilderness, feels an affinity with the land; 
Evelyn, growing up in suburbia, crowded by walls, becomes asthmatic and 
claustrophobic, slowly loses her mind. As I prepared lecture notes, Billy-Ray 
Reeves' soft, florid face melted away and in its place appeared the hard, 
unforgiving features of Wilhelm-Rajmund Reichmann.
By now, months had passed, and still I was weeding and wondering. I had 
revised my course from the path I took when I tried to ignore the narrative 
conventions that have always informed both my reading and writing. I had 
modified my story grammar to accommodate a larger cast of characters, the 
narrative shifting, as it were, from being a closed system to an open one. I was 
digging deep into memories of my childhood to write Evelyn and memories of 
travelling through Alaska to write Frankie. And, of course, I was all the time 
constructing representations of hypothetical events. I realised that Wilhelm- 
Rajmund, Alice, lan, Dorothy132 and Maggie all needed backgrounds, needed 
their own personal histories. I made notes and tinkered with plot-lines, problem 
solving, in effect.
I began again at the beginning:
The tall woman is creating an obstruction on the bridge; the river of people heading west 
is breaking up around her, slowing down and resetting its course. There is something 
about her, something about the way she stands, broad-shouldered, relaxed, focusing on 
what can see, which makes people swerve so as not to jostle her. Her hair, black, short 
and spiky, is damp with sweat. The blue marlin on her upper arm appears to swim lazily 
as she shifts, moves her arm, but the tattoo is not remarkable here, amongst the festival- 
goers, with their braids and dreads, combats, skateboards and surf wear.
The bridge is higher than she thought it would be - higher and more solid than 
she'd imagined. She wants to lean over railing to study the mudbanks hundreds of feet 
below, but there are bars curved like swans' necks which arc back over her, preventing 
the desperate from jumping. Behind her she can see the gorge, its steep-sides marred by 
graffiti, traffic streaming along the river's edge. Before her is the city. Shading her eyes 
she can make out spires and towers, follies and warehouses. The docksides are disused, 
built over by luxury apartment blocks. A steam train rolls past gantries in the distance, 
but she knows these are mere remnants of a time long gone. To the left and above her
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the Downs and the camera obscura seem unchanged. She is surprised by how familiar 
an alien city can feel.
The bridge is crowded, two lanes of cars moving relentlessly as cyclists weave 
between them. The pavement on the south side of the bridge, where she is standing, is 
solid with bodies heading towards Ashton Court. The sun is high and she sees red noses 
and blistering shoulders, sweat stained t-shirts. She had not known that this was a 
festival weekend. She hears a blasting, roaring sound and looks up as a hot-air balloon 
in the shape of a chic, French town car floats by, passengers waving from the wicker 
basket. Still leaning immobile on the rail, scanning the panorama of distant hills and 
nearby bridges and woods, she is aware that she is creating a disturbance in the crowds, 
that she is an island, rock-like. A child rams a bike into her knee and she flinches, looks 
down at the small, blonde boy, frowning.
(Fata Morgana, August 2002, p. 1)
The working title is now Fata Morgana;^ Frankie opens the novel, standing 
centre-stage on the suspension bridge in Bristol during the Ashton Court festival, 
a city and an event I know well. The blond boy on the bike is the son of her 
unknown twin, Evelyn, who by then lives in Bristol. My intention is to end the 
book with a passage opening as the boy rams his bike into Frankie's leg and then 
cycles away.
I approach the whole unwieldy affair from a different angle: I divide the 
narrative into 'Books', Books I - V. (I love those Roman numerals, so 
Carolingian.) I develop the Temples (nees Sharpnells), the Reichmanns and the 
Regans (Maggie now has eleven siblings and a whole history to herself). Then 
there's Sidney and Jackie O'Toole, now Cooper, Thekla and Lucca Barzini and 
... I begin to feel like plate-spinner, rushing from stage left to stage right, twisting 
the narrative props as hard and fast as I can. The canvas grows denser and 
heavier; even Pollock would have had a problem with dealing with it. I write 
Books I, II and III, still sprinting from plate to plate.
Alice Temple, Evelyn's mother, has whole chapters devoted to her. An 
excerpt from one of them:
But most often Alice sipped her tea, listened to the sounds of her neighbours (the terrible 
cries of old Mr Greenfield next door sometimes shattering the evening) and she thought 
about the world around her - wondered if she was living in a catastrophe and hadn't even 
realised it? Unlike her husband, who read only the sports' pages, editorials and the
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obituaries in the newspaper, Alice read the articles and reportage and they scared her. 
She remembered when Evelyn was one year old and she, Alice, had sat up with her 
through the night, holding her tight, as thousands of miles away troops h 
ad landed in the Bay of Pigs and the world hiccuped with fear. Alice remembered how 
angry she'd been that Evelyn, who had lived but one year, might not see another. The 
Bear backed down that time and the Eagle won - but for how long? She recalled crying 
when she heard Martin Luther King announce that he had a dream. That memory, of 
being in a staff meeting on the dreary evening of 22 November 1963, wishing they could 
pack up and go home, was as sharp as a knife. For as she sat there, listening to a visiting 
teacher complaining about pigeon holes, the school caretaker burst into the room, almost 
incoherent. 'They shot Kennedy,' he shouted and burst into tears. 'They've shot the 
president. He's dead!' And the fifty-four members of Trinity Manor staff sat in silence, 
stunned, immobile. 'They' had indeed shot Kennedy, blown gaping holes in his neck 
and head, blown a gaping hole in Camelot itself. The only Catholic president and they 
had shot him. Alice remembered taking the train home that night and how many people 
were sitting alone, crying, as she did herself. And it seemed to go on and on, the 
catastrophe unwinding itself outside her windows. The papers full of reports from 
Saigon, Hanoi and Washington as the American troops began to fly into Vietnam and 
Bhuddists self-immolated on the television screens. Orange robes flaring as flames 
danced around their unmoving bodies - what self-discipline. What self-delusion. LBJ, 
LBJ how many kids did you kill today? The slag heap in Aberfan shifted and slithered 
and forty-four children died. How she had cried that day. The effects of taking 
thalidomide during pregnancy were made evident in the limbless babies that began to 
arrive, suffering, apparently from phocomelia (from the Greek, meaning 'seal's limbs', 
as Alice read in the Telegraph). Christine Keeler opened her legs and a government 
teetered. Los Angeles and Chicago began to burn as Rhodesia turned and snapped at the 
heels of its oppressors. And all the time the B52s were humming across a distant land, 
dropping napalm. Before that - the Berlin Wall going up in a day and Yuri Gagarin 
orbiting the earth. Alice often wondered what he saw when he was up there - was the 
catastrophe obvious? Did it have shape and colour? Did it hum or did it roar? 
Was it surprising that Alice Temple's hands shook?
lan Temple, Evelyn's father, now has a chapter about his National Service days. 
An excerpt:
LAC lan Temple arrived in Alexandria in December 1950, on the troop carrier, the 
HMS Canberra, sickened by motion. LAC Temple, who had never been further than 
Devon before, whose only brush with the ocean had been a week each summer on the 
tame beaches around Bude, had been bucketed along the Bay of Biscay in winter storms
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and then thrust through the Strait of Gibraltar to sail the relative calm of the 
Mediterranean. He stood on the docks of the port, eyes swimming, stomach heaving, 
and felt he was losing his nineteen-year-old mind. The troops gathered their gear and 
mustered untidily before climbing aboard open-sided trucks which set off for the train 
station. Dust flew around them, coating slick skin with grit, blasting in their eyes, and 
lan swayed on the wooden bench, trying to swallow his vomit as he stared unseeing at 
the slums and mud huts on the outskirts of Alexandria. The smell of life - exhaust 
fumes, dung, rotting vegetables, open sewers - combined to make him lean forward 
suddenly and drool thick, acid-rich spittle on the truck's wooden floor. He was not alone 
in having nothing left in his guts to throw up. The journey to Cairo was a mere hundred 
and fifty miles, yet it took more than eight hours as the train stopped at junctions, 
stopped for herds of goats crossing the line, stopped to collect freight and goods at Kafr 
ad Dawwar and Damanhur. lan slept as much as he was able, his blond head resting on 
the shoulder of the man next to him. He woke to the glory of the west bank of the Nile, 
the expanses of desert swamped by palm trees and fields of cotton and com.
The writing of these short passages takes me days because there is so much 
research to be done: the name of the ship, the date, the towns along the rail tracks, 
the crops that would have been grown. The balance between research and 
imagination has become unequal and I'm relying on language to see me through. 
Did I just write the word 'imagination'?
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IMAGINATION
Foolish, really, to think I could get away without addressing the issue of 
'imagination', the elephant in the writer's living room. Yet again, we have 
stumbled across a thorny problem which has occupied philosophers154 and 
psychologists for centuries: 'what is imagination?' 155 To turn once more to the 
dictionary in search of a pithy definition:
Imagination n. 1. The faculty or action of producing mental images of 
what is not present or has not been experienced. 2. Mental creative 
ability. 3. The ability to deal resourcefully with unexpected or unusual 
problems, circumstances, etc. 156
Certainly pithy but raising as many questions as it answers: what act is 
performed? What kind of mental images do we retrieve? What are the qualities 
of these images? Is there evidence to suggest that we can imagine what we have 
not experienced? The Dictionary of Psychology may provide answers:
Imagination the process of recombining memories of past experiences 
and previously formed images into novel constructions... imagination is 
treated as creative and constructive, it may be primarily wishful or largely 
reality-bound.
The word 'imagination' is also subsumed into the entry for 'image'. A few 
interesting points are raised there, however: that Structuralists consider 'image' 
to be one of three sub-classes of consciousness and they describe an image as a
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mental representation of an earlier sensory experience, that is, a copy of it. The 
copy is considered less vivid than the original perception but 'still consciously 
recognizable as a memory of it'. l57 This position has been adopted by cognitive 
psychologists, who consider an image to be a 'picture in the head'. 158
This last definition - of 'the picture in the head' - appeals to common 
sense, writes Reber, but there are caveats. First, the 'picture' is not a real one; re­ 
presenting an image to oneself is a cognitive process 'that operates "as if one 
had a real-life picture that was an analog of a real-life scene'. Secondly, the 
image is not necessarily an exact reproduction of an original event or experience 
(as Conway wrote, autobiographical memories are 'actively reconstructed at 
retrieval') 159 . It is, after all, possible to imagine a unicorn driving a Ford 
Mustang. Thirdly, this form of mental representation is not fixed, but adjustable. 
That is, we can adjust the view we have of it; the unicorn can drive away from or 
towards the 'viewer'. 160 Fourthly, we tend always to think of 'images' as visual, 
and in the main they are, but it is possible to 'image' a melody (think of Sinatra 
singing 'My Way'), or a tactile experience (think of forking hot spaghetti 
bolognaise into your tender mouth). Reber concludes that this 'picture in the 
head' theory 'encroaches on the meaning of an etymologically related term, 
imagination' and indeed it does.
The Unicorn is Driving a Mustang
Let me address one cavil the reader might have: that we can have no memory of a 
unicorn as we have had no direct sensory experience of one. Hmmm. One aspect 
of this potential problem can be dispensed with straight away - the fact that a 
unicorn is not here, standing in my study, polishing and buffing its horn with a 
red neckerchief, does not mean that I cannot present to myself an image of it 
doing just that. I agree with Ryle and his assertion that representations are not 
copies, because they are not copying an object or perception - remember the 
auditory memory without the concurrent accompanying sound? Brentano, the 
founder of phenomemology, describes the relationship between a memory and 
the object remembered as being simply that between self imagining and object 
imagined. There is no mediating agent 'between' them. I can imagine an absent 
friend - how? By retrieving memories I have of encounters with her, which may
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be stored in any number of memory systems (schema, MOPs, episodic etc.), and 
actively reconstructing them at the point of retrieval. As with the fastidious 
unicorn, she doesn't have to be here. I can 'imagine' her when she was younger. 
I can 'imagine' her now. I can 'imagine' how she will be when she is older. 'A- 
hah!' you might cry, 'but you've had no experience of her being older!' Well, of 
course I haven't. But because I have memories of her when she was younger 
and I have experience of other people getting older (not least myself) and I'm 
able construct hypotheticals, I can 'imagine' her at seventy. I would not be able 
to do this if I had not known her before or now. I cannot only know her in the 
future. This is a case of 'here, now' informing a future 'there, then'. I did not 
say my well-informed, well-supported conjecture of what she will be like at 
seventy will prove correct; I only said that I am able to 'imagine' it. 'All well 
and good,' you may sneer, 'but you cannot claim to be able to imagine an older 
unicorn on the same basis.' If you mean, 'in the same way', then I would agree. 
The memory systems I use to construct the older woman my friend might become 
are not the same as those I use to 'imagine' a unicorn - that is to imagine an 
object that does not exist, just as Wilhelm-Rajrmjnd Reichmann does not exist. 
According to Tulving, the memories I use to 'imagine' my friend are encoded in 
my autobiographical memory, they are autonoetic and as such firmly embedded 
in their contexts; the memories I use to 'imagine' a unicorn are noetic.
The Gauntlet
I mentioned above that I would be challenging the cognitive psychologist's 
account of autobiographical memory being distinct from memories of other 
people's experiences, memories of public events, general knowledge and skills, 
and it is at this point that I throw down my gauntlet. I am referring here to my 
memory in terms of it being the tool of a realist fiction writer (although I feel a 
little uneasy with this distinction, as if I change dramatically, or even become 
someone else, Incredible-Hulk style, when I write). 162 I am arguing that, for the 
purposes of creating realist fiction the distinction between my noetic and 
autonoetic memories disappears. That is, the variable element of degree of 
consciouness (as argued by Tulving) disappears - when I imagine, I experience a 
very high degree of awareness of the fact that I am manipulating, editing and
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reconstructing memories. For example, I appropriate from the real world facts 
(the Alaskan earthquake occurred on Good Friday, 1964, measuring 9.4 on the 
Richter scale) and I retrieve episodic memories (standing at the head of fjord east 
of the Fairweathers, looking at a treeline which had been obliterated to a height of 
more than eleven hundred feet, decades before, by a tsunami) m When I write 
about the earthquake in Blue Earth, 164 I roll fact semantic and episodic/noetic 
and autonoetic memories into a ball, as if they are two strips of differently 
coloured plasticine, and soon the two are inseparable, shot into each other, like 
marble cake. If I go further, perhaps add other facts, episodic memories and 
semantic memories, the ball becomes an entirely different colour. There is, if you 
like, no longer any substance resembling my autonoetic memories. The 
memories have become Billy-Ray's, it is his view of the landscape, it is Billy- 
Ray sitting in a Beech 18, watching the waters of the Gulf recede as he listens to 
a voice on the radio, emanating from Honolulu. 165
There is always much talk of 'empathy' when characters in narrative are 
analysed (by critics, readers or writers), that is, the ability to understand and 
imaginatively enter into another person's feelings. 166 (Recall what Cohen said of 
the intra- and inter-personal functions of autobiographical memory.) It would 
seem to me fair to say that if the writer has expectations of the reader feeling 
empathy for a character, the writer had better feel it herself. I would argue that 
what happens when I experiment with my plasticine ball, modelling and 
remodelling Billy-Ray Rickman, is that I effectively move away, first, from the 
field view of my episodic memory to the observer mode, and then, secondly, I 
move back into field mode, but it is a field that is not mine. 167 It has become 
Billy-Ray's memories and sensations I am experiencing. That is what I mean 
when I write of 'imagining' in my role as writer. It is not my intention to imply 
that my act of 'imagining' is in any way mystical because I don't think it is; but I 
would say this is what I do when I slump back in my chair and stare out of the 
window :
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SUGGESTED MODEL OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IMAGINATION 
AND MEMORY SYSTEMS (AFTER COHEN) 169
NOETIC
No knowledge of the how 
and why of the event
AUTONOETIC
Knowledge about the
context of personal
experience
INFORMATION:
ORGANISATION.
• SOURCE:
• FOCUS.
SPECIFIC EVENTS 
EG: OBJECTS/PEOPLE
CHRONOLOGICAL/
SPATIAL
PERSONAL EXPERIENCE
SUBJECTIVE: SELF
GENERAL KNOWLEDGE: 
FACTS ABOUT THE WORLD
SCHEMA/CATEGORIES
ABSTRACTION/INFERENCE 
REPEATED EXPERIENCE 
GENERALISATION
OBJECTIVE REALITY: WORLD
The Unicorn is driving a Mustang 96
In Delusion and Dream, 170 Freud suggested that we all have within us 
multiple voices, as if we embody, although not in any corpuscular way, a whole 
cast of characters, like those found in novels or in plays. More, he argued that 
writers create their narratives by throwing the characters on the page, much like 
dice on baize, and seeing what numbers come up. These multiple voices, which 
may be in conflict, interact with each other until they resolve their differences, in 
effect. I find this idea intriguing but ultimately mistaken. It may brush against 
my notion of having different field views but there the similarity ends because 
according to this Freudian view, it is always the same characters treading the 
boards.
The Tattooed Character
The two main characters in Altered Land are an alcoholic mother and her deaf 
son; the narrative is written from the point of view of both, in the first person. 
This technique requires the writer to be able to move from one field position to 
another extremely convincingly; I am not saying that I managed to do this, all I 
am highlighting is the fact that the more adept the writer is at 'imagining' in the 
way I describe, the more successful the narrative. Indeed, its plausibility is 
dependent on this. Mr Candid had a cast of wildly dysfunctional characters but I 
would still like to think that I managed to 'imagine' them in the way I have 
outlined. I felt empathy with them; I 'became' them in order to picture what they 
would do in certain situations:
Flanagan is staring furiously at the scuffed pine floor of the town hall. He is thinking of 
Jane Sullivan and how it must have been for her - how bereft she must have been to take 
her own life. The Jane Sullivan he remembers was a good, God-fearing Catholic, 
Flanagan's heart is hammering as Brannigan returns with two more whiskies and the jazz 
band begins to swing. (Mr Candid, p. 7)
That night, as I sat with a beer in the old train wagon they use for a bar there, the radio 
was playing and I heard that the little girl had died of multiple injuries and that the other 
driver had survived. The girl's dog, a Labrador, had died as well in the impact. The dog 
was called Tinkerbell and when I heard that I put my head in my arms and I cried and I
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couldn't stop and I tried and I couldn't stop and I tried and I couldn't stop and when I 
looked up, snot and tears running down my face, there was Mr Candid, leaning against 
the bar looking back at me, unsmiling. (Mr Candid, p. 228)
Luke Kane lost control when he realised that the body under the sheet belonged to Sugar. 
He was uncontainable. No one there ever managed to erase the sight of Luke Kane - the 
son of Mr Steel, the man who had everything - crying and mewling like a baby. No one 
could get near him just as he made sure no one could get near Sugar. Luke Kane 
guarded the body, like a lion, like a mother, kneeling over it, howling, desolate, lashing 
out at anyone who tried to calm him. He pulled the sheet back from Sugar's face, saw 
the damage inflicted by a single sliver of steel and his grief redoubled. The sounds he 
made were inhuman, bestial. [...] The afternoon was strangely silent - no cars passed on 
the distant road, no gulls called to each other, there were no thin cries floating from the 
beach. The only sound was the sound of Luke Kane's heart emptying and filling over 
and over as he bawled. Time passed and the doctor and paramedic tried to approach him 
again; again he snarled and roared, lashed out. It took more than an hour for the cops 
and paramedics to grab Luke Kane and drag him away from the body so he could be 
sedated. Luke Kane had chewed his lips and his chin was bloodied as if he had gorged 
himself on his sister's body. Which, in a way, was what he been doing for years. (Mr 
Candid, pp. 336-7)
Flanagan, Chum and Luke Kane all reacting to death in distinct ways, which 
reflect how I 'imagine' them: Flanagan thinking of others, Chum Kane thinking 
of Mr Candid and Luke Kane thinking, as always, about himself.
The Dead People
There is always debate regarding characterisation, technical questions, as it were, 
about how or whether to show or tell and so on. More, there are the problems 
identified by Davis: 'One is that they are designed to elicit maximum 
identification with the observer. The second is that their existence is part of a 
monolithic structure created by an author.' 171 Davis (who adopts a Marxist 
approach to literary theory) alleges that characters have purpose whilst people 
have personalities, characters are intentional, they are created purely for authorial 
purposes - and perhaps there is something to be said for this view. But he goes 
further, claiming that 'characters' are essentially dead people: if a reader reads 
less of the D 'Urbevilles ten times, Tess never changes, she is always the same,
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no matter how many times she is encountered. This does not take into account 
the relationship between the text and the reader. First, I would suggest that if the 
reader were to encounter Tess at seventeen, and then to re-read the book thirty 
years later, the interpretation of Tess-as-character would be different. Secondly, I 
would suggest that a nineteenth-century reader would interpret Tess-as-character 
very differently from a reader in 2005.m More, Davis' argument takes no 
account of character-as-metaphor - Captain Ahab, Marlow and Kurtz, Madame 
Bovary and Heathcliffe, to name a few.
Also, consider this: Davis assumes the writing of the novel is a seamless 
affair, in which well-groomed, burnished characters roll along well-greased, 
silent tracks, their purposes tattooed on their foreheads, from the first line to the 
last, as if the novelist began to write knowing them absolutely and never revisited 
his idea of them. I would certainly dispute this: if I am what I have experienced, 
and my 'imagination' functions in the way outlined above, then to say my 
characters have no personality is to imply that when I 'imagine' I strip myself of 
my personality in order to 'imagine'. Which is patently absurd. 'Character,' 
Davis remarks, 'gives readers faith that personality is, first, understandable, and, 
second, capable of rational change.' 173 Well, yes. Precisely.
Wittgenstein's Boiled Fox
Kant maintained that 'it is only what we have experienced that we can reproduce 
by connecting together images from our memory'. This makes no allowance for 
the development of semantic memory. More, Kant's statement makes no sense 
when it is remembered that Kant himself never ventured further than seven miles 
from his birthplace of Konisberg and yet felt qualified nevertheless to discourse 
on how we understand the world, discourses which incorporated asides about 
waterfalls, volcanoes and hurricanes. Of course, the problem here is with the 
word 'experience'.
There is a tendency amongst philosophers and cognitive psychologists 
alike to speak of'sensory experience', 'sense data', 'apperception', 'perception', 
'auditory image' etc., when theorising about the way we construct reality. The 
effect of these labels is to suggest that we serially encounter a river of 
bits/bytes/dollops of information about the world which we then store according
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to various systems. Psychologists, in particular, are wont to record the memory 
traces of flash cards, lists, maps, and so on. The lay person might ask 'What does 
this have to do with creative life?' and answer, 'Nothing'. Then ask, 'What does 
this have to do with everyday life?' and answer, 'Nearly nothing.'
But it does. It is the language of philosophy and psychology that creates a 
fog between how we construct our concepts of reality and self and the tools we 
use to do this. 'Experience' can mean a myriad of things. It can mean the 
incident witnessed at a supermarket check out, when a mother finally snaps and 
wallops her whinging seven-year-old; it can mean the sensation of falling of a 
cliff edge as sleep beckons; it can mean turning on the radio mid-way through 
Peggy Lee singing 'Is that all there is?'; it can mean watching the film 'Legend'; 
it can mean tasting a Zanzibar bug or smelling the infamous Durian fruit; it can 
mean glimpsing a front page photograph of Victoria Beckham pouting in that 
curious way she has; it can mean ... anything. Everything you do is an 
experience. It may not be a memorable experience (that is, generic schema 
event) or it may be (schema-plus-tag), but whatever the experience is, it will 
affect the experient, perhaps minimally, perhaps in a way that can be called life- 
altering.
There is, Tulving might argue, a difference between the mother- 
walloping-child and the Durian-smelling experiences: the former was presented 
to me by an outside agency, the latter was (unfortunately) directly experienced 
and this is what Tulving means when he writes of the distinction between 
autonoetic and noetic memories. And here, yet again, I have to disagree. I 
cannot accept his argument that the mother-walloping-child incident is without 
context for me. If it were, then how would I encode it? In my semantic memory 
involving concepts of child abuse? Or parenthood? Or would it be a 'floater'? 
In my role as writer (which, for the record, is, as they say, 24/7; the fat lady never 
seems to sing in this regard) I would argue that both my direct and indirect 
experiences are fed through a filter marked 'things that might be useful in my role 
as writer'. W. G. Sebald articulated this view far more elegantly:
Writing is by definition a morally dubious occupation, I think, because 
one appropriates and manipulates the lives of others for certain ends. [...] 
A writer's attitude is utilitarian. I think Graham Greene said somewhere
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that most writers have a splinter of ice in their heart. This seems to me a 
very perceptive remark because writers have to look upon things in a 
certain way. There is this horrible moment when you discover, almost 
with a sense of glee, something that, although in itself horrid, will fit in 
exactly with your scheme of things. 174
Quite so. Sebald recalls a short story he wrote, 'The Emigrants', in which a 
school teacher boils a dead fox. The teacher's story, as told by Sebald, 
augmented by photographs, was supposedly 'authentically' autobiographical, 
quasi-journalistic. 175 The boiled fox was not. Sebald borrowed that pretty 
vignette from Ludwig Wittgenstein's life as a school teacher. (Wittgenstein 
might say in defence of a charge of animal abuse, 'death is not event in life'; to 
which I would reply, 'OK, I'll allow you that, if you'll allow me to make pictures 
from facts'.)
Sebald has touched on a matter (the writer as vicarious emotional thief 
and factual magpie) which is of no little interest to cognitivists and writers - the 
matter of Attention. A great deal has been said here about perception and sensory 
experiences and it is a well known fact that we filter the sensory data we receive 
because we simply do not have the capacity to deal with the sensory overload that 
results from experiencing the world. We choose those events on which we wish 
to focus and we are often distracted when the filter begins to fail. Colin Cherry 
has identified another aspect of attention which, I believe, is well-known to 
writers: the Cocktail Party Problem. 176 Cherry has studied the way attention 
functions when someone is at a loud party trying to filter out the noise around her 
and he has developed the theory that attention switches according to the 
emotional content of what is being filtered out. For example, if amongst the 
hubbub the woman's name is mentioned, perhaps across the room, she will hear it 
despite the fact the filter should have screened it out according to the factors of 
volume and distance. I believe that writers are particularly prone to attention 
switching but that the switch is not necessarily thrown by the emotional content 
of what is heard or seen, rather it is thrown by the desire to hear others' stories, or 
because he or she is writing about a place or time or subject. When I began to 
write (the final version of) Blue Earth, I became aware of any references to 
clouds, pigs and Catholicism, to name a few attention-seeking subjects. I listened
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to weather reports closely, I spotted short articles in magazines and newspapers 
about battery pig farming. Obviously, in these cases, the material was always 
there, I had simply never directed my attention towards it before.
There is also, however, the issue of the manipulation and appropriation of 
the lives of others to use for one's own purposes and this is where the writer 
could be described as being, at best, an always sympathetic ear, or, at worst, a 
callous pirate of the emotional seas. What might pass as concern for a woman's 
account of miscarriage, might, in fact, be a desire to hear about the physical event 
and the emotional fallout because realist narrative must be plausible. 177 
Utilitarian indeed. My memory of this exchange could not, I would argue, be 
described as purely noetic because the context has been encoded by me. 178 Not 
only that, but I have no interest in encoding the memory as representation or 
copy, since I intend to manipulate and elaborate the memory content. The 
memory is encoded as proto-narrative.
The Unicorn's Pedigree
Of course I have memories of experiencing unicorns, I have memories of 
encountering them in childhood books, films, heraldry, conversations, 
advertisements ... just as you have. I spent my university life smoking Benson 
and Hedges, fingering the embossed unicorn daily, as it were. In fact the unicorn 
has quite a pedigree for an animal that has yet to be directly experienced. A short 
history of the beast:
The unicorn appears in ancient Chinese mythology, its companions the 
dragon, the phoenix and the tortoise. We know this because it adorns gateways 
of the tomb of Confucius in Qufu, built in 500BC. Pliny the Elder refers (AD60) to 
the unicorn in his Historia Natural is, and describes it as 'a ferocious beast, 
similar in the rest of its body to a horse, with the head of a deer, the feet of an 
elephant, the tail of a boar, a deep bellowing voice, and a single black horn, two 
cubits in length, standing out in its forehead'. Unsurprisingly, Pliny says it 
'cannot be taken alive', which neatly explains the dearth of fossils, skeletons or 
furs. In the second century AD, an anonymous Greek monk felt moved to write 
Physiologus (The Naturalist), in which he makes reference to the unicorn. 
Physiologus, the original bestiary book, greatly influenced Medieval artists and
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the art of the Middle Ages, where the unicorn appears in tapestries, in heraldry 
and in paintings. Its disposition had evidently changed since Pliny's times, as it 
by then signified holiness and chastity. Shakespeare refers to the unicorn in 
Timon of Athens (Act 4, scene iii), naming it amongst lions, lambs, wolves, 
horses, bears and foxes, all animals for which, as Wittgenstein would confirm, we 
have epistomological evidence. Robert Bylot, searching for the elusive North- 
West passage in the seventeenth century, claimed to have seen 'sea-unicorns' 
bobbing in the waves - we can only surmise he was referring to the illustrator- 
shy, elusive narwhal. Centuries later, in 1941 to be precise, George Orwell's The 
Lion and the Unicorn was published, the title referring to the emblem, the shield, 
the signifier of the British Empire. (Disney released Fantasia in the same year, 
featuring all-singing, all-dancing unicorns. But these were essentially frivolous 
unicorns, unicorns who'd give you the glad-eye, unicorns for whom the word 
'cartoon' meant something other than it did for Michelangelo.) In 1951 there 
came the Festival of Britain, an Empire-Fest of awesome proportions, during 
which the royal herald was blazoned everywhere, because it gave a clue, 
apparently, to the British character: the lion symbolised action, the unicorn 
symbolised imagination (italics, obviously, mine). Then came the films, Legend 
and Harry Potter spring to mind ... The poor unicorn. Dragged from pillar to 
post across the ages, mourning, no doubt the loss of its terrifying bellow and 
terrifying feet, as it was transmogrified across centuries from O-beast to My 
Little Pony.
But there is hope, yet, for the unicorn. It has a more illustrious pedigree 
even than that which I have outlined. We know that Palaeolithic man sat in his 
temperature- and light-controlled cave and painted the unicorn fifteen thousand 
years ago on the walls of his sanctuaries. Thousands of years later and thousands 
of miles away the people inhabiting the Indus valley, in modern Pakistan, 
Afghanistan and India, depicted the unicorn in their temples, their homes, even in 
the seals they used to formalise agreement. These seals have been dated to 
between 2600 and 1800 BC. The implications of this are staggering: recall Levi- 
Strauss' theory that language patterns and myth demonstrate that there is a 
common framework underpinning all human life across thousands of years. It 
would seem that the ability to ask (and answer) the question 'what if?' has been 
with us a long time, as long as the ability to construct hypothetical; indeed, so
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long has it been with us that to suggest the ability is not innate, a priori seems 
misguided, not to say churlish. The unicorn has always been with us, no matter 
whether we are homo sapiens or homofictus.
If I, as homo sapiens, create homofictus™ then why would I deny homo 
fictus any knowledge that I have? How can I deny my characters my semantic 
knowledge? I know Wilhelm-Rajmund, Chum Kane and John Player all know 
about unicorns. As Carver said, 'You are not your characters but your characters 
are you' (which is another reason why Leonard J. Davis is wrong to describe 
characters as 'dead people'). Chum, Special and Billy-Ray know all about men 
and women and love and disappointment and divorce and regret and friendship. 
Of course they do, because I do - but they cannot know anything I don't know 
about these things. Interestingly, Weber remarks that 'Carver's characters know 
a great deal less than the author does' 181 and I agree, because they cannot know 
more than Carver. Moreover, Carver must have had an epistemic awareness of 
what his characters did not know in order precisely to relieve them of the burden 
of certain kinds of knowledge. 183
As Cohen said, we can retrieve far more knowledge than we store because 
we are able to infer (for example, the knowledge nugget 'Julius Caesar had a 
mother'). As a writer, I do not burden readers with superfluous knowledge about 
characters that can be inferred; I would not do this if I were introducing Billy-Ray 
to a friend at a cocktail party, so why do it on the page? Further, as a writer, I do 
not burden my characters with knowledge about the world that they can infer. To 
be sure, the revelation of inferential knowledge can itself be pivotal either to the 
character or reader, or both; it may even be the force which drives the plot. (The 
most obvious illustration of this would be the crime genre, in which the detective, 
Patricia Cornwell's Kay Scarpetta, for example, infers from facts and forensics, 
the actions of the perpetrator of a crime, and reader is aware of the accretion of 
these inferences.) These observations are, obviously, encroaching into questions 
concerning the relationship between author, text and reader, and I don't have the 
space here to address them fully. What I would like to say is that my comments 
regarding what is not written about characters reminds me of Hemingway's 
theory of omission; I could define the nine-tenths of the iceberg beneath the text 
as representing both reader's and the writer's inferential knowledge.
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Which last point brings me to my final digression on the various 
dimensions and affects of memory and its relationship with narrative and 
imagination. Not only does the submerged body of ice contain frozen within it 
inferential knowledge, it also provides the tip of ice with a foundation on which 
to float, based on our understanding of shared cultural and emotional experiences. 
These inform our prospective expectations and provide us with 'expectation- 
supporting norms', as Bruner describes them. 184 These norms may be simple, 
such as 'woman crying - pain or disappointment', or complex, for example, 
'stranger- alienation, displacement, danger' (that is, character as metaphor), or 
'9/11 - fear and destruction' and they provide the writer and the reader with a 
common shorthand, obviating the need for lengthy exegesis. (And one element 
of that shorthand tacitly agreed upon by both writer and reader is that these norms 
have as their dialectical opposites, 'possibility-evoking transgressions' 185, another 
version of peripeteia.) These norms also provide a framework for what can be 
considered plausible, an essential aspect of the writer-reader relationship given 
plausibility is at the heart of realist fiction. It seems fitting that lan McEwan's 
Saturday has been recently published to great acclaim, as the narrative deals with 
a problem that has arisen for the writers of realist fiction with regard to individual 
memories and shared experiences: the flashbulb memory.
Flashbulb Memory
Flashbulb memory is a special case of witness memory. It is the term 
given to the unusually vivid and detailed recollection people often have of 
the occasion when they first heard about some very dramatic, surprising,
12&important and emotionally arousing event.
This is the succinct definition provided by Cohen (in 1996), who goes on to 
mention Kennedy's death, Pearl Harbour and the Challenger Shuttle.
Flashbulb memories typically encode what is called the 'reception event' 
rather than the event itself. That is, they encode the circumstances in 
which the person first received the news and usually include the place,
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who was present at the time, what activities were going on, the affect 
occasioned by the event, and the source of the news. 187
I sit here, in the third week of June 2005 and look at the list of notable events 
mentioned by Cohen in 1996. What to say? 188 9/11. Beslan. Tsunami. Three 
intrinsically different events, all seared into our memories. Branded there, 
ineradicable.
Once formed, flashbulb memories are apparently long-lasting and 
unchanged over time. Flashbulb memories are also distinguished by their 
phenomenological quality. They seem to have the peculiarly vivid 
character of an actual perception - what Brown and Kulik189 call 'live 
quality' - and tend to include seemingly irrelevant and trivial details.
There have been many millions of words already written about 9/11, Beslan and 
the tsunami, and there will be many more, because there are so many things to be 
said about these events and I shall leave that contextualising and conjecture to 
others better able to comment.
My reason for mentioning them here is that this concept of flashbulb 
memories - an undeniable fact of twenty-first century existence, as images are 
beamed around the world, in real time and remembered in exactly the manner 
described by Cohen190 - is fascinating to any writer. There is, first, I would 
argue, the fact that these memories are both social and individual. That is, they 
are substantially common memories, shared by hundreds of millions and yet they 
are also your own. To be sure, my memory of 9/11 has details yours will not - a 
friend I bumped into as I walked to a post office; telling her I'd just heard a report 
of a plane hitting the World Trade Centre, puzzled that a pilot could allow that to 
happen (this is my memory of the reception event). I later sat on a burgundy sofa 
watching television for hours; you may have sat on an emerald sofa, or you may 
have stood in an office but we all watched the same images, over and over again. 
We were collectively being presented with Neisser's 'successive reconstructions' 
so it is hardly surprising that when I cause the black marks 9 and / and 11 to 
appear on the page, I know that you see two silver towers, stark against a 
cerulean sky, gold and russet flames billowing from them. But, of course, what I
The Unicorn is driving a Mustang 106
cannot know - exactly, in detail - is your emotional response to that image. I 
cannot know if you reviled the pornography of violence, or if you (like Damien 
Hirst) thought the image strangely beautiful, or if your fear of what might happen 
next overwhelmed you, as the search went on for other, lost planes. Or, perhaps, 
all of these.
It would be asinine to suggest that Michelangelo and his contemporaries 
did not experience flashbulb memories, but I would argue that these memories 
would have been qualitatively different. He may have seen bloody battles, may 
even have witnessed murder. But a battle is a series of events and a murder a 
single event, usually involving one person and few witnesses. These are not 
memories that would have been global in the way I outline above; they would 
still have been individual. The memory of seeing a man murdered might have 
changed Michelangelo's concept of self as it was encoded, but he could not refer 
to it to others and expect them to share any aspect of it in the way I can by 
writing 9/11, Martin Luther King, Diana, Princess of Wales, tsunami.
Many writers of fiction contributed to the editorials and analysis pages of 
the broadsheets after 9/11 to debate what we should 'do' about the event. 
Impossible to ignore, impossible to include. What to do about it? For example, 
to set a realist novel in New York, or indeed just about any westernised urban 
area, at the turn of the century and not mention 9/11 and its effect on the 
characters would be to distort the mirror the author holds up to the world. Now, 
however, more than three years later, it is easier. The event cannot, I believe, be 
ignored, but three years later a great many of us are experiencing a form of 
emotional amnesia, or selective forgetting, that enables us to both write and read 
fiction which encompasses these events. I remember my mother crying 
hopelessly on 22 November 1963 as she watched the black and white frame by 
frame assassination of Kennedy (surely the first of the truly visual collective 
flashbulb memories?). Many years later she watched Oliver Stone's JFK, 
emotionless as a stone.
My first brush with the problem of how to incorporate a collective 
flashbulb memory into narrative came last year, during the writing of 
Unlockedr. 191 Why a 'problem'? Because the vividness of the memory is directly 
proportional to the degree of emotion experienced at the time of reception. Does 
the writer place a character at the site and imagine how it must have been? It
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would be a brave thing to do but not, I suspect, a difficult one precisely because 
of the 'live quality' of the memory. However, I fear I am a narratival coward 
because I elected to refer to the event obliquely.
Shake, the main character of Unlocked, owns and operates a small deep- 
sea fishing venture based on the fictional island of St George, set to the south of 
the Windward Islands in the West Indies. Shake is a white Englishman, a 
wanderer who craves emotional amnesia. One early morning he takes an 
American family, the Wesrmores, fishing:
Shake climbs up onto the flybridge as Bap casts off the bow line, and Ribailagua II eases 
away from the jetty. Out in open water, the swell increases and Shake powers up, begins 
to plane the waves, reducing the pitch. Mr Westmore hauls himself up the ladder and 
comes to stand by Shake, legs braced, feet splayed, arms crossed.
'Everything OK?' asks Shake.
Tine.' Mr Westmore nods his pale ginger head. 'You're English, aren't you?'
'Yes.'
'My grandmother came from an English village called Frithelstock Stone, in 
Devon. Maybe you know it?'
'Afraid not.'
'No. No one ever does.' Mr Westmore looks even more despondent than 
before.
'I wasn't born in England and I haven't lived there for a long time.' Shake feels 
he has to apologise for his ignorance. 'But it's interesting, because if you look at a map 
of St George a lot of the names are from Devon. Some of the sailors who landed here 
must have been from the area. There's Exeter, Tor Point, Plymouth and Tamar for a 
start.'
'How long you been doing this?'
'About ten years now.'
'Hmm. Must be a great life. I work on Wall Street.' Mr Westmore grips the 
grab rail. 'I have a seven bedroom house in Westchester, a son at Yale and a beautiful 
daughter. I drive a Jaguar or, sometimes, my Maserati for a change of scene. Sometimes 
I drive to our summer house on the Island. I also have a duodenal ulcer, hypertension 
and haemorrhoids.'
Not surprising he looks so sad, thinks Shake. But when he glances at Mr 
Westmore, it's to find the man smiling slightly.
'Well, I have a one bedroom shack on a piece of land that looks like a clearing 
in a jungle with an empty swimming pool pit in the middle. There's one tap with cold 
water and the power cuts out twice a day usually, sometimes more. The phone line goes
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dead most days. I drive a fifteen-year-old Land Rover, when it allows me. I'm building 
a concrete house and I have more outgoings than income. I also have a crocked left 
knee.'
'Last year we went to Puerto Rico, year before to Nassau.'
'Nice.'
'No, not nice.' Mr Westmore wipes the sweat from his temples. 'Just more of 
the same. Went looking for something different and they weren't it. It's not the same - 
Wall Street. It's not the same. I've worked there more than twenty years and it's not the 
same. The whole city is different. Everyone I know has been looking for something 
ever since and I don't know anyone who's found it.'
Shake always has a problem with this, does not know what to say.
He'd been out deep sea fishing with four young Frenchmen early that morning, around 
Jacamar Island, and he didn't get back to dock until nearly eleven. The men had been 
disgruntled and burned by the time they returned, had walked off to the Oriole Palm Bar 
with barely a thank you. Shake remembers looking round and the grounds were 
deserted, no security, no gardeners, no guests around the pool. He'd cleaned up the boat 
and then walked across the manicured lawns to the beach bar, puzzled by the set of the 
shoulders of the men there, puzzled by the way each of them had each built a fence 
around himself. Shake arrived in time to see a replay of the second plane coming in, 
argent and curving, arcing like a scimitar as it sliced through the tower. Shake stared as 
the clip replayed, frame by frame, each frame matching the slamming of his eyelids. His 
hands and thighs felt suddenly cold and he'd sat on a stool, looking up at the screen, 
waiting to believe what he was seeing over and over and over again. The bar tender 
poured him a straight whisky, unasked, and Shake - who never touched anything 
stronger than an occasional beer when he had the boat - drank it and the glass was 
refilled. He sat there for hours, with the same men, building his own private fence, 
fighting the sense of mute panic. The world kept showing itself to Shake it its awful 
immensity and he kept trying to draw it back in, pull it back in, reduce it once again to an 
unimportant, sunlit Caribbean island. No one spoke. Sometimes the men glanced at 
each other, sometimes they cried and no one said anything. When the near-atomic dust 
clouds began to race along the concrete canyons, burgeoning florets of breathlessness, a 
heavy-set blond man stood, set his stool carefully against the bar, wiped his eyes with the 
heels of hands, and said, 'That's it then.' And everyone knew exactly what he meant.
'That's why I wanted to come here, to St George,' says Mr Westmore. 'I didn't want 
just another bit of America with white sand. I wanted ... shoot, I don't know what I 
wanted. To live a little, maybe. To not feel safe. Because anyway, I don't feel safe. I 
never feel safe. So why pretend it's all the same? My duodenal ulcer? I got that since
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nine eleven. It's not the work, it's not the dealing and the commuting and the parties.
It'snot that.' 
'No.'
'Don't know why I'm telling you all this. Never told anyone before.' 
'It's because you'll never see me again.' Shake begins to slow the Bertram 31,
and the bow drops a little. 'You should put some cream on your face. The wind makes
it feel like you're OK but you're burning all the same. Here.' Shake ferrets in a box and
digs out a tube of SPF30.
What is happening in this extract? First, as a writer I have made many choices. I 
have decided to address the issue of 9/11. Why? Because Mr Westmore is 
American, and it is important for later plot developments that he be so. He is a 
rich American, he is, after all, staying in a seven-star hotel in the Caribbean, so I 
have 'made' him192 a futures trader on Wall Street. He is in his fifties, so will 
have experienced 9/11 - but directly or indirectly? And this is where my 
cowardice comes into play, because I elected to switch the point of view at the 
moment that Mr Westmore makes oblique reference to 9/11. More than that, I 
also change tense and style. The narrative begins in present tense, revolves 
around dialogue, then switches to past tense recollection, purely from Shake's 
pov, and then back to present tense. There is also the stylistic notation of line 
spaces to underline the switch. Cowardice aside, why elect to make these 
choices?
Because they allowed me to write my memories. I didn't watch the news 
in East Coast real time, sitting in a Caribbean bar, nursing a whisky but that is 
what Shake would have done. However, my memory of watching the event left 
me with three strong images - the flight of the second plane, the clouds of dust 
and the stuttering frame by frame endless replays. I received the news in the 
same way as Shake, so I could shift my vision from my field to observer to 
Shake's field incorporating in him my (remembered, rehearsed) responses with a 
sense of certainty that these responses were plausible. As I mentioned, Shake has 
a desire to collapse the world to the manageable, so his need to reduce the impact 
of the news was, to an extent, peculiar to him but I 'imagine' that many people
felt the same.
This last point is important - it refers not only to the 'collective' element 
of our flashbulb memories but also to the fact that it is indeed possible for the
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writer to use forms of factual and emotional shorthand (or to appeal to 
expectation-supporting norms, as Bruner might say). As a writer I do not feel 
compelled to elaborate the events of 9/11. The reader has an entire subset of 
memories which they can explore for themselves but because of the nature of the 
encoding of these events, a writer can be sure that this subset exists. l93 It is a 
matter for some debate, however, and possibly of some concern, whether this 
'memory sub-set shorthand' applies equally to other mental acts, such as feeling 
guilt, remorse or love. 194 (It would seem that writers do assume that the reader 
knows what a character feels when he feels angry, that writers assume that a 
reader has a similar sub-set of memories, which have influenced their concepts of 
'self.) I am referring here, of course to the issue of the writer appealing to the 
reader's capacity to empathise. Suffice to say here that my assertion above, that I 
cannot know - exactly and in detail - your emotional responses to the images of 
9/11, still stands; but I also assert that I can assume with some degree of certainty 
that you have a subset of memories which correspond with the collective 
flashbulb memory.
Anyway, Back to Unicorns ...
He hated staying in motels - the beds were never long enough and the air-con never 
worked. Well, maybe it worked, but it never worked right - too fuckin' hot or too 
fuckin' cold. So he'd snort and toss and flick his mane out of his eyes all night long, 
waking up muzzy, his teeth gluey with hot spit. That morning was no exception - he 
woke in room 24 of the Hot Sands Motel, tangled in the sheets, his hooves scraping on 
the worn linoleum as he wrestled his horn free of the speared pillow, and the air con was 
buzzing but no fuckin' cold air was coming through. Well, whaddya expect for fifteen 
bucks a night?
He didn't even bother visiting the bathroom, just stepped outside and trotted 
over the highway to a 77 gas station, where he ran himself through the car wash. It was a 
good one too, the brushes well-worn, and the jets of water not too hard or too hot, jus' 
firm enough and wet enough to make him feel human, as they said. He snickered as he 
strolled back to the lot outside the motel, where his car was cooking in the Nevadan sun. 
What the hell was all that about? People making themselves feel human? Shit - either 
they were human or they weren't. No half-way houses there - although there were those 
weird psychos, the centaurs. Now they were trouble you din' wanna meet on a dark 
night in a narrow place. Except for, maybe, that dude Chiron.
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The inside of the Mustang was baking under its rag-top, and he motored it over 
into the shade of a convenience store, before lowering the roof and switching the air-con 
on full blast. As he waited for the cool to kick in, he checked his smile in the mirror, ran 
a rough, serrated tongue over white, ridged teeth, smiled again. Yanking open the glove 
pocket, he rummaged through a selection of kerchiefs before pulling out a very 
conservative, cowboy number, scarlet with white spots. He polished his horn, rolling the 
kerchief along the spirals until they gleamed, and then tied the sweat rag round his neck. 
One last glance in the mirror, a self-satisfied smirk and he slipped the gear shaft, floored 
the gas pedal and fishtailed out of the lot, throwing up clouds of fine grit and sand, as 
garbage fled to the gutter and snagged on tinder-dry brush.
Leaving Caliente, he chased a freight train, ninety-six wagons from Santa Fe, 
Topeka and Jackson, rumbling out of town into the desert. The US606 followed the lazy 
curves of the line, and the Mustang roared, moved up the gears until the train grew 
smaller in the mirror. He slung a foreleg out the window, resting his fetlock on the 
ledge, felt the hot air rushing past, as an F16 fighter plane shot tracers over the endless 
valley ahead. The Mustang was the only car moving on the blacktop as far as the eye 
could see and he set the cruise control at 110 mph, leaned back and sighed, lit a Marlboro 
before slipping on his Raybans. And then he saw it, by the side of the road, in the 
distance, shimmering in the waves of heat rising from the badlands ...
We'll leave the unicorn there, cruising the least-travelled road in the USA in his 
Mustang, and perhaps wonder every now and then what it was he saw on the 
roadside. This vignette, excerpt, short piece, character study, exercise in third 
person pov, is included for one reason and one reason only: to illustrate what I 
mean by 'I imagine'. It took fifteen minutes to write, and for some of those I sat 
back and stared out of the window. I took from my semantic memory all I know 
about unicorns, all I know about driving Ford Mustangs, ransacked episodic 
memories of watching a ninety-six wagon train passing through the Nevada town 
of Caliente and hearing the boom of F 16s passing overhead as I drove to Tonopah 
and I then I rolled these memories, these inferences etc., together in a ball. As a 
result I came up with a short 'road movie' piece, possibly in the detective-noir 
genre, the central character of which is a foul-mouthed unicorn. I could have 
written a scene in which a silent, brooding unicorn lies beside thundering, glacial 
waters outside the gates of Valhalla; or a scene in which a rather fey beast, 
nervous and diet-conscious, sidles through a sylvan glade as minstrels play in the 
distance. But what is essential to all these scenes is the fact that I wouldn't feel 
compelled to describe the unicorn. I know that you know it's white. 195 If I
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described it as brown, you would roll your eyes, wonder at my temerity or 
stupidity, and move on to a different, more plausible text. None of us has seen a 
unicorn but we know it's white. More disturbingly, if I described a scene in 
which a foul-mouthed mustang (a horse which does exist) drove a Ford Unicorn 
(which is a more than credible name for a car), 196 then your faith in me as 
narrator would evaporate entirely. It would seem that even fiction which does not 
depend on plausibility for its validity is nevertheless bound by certain 
conventions of expectation-supporting norms which support the conspiracy 
between writers and readers. The unicorn exemplifies, for me, the narratival 
shorthand to which I have referred; if Memory is the Daughter of the Muse, then 
the Unicorn is the Nephew of Imagination.
One last question: am I right in thinking you also know that the Ford 
Mustang is cherry red?
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BLUE EARTH
In October 2002, carrying the 200,000 word, unfinished manuscript of Fata 
Morgana, I flew to Tobago in the West Indies, where I spent the next seven 
months. I had, before leaving, posted a copy of the unfinished work to my agent 
in London. On the title page I had scrawled a note to her: 'Maggie - forget 
everything I said it was about...' Once settled in the house in Tobago, which is 
sited on a wide, crescent bay, twenty metres from the sea, I swam, I drank beastly 
cold Carib and wondered how to deal with the behemoth in my study, only half- 
finished and already 550 pages long. I need not have bothered because my agent 
called me after a week and told me to throw half the manuscript in the bin. I was 
so stunned, my memory of the event is hazy (which must be the exception to the 
theory regarding the relationship between emotional content and encoding); I 
suspect I even stupidly asked, 'Which half?' Later that afternoon, after a lengthy 
conversation with my agent, I divided the manuscript into its chapters, stood back 
and looked at fifty three piles of paper. Then I picked out each chapter that had 
any reference to the Temples (Alice, lan and Evelyn) and Knights (Alice's 
parents), I bundled them up and buried them in the back of a dark, damp 
cupboard. This is a deceptively simple sentence that masks a welter of emotions 
- rage, despair, self-loathing and so on. The usual emotions experienced when 
one accepts that a year's work and a hundred thousand words amounts to nothing.
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Illumination
I did not think, I must write another novel. Instead, in the absence of my 
laughable lawn and unfinished shelves, I sat on the gallery and stared at the 
endless sky falling to the horizon, where it met the Atlantic. I watched the sun set 
and rise, I watched Mars and the moon move across the night sky. I watched 
clouds form: lens, stratus and cumulonimbus. All the time, as I watched the sea 
and sky, the engine was turning over, grinding out its strangely punctured ticker- 
tape. I remembered telling my agent to forget everything I'd said Fata Morgana 
was about, to forget the nature-nurture theme. But if it wasn't about that, then 
what was it about? I realise this sounds odd - a writer with a three hundred and 
fifty page manuscript, sitting out, looking at the stars, and wondering what the 
book was about but it did happen. Gradually, I realised the root of the problem: I 
had committed the cardinal sin of ignoring my meta-theme and as a result the 
manuscript had become unwieldy, bloated and implausible. My meta-theme is 
(as of course it always is) the individual's ability to survive a life-altering event, 
an event which is experienced at an age when their concept of 'self is still being 
formed. For John Player in Altered Land, it was the effects of an IRA bomb at 
the age of thirteen; for Chum Kane, in Mister Candid, the rape of his sister by his 
father, which he witnessed at the age of twenty; for Billy-Ray Rickman, in what 
was still Fata Morgana, the deaths of his brothers on the same day, as they 
served in Italy in 1942, when he was fifteen. Once I had acknowledged my meta- 
theme, I knew who was the character standing at my shoulder, whispering in my 
ear, 'It's about me, it's about me, it's about me' - Billy-Ray Rickman, in all his 
ambiguous glory.
I spent some time stitching together the gaps in the narrative, or, rather, in-filling 
the cavernous gaping holes left by the excision of the Knights and Temples. This 
work was not what I would describe as creative, rather it was an exercise in 
problem-solving as I sifted through the narrative, smoothing out the rumpled plot 
and deleting cross-references to characters who were now languishing in a dark 
cupboard, growing mouldy. Once I had finished reading and writing, re-reading 
and re-writing over and over, I had unearthed the themes were that were already 
illustrating my meta-theme: blood, oil and hubris. They had been buried under 
the weight of too elaborate a structure. Then I began to write again, to write
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creatively, that is. I found myself in the interesting position of having to revisit 
lives and worlds I had already 'imagined' and left behind. But, of course, I had 
the nine-tenths of the narratival iceberg to mine for myself. I knew already a 
great deal about my characters and the landscape they inhabited. So I began to 
tweeze out strands of my characters' experiences which I had not written about 
before (for example, Billy-Ray meeting and sleeping with Magde again; Isobel 
learning about fishing from her father) and began to weave them into the 
narrative.
Still I was living, alone, in the house in Tobago, looking out over the sea. 
I spent my days swimming, writing and walking along the beaches; in the early 
evenings, I sat on the gallery and watched the sun fall and the moon rise, weather 
permitting. Why is this important? For two reasons, I believe. The first refers to 
my comments in the opening chapters of this paper about the socio-political 
context and personal context in which the writer lives and writes. If it is accepted 
that my experiences and the manner of the encoding of those experiences as 
semantic/episodic/autonoetic/noetic memories both constantly inform and modify 
my concept of self- self as writer - then the landscape in which I was writing 
changed me. 197 Over time, my narrative became water-logged, as Viveka trawled 
the waters of the Gulf of Alaska, as Irochka drowned in Home Lake (rather than 
shooting herself, as in an earlier version), as the tsumani raced up Seward fjord, 
as Isobel stood smoking and thinking, looking out over the Gastineau Channel 
and wondering about ghosts. There are myriad allusions and references to ships, 
kayaks, Zodiacs, liners crossing water; Billy-Ray looks for oil beneath the North 
Sea, beneath the polar sands of an ancient ocean, as Scan Regan casts his line 
from the rocks of Blacksod Bay; sodden, mythical creatures appear - the Fish 
God, the black marlin, Sedna (or Arnaknagsak). And then Frankie flies to the 
North Slope with Billy-Ray in the de Havilland Beaver, and she watches the sky 
and begins to dream about escape. The fourth draft of the novel opened with 
Frankie sitting on her balcony in Male, making gorillas and women out of clouds, 
which were gliding over a restless Indian sea. When that fourth draft was 
finished, I remembered what Billy-Ray had said when he first saw the Pacific and 
I called my agent to tell her the title had changed.
'It's called Blue Earth; I told her.
'Hmm. Not really snappy enough.'
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'It's called Blue Earth" I said again.
Perhaps it was my curtness or the rasp of insanity in my voice that 
persuaded her (fourth draft?) but from then on it was called Blue Earth.
Which brings me to my second point, with reference to the fact that the 
landscape I lived in changed both me and the novel as I wrote it.
Landscape
In the introduction to this paper, I described the route I would be taking through 
the labyrinth of theories regarding self, memory and narrative, and suggested that 
the concept of this pathway itself illustrates, or, rather, mirrors my final 
contention here: that narrative is a landscape over which swarm many possible 
pathways. As I have also written, when I imagine myself into the landscape of 
novel in progress, using my elaborated198 memories in all their forms, I imagine 
the view from a changed field perspective. More than this, I try, as best I can, to 
select the most satisfying route along which to lead the reader in this landscape.
Programmers responsible for computer-generated narratives of games, 
film and advertisements (hypermedia, so-called) approach the problem of story 
grammar from an interesting point of view, a view very different from those of 
literary theorists and linguists. 199 One of their number, Bob Hughes, has also 
argued that narrative should be seen as landscape:
Most approaches to computer-generated narrative focus entirely on the 
creation of paths. But there is much more to narrative than this. To 
propose that the path is the narrative is like proposing that the Pyg track is 
Snowdon, or the Pennine Way is England. Each path is chiefly a route 
through a particular terrain - and the terrain is the main thing. Each is 
popular because it is a very good route that begins promisingly, develops 
interestingly and concludes satisfyingly. However, the Pyg track is no use 
without its surroundings and if you were to divorce it from the landscape, 
you would have nothing very much.
Of course. I'm not sure that when I use the word 'landscape' I mean exactly the 
same as Hughes, who is speaking of essentially virtual landscapes.201 However,
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there is a great deal worthy of interest in his article: as he writes, 'the terrain [that 
is, the narrative] is the main point'.
First, his description of the possibility of landscape, that is, that there are 
many paths we can use to traverse it, reminds me of aspects of prospective 
memory. Remember the woman who wanted to leave her husband and explored 
many different pathways to reach the trig point which represented 'happiness'? 
This obviously refers to an imagined landscape (the problem), over which run 
paths of varying difficulty (the solutions). 202 I'm here tempted to suggest, 
adapting Hughes' metaphor, that the narrative is Snowdon and the words on the 
page are the Pyg track. This is particularly apposite for me, with regard to Blue 
Earth: four drafts and eventually a final version; four pathways and an ultimately 
satisfying (Pyg-like) track. In retrospect, there were two reasons and not one why 
Blue Earth proved so difficult in the writing. Not only because I had ignored my 
meta-theme, but also because I consistently chose the wrong pathways - dead 
ends and cul-de-sacs, pathways strangled by brush. 203 (It is interesting to 
remember here deciding that Billy-Ray reveal himself to himself in an episode 
described as a trudge across a bleak landscape to reach a cairn.204)
Hughes also makes mention of Brenda Laurel's analysis of Freytag's 
Triangle:
COMPLICATION
Incentive moment - 
Causes downplayed, 
Effects stressed
CLIMAX/ 
PEREPETEIA:
Cause and effect 
stressed - 
Denouement
RESOLUTION: 
Causes stressed, 
Effects 
downplayed
Freytag's triangle refers to the dynamics of drama, specifically farce. Laurel 
argues that if subsidiary peaks are included, then the model serves to illustrate the 
dynamics of many forms of literature. So, a traveller/audience/character would
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have glimpses of the goal at all times, whilst encountering a series of problems 
along the way:
COMPLICATION
This model obviously has the characteristics of a mountainscape and, as such, 
suggests it has a spatial element lacking from the original. Because of this, it 
suggests to me the unseen (or the inferred, as I prefer to think of it); that is, the 
sense that there is a great deal which is unsaid, that there are lives lived off-stage 
- Hemingway's nine-tenths iceberg made manifest. 
Bob Hughes also observes that:
War and Peace really is a landscape and the text Tolstoy has given us is 
simply a route he found through it; his other works traverse different parts 
of the same landscape, by different routes, of different lengths. I certainly 
get a similar experience from all Tolstoy's novels - and indeed from all 
Tolstoy's sentences. [...] What's more, Tolstoy behaves as if he is in a 
landscape. He is famously apt to indulge in what we call 'digressions', 
where he 'leaves the main path' of the tale to explore some philosophical 
or historical issue at length -just like some good mountain guide who 
takes you off the track for a while to show you some ruins, or an 
interesting geological structure, or a fantastic view, or to pick bilberries.
And as a writer I do the same; I behave as if I am operating in/imagining a 
landscape. In Mr Candid, the landscape was America, coast to coast, north to 
south. Chum made it from Alaska to Florida, from Long Island to Malibu, 
travelling always alone. I look back at the novel now, and I see scenes set in the 
Everglades of Florida, on the roads around Montauk, in the badlands of Montana
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- and when I wrote the book, I had visited none of them. I have been to these 
places since to see if I had 'imagined' them in a way that had any correspondence 
with reality, to check whether the 'pictures in my head' were right. I like to think 
they were. In 'La Corrida', the world of bull-fighting, which stretches from 
Galicia to Andalucia, is central to the narrative: the casa as urban landscape and 
calle as the dusty, scrubland of the interior, mirrored in the sand circle of the ring. 
In Altered Land, the landscape is restricted to southern England, as it must be 
precisely because John's timidity, his fear of change, prevents him breaking away 
from the familiar. And yet, throughout the book, there are references to the sand 
dunes of southern France, to the west coast of the States, to the peregrinations of 
tribes across Asia, to John's desire to see the world. On the last page is Joan's 
wish for John, as he sets off to travel in Europe: 'he seems at last to have grabbed 
his life in both hands and shaken some sense into it. I want him to stay in that 
van and keep going. Drive through Europe, along the Mediterranean, down 
through Greece to Piraeus, jump on a ship and sail the world.'
Which brings me back to Blue Earth. I know now why I had to put all 
those piles of paper in the cupboard in Tobago: because the life stories of the 
Knights and Temples were nothing to do with the wide, endless, blue earth. To 
borrow from Forster, I doubted the Knights and the Temples for the same reason 
Lucy Honeychurch doubts Cecil Vyse,205 whom she imagines always in a room 
without a view. Alice, lan and Evelyn all existed in a world of small, shuttered 
rooms when I wanted to write about mountains and glaciers, arctic storms and 
earthquakes. They were too small, they rattled inside the Chinese box of the 
novel when I shook it.
Wykhamists in the driveway
On 11 December 2003,1 worked on the manuscript until half past three in the 
morning, the time at which I typed the line, 'When the Great Sea Spirit is angry, 
insufficiently propitiated, she will send a dead spirit, a malignant tupilaq, to 
unsettle the mortals living on the ice shelf Having reached the end of my 
journey, traversed my track, I then spent four hours printing and collating the 
manuscript. On the morning of 12 December 2003,1 flew into Gatwick, 
returning from another long sojourn in Tobago, where I was met by a friend.
The Unicorn is driving a Mustang 120
'Take me to a Post Office, and make it snappy,' was my greeting. That morning I 
posted the final draft of Blue Earth to my agent, with a note scrawled on the title 
page: 'Maggie -1 know what it's about now' and then I was taken to a hotel, the 
Wykham Arms in Winchester, Hampshire, where I slept for hours, through that 
day and into the next. For months, I had sat at my desk sweating in tropical heat, 
ignoring mosquitoes and yelping dogs, ignoring the sheen of salt spray on my 
skin, battening down the jalousies as tropical storms lashed outside and rain 
flooded tiled floors, my days twelve hours long, my nights twelve hours long, 
month after month. All the time trying to switch my field view to Billy-Ray's 
and Isobel's and Frankie's and and and ... Trying to imagine being freezing cold, 
flying in a float plane, trying to imagine that there were glaciers behind the back 
yard, rather than palm trees and bougainvillaea. And all the time I could hear the 
waves breaking on the beach, all the time I was aware of the turning of the earth, 
because I could see it every night.
I woke in the Wykham Arms early in the morning of the 14 December 
2003, feeling strangely bereft. They were all gone, those people I'd lived with 
every day for nearly three years; it no longer mattered what patterns the clouds 
made, whether the sea was pale or leaden. I went to the window and cracked 
open the curtains on a dim day, still grey even at eight o'clock (my nights were 
now to be sixteen hours long). In a driveway on the road opposite, a gaggle of 
men dressed in academic gowns were gathered, mortar boards in hand. They 
were bounded by pale walls, standing on beige pea gravel, in the middle of a 
maze of tiny streets. I felt claustrophobic, I felt alienated and yet this was my 
culture: English academia joshing and jeering, flaunting itself in a small, self- 
satisfied, moneyed city. I watched them and I was suddenly soothed by the 
realisation that Billy-Ray and Jacqueline, Isobel and Frankie, were all still there; 
it was just that they were living on the other side of the mountain. I could visit 
them any time.
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SELF, MEMORY AND NARRATIVE
The sandwiches are long gone and the Glenlivet bottle now lies empty. Our 
tramp across the narratival landscape, where we paused every now and then to 
admire the occasional memory system along the way, is over, leaving us gazing 
at a mountain range, as a unicorn thunders across Death Valley in a (cherry red) 
Ford Mustang, disappearing into the distance. As you stab desperately at your 
mobile phone, trying to raise the Mountain Rescue Service, I'll take the weight 
off my feet and reflect on the journey.
First, we encountered the issue of self-identity and the manner in which we 
construct our sense of selves, how that sense flows from the outcome of the 
functions of many forms of memory, which are stored in a number of ways. 
There followed an excursion into the field of consciousness and the problems of 
establishing what, exactly, we mean when we use the word. A number of 
suggestions were made as to how we could solve the problem of who or what wa 
ordering our inner worlds, ranging from homunculus of the inner self to the 
benevolent conductor. The focus then shifted to the functions and dimensions of 
autobiographical memory and the realisation began to emerge that there exists 
parallels between accounts of schema, scripts, MOPs and TOPs, and theories 
concerning the processes of creative thinking. This informed a discussion of 
whether or not to adopt a nativist theory of innate narrative/story grammar. At 
this point the path changed direction dramatically and various ideas were put 
forward to explain what it is that compels writers to write (with reference made t 
Thematic Organisation Packets) and what happens when writers 'imagine'; that
The Unicorn is driving a Mustang 122
is, how they use their memory - semantic and episodic, long-term and short term, 
etc. - to provide the basis for their fiction. Finally, the process of the writing of 
Blue Earth and the influence of the environment on that writing, was analysed. 
And at the end of the journey, what do I think?
I think that there is a consensus of opinion, amongst practitioners and theorists of 
many and varied disciplines that our concept of self is dependent on our memory 
and that our self histories are constantly revised and updated by our working 
memory. It is self-evident that anything that is written as realist fiction - indeed, 
anything that is written at all - is mediated through the writer, and this is why the 
writer's sense of self is important. I believe that our impulse to narrate is driven 
by meta-themes and that our understanding of story grammar is innate, a priori, 
and this knowledge strongly influences the way we make sense of the world and, 
inevitably, influences the way that worldview is reflected in prose. As a result 
our interpretations of reality are subliminally broken into pico-narratives, 
atomistic narratives that are strung together in such a way that our expectation- 
supporting-norms (or prospective memory) are reinforced time and again, 
ensuring that what we remember corresponds to reality. This familiarity with 
narrative crosses temporal, cultural, ethnic, spatial and linguistic boundaries 
precisely because it is innate, a priori.
I believe that the mental act of imagining (with reference to the writing of 
realist fiction) relies on the exploration, elaboration and exploitation of semantic 
and episodic memories, both my own and other people's. I also contend that the 
distinction between autonoetic and noetic memories disappears for the writer. 
'Imagination' is, effectively, mimesis, imitation but not in the sense that it is a 
'copy' as the original event or perception is no longer present.206 Memory, or, as 
I have occasionally described it, the engine, needs fuel to function. Episodic 
memories and semantic knowledge are the vampires of mental life, they suck the 
blood out of perceptions of and experiences in the world and store the resultant 
data as proto-narrative. I believe the writer burns and converts this data into vast, 
unusual banks of inferential knowledge, which represent indirectly and directly 
experienced events. The more developed the writer's ability to manipulate his or 
her semantic knowledge and proto-narratives, the more plausible the narrative. If 
the writer is skilled at this, it will be possible for the writer to weave into his or
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her narrative elaborated events and accounts of places that were either directly or 
indirectly experienced, and these accounts and events will not be qualitatively 
different. That is, it will not be possible for the reader to be able to distinguish 
between the autonoetic and the noetic memories of the writer. 207
'Imagination' appears, prima facie, to be boundless. Surely, if we can 
'imagine' the unicorn in his Mustang, then it must be boundless? Not so. On the 
one hand I recall a CIA agent, standing in the dust clouds of Manhattan on 9/11 
talking to camera and saying, 'Imagine the unimaginable', when what he meant 
was the previously unimaginable (although, of course, the pilots of the planes had 
been imagining it for years, no doubt, literally making pictures in their heads). 
On the other hand, there are some things which do appear to resist imagining: 
Margaret Thatcher's social conscience, world peace, Ellen Macarthur enjoying 
eight hours sleep, the Alpha Mind. Of course, the first three scenarios are 
originally located in the 'real' world, suggested by an interpretation of known 
facts.
The existence of the Alpha Mind, however, is a theory propounded by a 
fictional character, Janet, earlier in this paper. It is an appealing notion, for two 
reasons. First, because it accounts for the reports made by cognitive 
psychologists of higher order mental events which occur at such a speed and in 
such a way that the experient is unaware of them. Secondly, precisely because it 
occurs 'in such a way', a seemingly mystical way, this relieves this writer of the 
responsibility for describing exactly the complex and elusive relationship 
between self, memory and narrative. But this is not a responsibility I can shirk. I 
have explained my theories regarding the role memory plays in realist fiction 
writing. I have gone so far as to describe my 'imagining' as being akin to playing 
with plasticine, a childlike metaphor for such a sophisticated mental act. And I 
have accepted Humphrey's suggestion that there exists a 'benevolent conductor' 
who oversees these mental acts; but this 'conductor' is not someone other, it is a 
sub-self. To paraphrase Humphrey: what truly binds the elements of memory and 
imagination into one organic narrative unit [is] the very act of making up stories - 
the fact they are involved together in creating a single work of art.
Finally, I have argued that narrative is a landscape. How can it be 
other? We live in a three-dimensional world as three-dimensional beings - even 
homofictus has to be somewhere. Any narrative, fictional or otherwise, is
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founded on the notion that 'there is more to this than meets the eye'. Behind the 
house opposite a barbecue party is taking place, but I can't see it from here; the 
traitors are gathered on the steps of the Forum, but Caesar can't see them from his 
villa. Just as the mind filters and controls the amount of sensory data we receive, 
the writer ignores many pathways, selecting only one to follow across a spatial 
(and temporal) landscape.208 The writer will ignore the various vistas he or she 
can see and choose one view, whilst being aware of unseen events (taking place 
off the page, as it were). These events might be the opera and supper party 
IsobePs parents enjoyed one evening when she was a child, leaving her fretting 
for a night as she imagined she would never see them again; or perhaps Annie 
Regan's body being racked with labour pains as Maggie sits taking tea with 
Michael. Both the writer and the reader accept that these things occur - 
characters eating, sleeping, working - in much the same way they accept that 
Caesar had a mother: by using their inferential knowledge.
Freytag's Triangle is unequal to the task of representing the depth of this 
landscape, as is Laurel's. Perhaps a better representation might be:
As Umberto Eco says, 'Once this world has been designed, the words will follow, 
and they will be (if all goes well) those that that world and all the events that take 
place hi it require'.
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Finally...
I have encountered many previously unknown concepts and unexplored 
disciplines in the writing of this paper; the writing of which has, itself, been a 
journey. Having discussed the various explanations which have been offered by 
those who know a great deal more than I ever shall, in an attempt to answer the 
question 'what happens when I stop typing and stare out of the window and what 
has happened when I begin to type again?', when all is said and done, when the 
philosophers' wall has been scaled or circumvented, when the cognitive 
psychologists' nutshell has been cracked or put back in the bowl and I lay me 
down to sleep, there is one image that keeps bobbing up to float on the surface of 
my mind. As the reader knows, I am satisfied by Nicholas Humphrey's 
suggestion that a benevolent dictator is the bundler of perception data, the 
overseer of memory. However, I confess, that there are times - many times - 
whenKliban's God seems to illustrate exactly what it feels like to create Billy- 
Ray Rickman ...
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From Kliban, Never Eat Anything Bigger Than Your Head
(Methuen, London, 1978)
The illustration has been removed from this digitized version of the thesis due to 
potential copyright issues. 
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NOTES
1 The references to Billy-Ray Rickman, John Player Special and Mr Candid are to characters in 
three of my published novels: John Player is the central character in Altered, Chum Kane inM- 
Candid and Billy-Ray Rickman in Blue Earth. Shake is the central character in Unlocked. I shall 
be referring to these works throughout the text, as well as other narratives I have written.
2 Interesting to note that these authors also wrote The Grapes of Wrath, Earthly Powers, Cancer 
Ward, Tender is the Night, Howard's End, all of them substantial works, as firmly established in 
the Western canon as the shorter novels.
Umberto Eco, in his On Literature, remarks 'I do not have anything else to say about the way I 
write my novels. Except to say they take many years. I do not understand those who write a 
novel a year; they might be wonderful and I do admire them, but I don't envy them.'
John Creasey, a little known mystery writer, wrote five hundred novels under ten pseudonyms. 
Stephen King wrote The Running Man in a week, yet Harper Lee took a lifetime to write To Kill a 
Mockingbird.
5 I suggest the period one to two years because that is the timetable imposed on many writers by 
virtue of their contract with their publishing house. This timetable is extremely flexible but 
nevertheless, the writer is aware of it. Not many writers will be as insouciant as Douglas Adams, 
a notorious procrastinator, who once said 'I love deadlines, I love the whistling sound they make 
as they fly past'.
6 I am aware of this difference because my second novel, Mr Candid, spanned six and a half 
years in the writing.
7 Davis, Resisting Novels, p.4.
8 One eyebrow raising moment last year occurred when I read about the launch of Katie Price's 
(ghosted) autobiography. Clear-skinned, pneumatic and half-dressed, she posed, pouting, holding 
the book at an angle for the photographers. 'This says all there is to say about me. It tells the 
world what I am.' Unfortunately, at that moment she dropped the book and it fell open to reveal 
blank pages. It was a dummy put together for the occasion. Make sense of that, Umberto Eco.
9 There are the tie-ins with television programmes (e.g. Michael Palin's Himalayas), television 
gardeners-rurned-novelists (Alan Titchmarsh), and, of course, Dan Brown, who occupied the top 
four entries for the best-selling paperbacks in May 2005. Not only that, there are now books 
written about the Da Vinci code, and as a result, Eurostar sales rose 17%. Hmmm.
10 Scholes, The Fabulators.
11 'The birth of the reader must be at the cost of the death of the author.' Roland Barthes, being 
essentially interested in the destination of the text rather than its origin, is not of interest here.
12 Llosa, Marquez, Fuentes, Calvino, Kundera, Grass, Lessing, Rushdie, de Bernieres ... the list 
may not be endless, but it is substantial.
13 It's worth mentioning here that Tom Wolfe, who once claimed that 'New Journalism would 
wipe out the novel as literature's main event', published the hugely successful and entirely 
fictional Bonfire of the Vanities in 1987.
14 Scholes and Kellogg, Nature of Narrative.
15 Lodge, Practice of Writing, p.5.
16 I am indebted to Lodge for the notion of such a quadrant, see Practice of Writing, p. 4.
17 I have direct experience of the potential problems arising from the commercial categorisation 
of novels in the marketplace. Altered Land was promoted in such a way as to appeal to the older
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female reader; Mr Candid was described by Amazon as crime writing and by Waterstones as a 
psychological thriller; Blue Earth has suffered the indignity of being variously described as saga, 
as eco-novel and as love story.
I should also say that I have no notion of what it may be like to imagine for the purposes of 
writing historical military fiction, nor of science fiction, children's literature, thrillers, crime 
fiction, chic-lit, lad-lit, etc.
But not fortunate enough to see La Pieta prior to it being screened by glass to prevent the 
repetition of a hammer attack.
In this context, the experiences of Carravagio, who murdered a man, subsequently spending 
years on the run, taking sanctuary wherever he could, is relevant. The style of his painting 
changed, the tones and hues becoming darker, the artist painting himself as the centre of violent, 
bloody scenes.
21 I am unsure of the antonym of 'Enlightenment', because whatever it is, it is appropriate. I
considered the Age of Ignorance, but we've already had one of those.
Wittgenstein, Tractatus, §2.1, p. 8.22
What Descartes was left with were not his doubts alone, but a range of thoughts, cogitattones; 
mental acts which are purely subjective, of which he was immediately aware, and which could, 
therefore, be described as 'his'.
24 This passage is Ryles' contribution to the entry for 'Solipsism' in Urmson and Ree, Concise 
Encyclopaedia of Western Philosophy and Philosophers.
25 Ryle, Concept of Mind, p. 20.
26 Sartre, in his Being and Nothingness, argues that there is a distinction between memory and 
anticipation and the act of imagining. Sartre suggests that when we recall an incident we posit it 
to ourselves as 'given-now-as-in-the-past', that is, not given-in-its-absence. Imagination, for 
Sartre, requires a mental act which grasps an object not given to the imaginer, grasps it, as it were, 
in its absence. This absence is an aspect of Sartrean nothingness. Effectively, Sartre is arguing 
that a man who imagines must, perforce, start imagining from the world he is in but treat it as a 
world which does not contain the imagined object. Therefore, when the man imagines he thinks 
of the object as non-existent. Contemporary cognitive psychologists might argue that Sartre has 
confused episodic and semantic memory systems. But it is interesting to consider Ryle's theory 
regarding memory - that there is a direct relationship between the mind and the remembered 
object, unmediated by a 'copy' - in the light of Sartre's theory. Indeed, Sartre might suggest the 
ability to imagine a unicorn supports his argument of the 'not-given' and non-existent. But this is 
difficult to accept as it is impossible to establish whether I could imagine a unicorn without 
having encountered images of unicorns throughout my life, deeply embedded as it is in English 
cultural history, which raises issues about the definition of 'non-existent'. (See the section of this 
paper entitled, 'The Unicorn's Pedigree'.)
27 In fact, Neisser went so far as to say, 'If X is an important or interesting feature of human 
behaviour, then X has rarely been studied by psychologists'; quoted in Baddeley, Human 
Memory, p. 1.
28 I am indebted to Gillian Cohen for her excellent overview of the history of research into 
memory, 'Historical Background: 100 years in the laboratory', pp. 1-23, Memory in the Real 
World. The quotation given here appears on p. 2.
29 For a summary of how TLR and everyday memory research have converged, to a certain 
extent, see Cohen, ibid.
30 These studies are left to neuro-chemists, neuro-physiologists and the like.
31 Cohen, Memory in the Real World, p. 3 .
32 Baddeley, Human Memory, p. 8.
33 Koriat and Goldsmith, 'Memory metaphors'.
34 Nisbett and Wilson, 'Telling more than we can know'.
35 The translation is 'The bark of some trees is very useful to man. '
36 Baddeley, Human Memory, p. 326. There are other anecdotes which will reward the assiduous
37 'Neglect' here means patients who have a tendency 'to ignore the left part of their visual field',
usually because of damage to the right parietal region of the brain. For a full description of the
phenomena of neglect, blindsight and anarchic hand syndrome, see Baddley, Human Memory, p.
329-33.
3g Altered Land, p. 204
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What I object to strongly about the 'leaf falling', 'sparrow dying', 'butterfly farting' 
arguments is that I have yet to read an account of this argument in which the writer suggests that 
because no one witnessed the seiche in Valdez fjord during the 1964 Alaskan earthquake, the 
event has no empirical status. The tree line was decimated to a height of 1,117 feet, so we can 
safely infer that something happened.
I feel it is time to outline the functions of memory. Tulving provides as good an overview as 
any in 'How many memory systems are there?'. 
41 Tim Radford, Guardian, 12 January 2005. 
^ See Ryle, Concept of Mind, pp. 17-25 for an explication of the famous category-type-mistake.
See Appendix 1 for examples of representation.
44 Baddeley, Human Memory, p. 328. Baddeley also points out these concepts are not articulated 
in Chinese or Serbo-Croat.
There now exist computers which can 'learn' and 'plan' (for example, those that 'play' chess), 
and which employ a parallel activity process. But does it even make sense to ask if the computer 
enjoys playing chess, enjoyment being essential to the understanding of the word 'play'?
I am indebted to Baddeley, Human Memory, pp. 255-9 for these concise objections to the 
computer-modelling theory. 
47 Wittgenstein, Tractatus, p. 73, §6.522
This is the position adopted by some philosophers, most notably Thomas Nagel and Colin 
McGinn.
The relevant quotation is 'Nagel argues that conscious mental life involves certain essentially 
subjective facts, facts that can only be appreciated from the "first person" point of view, from the 
point of view of the subject of those conscious experiences. Such subjective facts contrast with 
objective facts, which are accessible from the "third-person" perspective, independent of any 
particular subjective point of view. Nagel concludes on this basis that any physicalist account of 
mind must fail to account for the subjective aspect of mental life.' See Papineau, Philosophical 
Naturalism, p. 76.
50 I begin to suspect that this attribution is apocryphal. I have been in correspondence with the 
Armstrong archives office in New York and it is unable to provide me with any information about 
when or where Satchmo apparently said this; so, source unknown.
51 Baddeley, Human Memory, p. 3.
52 Which implies in the absence of stimuli, echoes of Sartrean nothingness.
53 A 'function', a 'system' and 'information' - the first two refer to the mechanisms of retaining 
the third element, eliding the aspects of memory. 'Memory' is a noun; 'remembering' a verb. 
Interestingly, we talk of'having' a memory, of owning it, in the same way we talk of having a 
plasma television. This is intriguing in the light of the statements made by Humphrey about his 
child (see section 'The Benevolent Dictator'), Descartes about his cogitationes and Frege about 
his 'inner world' (see below, note 71).
54 Reber, Dictionary of Psychology.
55 I should make it plain here that the 'bug' to which I refer was not an insect but a shellfish. It 
had no name other than 'bug', in English. It bore a resemblance to nothing so much as a trilobite 
and constituted the main element of one of the best suppers I have ever eaten.
56 More, Chum Kane changes; as I 'remember' him he changes. He is a copy of something that 
does not exist, that has no epistomological status.
57 This reminds me of piece, 'Here Lies Miss Groby', written by the peerless James Thurber, 
reproduced in The Thurber Carnival, pp. 52-59. In the piece Thurber remembers the mania of 
Miss Groby, his English teacher, for parsing prose. 'She hunted for Topic Sentences and 
Transitional Sentences the way little girls hunt for white violets in springtime.' She instructed the 
student Thurber to search for examples of 'Container for the Thing Contained' in Shakespeare 
and the works of Sir Walter Scott. I make no apologies for quoting at length:
At first I began to fear that all the characters in Shakespeare and Scott were crazy. They 
confused cause with effect, the sign for the thing signified, the thing held for the thing 
holding it. But after a while I began to suspect that it was I myself who was crazy. I 
would find myself lying awake at night saying over and over, "The thinger for the thing 
contained." In a great but probably misguided attempt to keep my mind on its hinges, I 
would stare at the ceiling and try to think of an example of the Thing Contained for the 
Container. It struck me as odd that Miss Groby had never thought of that inversion. I 
finally hit on one, which I still remember. If a woman were to grab up a bottle of Grade
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A and say to her husband, "Get away from me or I'll hit you with the milk," that would 
be a Thing Contained for the Container.
My point being that a model of working memory may, too, be a Thing Contained for the
Container.
58 Cohen, Memory in the Real World, p. 227.
60 T^°.m.as' 'Coding Dualism'. This is an on-line article and, as such, pages cannot be referenced.
This is an interesting turn of phrase - 'thinking with them', as if mental representations are 
analogous to food and the mind is a knife and fork, or the reverse? Or perhaps a better analogy 
would be that of a painter (thinker) utilising/manipulating tubes of oil (mental representations). 
Hmmm.
61 Thomas,'Coding Dualism'.
This reminds me of a character in Altered Land, Sonje, who suffers from the condition 
synaesthesia, which means, literally, the coming together of the senses. This is nonsense, of 
course, since the coming together of senses is how we all perceive the world. The difference in 
Sonje's case is that the coming together, the ordering of the perception data is confused, when 
compared to the vast majority of mammals. Sonje smells temperature, hears gustatory stimuli, 
even tastes emotions. This condition exists.
Which throws up the question of whether it would make sense to talk of a person being 'the 
thing contained for the container' (see note 54).
64 Paivio, Mental Representations.
65 Thomas,'Coding Dualism'.
66 See Appendix 1 for a model of the central executive.
67 Baddeley, Human Memory, pp. 85-101.
68 Ibid., p. 226.
69 Billy-Ray Rickman is the main character in Blue Earth.
70 Baddeley, Human Memory, pp. 370-71.
71 Humphrey, 'One-Self: A meditation on the unity of consciousness'.
72 Ibid., p. 32.
73 Ibid., p. 33.
74 Ibid., p. 34.
75 Humphrey provides a rather more cultured example, a passage from Proust's Recherche: 
'When I used to wake up in the middle of the night not knowing where I was, I could not even be 
sure a first who I was; I had only the most rudimentary sense of existence, such as may lurk and 
flicker in the depths of an animal's consciousness ... but then ... out of a blurred glimpse of oil- 
lamps, of shirts with turned-down collars, [I] would gradually piece together the original 
components of my ego'. This also reminiscent of Freud's description of the many selves in 
Delusion and Dream, pp. 135-45.
76 Humphrey, 'One-self, p. 36.
77 If this train of thought seems to be dragging us back to a solipsistic standpoint, inasmuch as 
the existence of the child could be argued to be predicated on the presence of the father perceiving 
it, it would be well to note that what Humphrey is saying is that he cannot look at his child 
without thinking 'baby', rather than 'set of sub-selves'. This is a matter for semioticians rather 
than solipsistic philosophers, since it is the nature of the signifier rather than the object signified 
to which Humphrey is referring.
78 Humphrey, 'One-self, p. 38.
79 Ibid., p. 39.
80 From Kintsch, 'Semantic Memory', pp. 581-87.
81 This model is based on Aristotle's own (logical and not psychological) semantic-structure for 
genus-species.
82 I still experience a niggling concern about this key question, precisely because of Frege's 
assertion that any discussion of 'the inner world presupposes the person whose inner world it is'. 
On reflection, I can only think that Frege's comment is a very blunt, very effective cudgel aimed 
at the tender head of dualism. Because he has in this statement incorporated the notion of 
possession ('whose'), he implies the very theory Humphrey is propounding - that it is impossible 
to imagine an inner world existing independently of a person, just as it is impossible for 
Humphrey to look at the object in the cot and not think 'baby'.
83 I am not referring here to those who suffer from neural abnormalities (amnesia or autism for 
example), or those who for psychological reasons have false memory syndrome, or
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obsessive/compulsive behaviours, or ersatz memories occasioned by hypnosis etc. I am referring
to those aspects of memory experienced by those who would be described by psychologists as
enjoying good mental and neural health.
^ Cohen, Memory in the Real World, p. 147
gg Brewer, 'What is autobiographical memory?', p. 271.
Conway, Flashbulb Memories, p. 17.
Cohen, Memory in the Real World, p. 147
I have worried about this analogy time and again. Sometimes I am persuaded (by myself- or 
perhaps a sub-self?) that autobiogaphical memory is the bottle, sometimes the glasses. The 
problem is a Rylean one - if the champagne is perception data, then is autobiographical memory 
the glasses, and so on ...? Where, in short, is the fountain?
Baddeley, Human Memory n 217
90 Ibid., p. 4 '
91 'Midweek', Radio 4, 25 January 2005.
92 Cohen, Memory in the Real World, p. 149. As Barbara Hardy remarked, 'Even logicians tell 
stories', Tellers and Listeners, p 17
QT *
Remember the pop art poster, which depicted a woman standing with hand slapped to forehead 
in surprise, the speech bubble announcing 'Damn -1 forgot to have children'? It sold in the 
thousands.
94 Cohen, Memory in the Real World, p. 46.
95 In The Writing Life Dillard, interestingly, remarks that 'A writer's childhood may well have 
been the occasion of his only first-hand experience', p. 109. I can only assume that here she is 
talking of a time of subjective experience before semantic knowledge begins to develop - before 
the child assimilates experiences of others, encounters media in all its forms, etc.
96 Tulving, 'How many memory systems are there?', p. 389.
97 Cohen, Memory in the RealWorld, p. 146.
98 Ibid., p. 180.
99 Schank and Abelson, Scripts, Plans, Goals and Understanding, pp. 89-112,
100 This leads me to ask if I have a script for writing a novel? A script within a script as it were.
101 It is one thing to point to a BMW 645 and say 'car' for the benefit of a two year old; it is 
another to point to a woman dressed in black suit and white coat and say 'phenomenologist' for 
the benefit of a forty-six year old. Why? For many reasons. The child will begin to perform set 
inferences, and recognise that Minis and Skodas are also cars. Already the child is beginning to 
build schema about transport, relative size, etc. But what can I do with the phenomenologist? I 
am too well-practised in semantics to assume that every woman, or every woman in a black hat 
and white coat, is a phenomenologist.
102 Schank, Dynamic Memory, p. 112.
103 Ibid., pp. 46-61.
104 Neisser, 'Snapshots or benchmarks?' in Neisser (ed.), Memory Observed.
105 Peter Brooks argues that a struggle between Freudian pleasure/reality principle and the desire 
to death is at the heart of our wish to read and tell stories and to reach the end of the narrative. 
'All narrative may be in essence obituary in that... the retrospective knowledge that it seeks, the 
knowledge that comes after, stands on the far side of the end, in human terms on the far side of 
death.' For Brooks, plots and narrative are tied to our sense of 'the human life-world'. Quoted in 
Felluga, Critical Theory.
106 Cohen, Memory in the Real World,, p. 276.
107 Mandler, Stories, scripts and scenes, p. 76.
108 Cohen, Memory in the Real World, p.277.
109 Forster, Aspects of the Novel, p. 41.
110 Ridley, Nature via Nurture, p. 216.
111 See Ridley, ibid., pp. 216-22 for a flail exposition of the various proofs for the primacy of 
gesture in the acquisition of language.
112 Ibid., p. 220.
1 u Evidence for this is the dimension of the space provided for the spinal cord in homo sapiens. 
Only in our case is the spinal cord broad enough to accommodate the nerves to the chest which 
control the complex muscle contractions and breathing that accompany speech.
114 'To imitate' - to mimic and make copies. There is here the suggestion of recreating, of 
copying from memory.
115 Deacon, The Symbolic Species, pp. 113-19.
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Ridley, Nature via Nurture, p. 220.
t | g Sunday Times, 'High Notes of the Singing Neanderthals', 30 January 2005. 
!!9 See Tylor's/VwH/w? Culture, vol. 1 (P. Smith, New York, 1970). 
120 Muller' s maJ°r work was The Antiquity ofVedic Astrology (1873).
Freud described myths as 'the secular dreams of young humanity', which raises questions 
about the Freudian definition of'secular'.
It is estimated that the painting was completed roughly 15,000 years ago.
Bruner, Making Stories, p 8
123 Ibid., p.8.
124 Ibid., pp. 8-9
125 Interesting to note the etymology of the word 'narrative', which compounds 'narrare' (telling) 
with 'gnarus' (knowing in some particular way). See Bruner, p. 27. Or, to put it another way, 
'telling (sharing) a particular type of knowledge; autonoetic/noetic knowledge perhaps?
Source unknown.
Allott, Novelists - an absolutely riveting book.
'There is no known language without some case marking for such narrative essentials as 
agent, action, object, direction, aspect and the rest ..." (Bruner, Making Stories, p. 33). 
129 Wallas, The Act of Thought, pp. 14-15.
Quoted in Czerniewska, Learning About Writing, p. 89. 
131 Robertson, Types of Thinking, pp. 41-42.
I could supply any number of differently named theories and models for this process but this 
is not the place. I simply want to stress the general agreement regarding the main elements.
133 Interesting, here, to note that Umberto Eco in his On Literature, pp. 307-9, accuses 
interviewers who ask writers, 'What are the phases one goes through in the genesis of a text?' of 
holding one of two contradictory views - that either the text develops 'in the mysterious heat of 
inspirational raptus', or the writer has followed 'a kind of secret set of rules'. Eco denies there is 
a set of rules, or any 'hot magma of inspiration', yet maintains that 'there is a sort of initial idea 
and that there are very precise phases in a process that develops only gradually'. He maintains 
that the genesis of his novels arise from 'a seminal image' - in the case of The Name of the Rose, 
that of a monk murdered as he read, and for John Fowles, a woman standing on the Cob.
134 Kennedy, 'Avoid the Spinning Plates', p. 3.
135 Bruner describes the 'impetus to narrative is expectation gone awry', Making Stories, p. 28.
136 I realise that there are circumstances in which this might be the case, usually in the genre of 
crime or thriller fiction - the character who reappears in one book after another, Inspector Rebus 
or James Bond or example - but I am considering traditional realist literature. 1 know that readers 
of lan Rankin will reply that his is realist fiction, but the demands of crime/thriller writing are 
essentially different.
137 The seven stories frameworks are: overcoming the monster, rags to riches, the quest, voyage 
and return, comedy, tragedy and rebirth. See Booker, The Seven Basic Plots.
138 'La Corrida', published by Francis Ford Coppola's production company Zoetrope, in the e- 
magazine, Zoetrope (www.zoetrope.com), 1998.
139 Sartre argues that imagining is, essentially, grasping at nothingness, grasping at a world that 
does not exist. My argument is that I am transforming what did happen to what might (future) 
have (past) happened. Sartre argues that there is a distinction between the function of 
imagination and the interpretation of what is imagined. I cannot agree; the interpretation will rely 
heavily on the functions of semantic knowledge as stored in a memory sub-system and it is no 
refutation to claim that the function of imagination is not interdependent with other memory sub­ 
systems.
140 Gentry and Stull, Conversations with Raymond Carver, p. 52.
141 Bruner, Making Stories, p. 86.
142 See Appendix 2 for a further discussion of dysnarrativia.
143 Bruner, Making Stories, p. 86.
144 I need not comment on how appalling it is ...
145 Bigsby, Writers in Conversation.
146 Interesting to note the echoes here with Barthes' description of the alignment of the 
hermeneutic code and the proairetic code producing 'the same tonal determination that melody 
and harmony have in classical music', S/Z, p. 24.
147 For example, see Burner's account of Dan Slobin's theories in Making Stories, pp. 73-75. I 
have often felt this myself. Many is the time I have stood in the shower, musing on some aspect
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of the emotional world and ended up muttering 'The Italians would have a word for it' when my 
own language fails to represent my thought
Stdmx, After Babel.
Famously, the marble used for the sculpture had been abandoned forty years before by 
Agotmo di Duccio, who had partially carved it as David himself, before declaring the marble 
damaged and unusable.
Copplestone, Michelangelo, p. 156."° .
What attracted me to the idea was the essence of Leibniz' theory: 'No two beings can be in the 
same place, because properties of a monad area function of its place, so that to have the same 
properties, the two would have to be in the same place, i.e., be one and not two.' See Urmson and 
Ree, Western Philosophy and Philosophers (Unv/'m, London, 1989), p. 168. 
^ Dorothy later became Isobel Chalfont-Webbe. 
U4 See Blue Earth> P- 348 for an explanation of this.
For Warnock, the answer is simple: 'For a philosopher a theory of imagination is a theory of 
self - and I have to agree, given that our self-concept derives from the functions of memory, and 
imagination could be said to be a function of memory. From Imagination, p. 90.
For Hobbes imagination 'is fundamentally a form of memory but a memory freed to some 
degree from the restrictions of actual experience'; which is a sound definition but one which lacks 
clarity since the locus of the problem of accounting for 'imagination' exists in the phrase 'to some 
degree'. For Hume imagination was the faculty that 'reproduces impressions, so we can think of 
them in their absence'. Hume, however, distinguishes between memory ('forceful' and 'ty'ed 
down') and imagination ('faint and languid' and 'transposed') (Treatise, Book I, Part 1, section 
3). 
1 6 From New Collins Concise English Dictionary, 1986.
157 Reber, Dictionary of Psychology, p.358.
158 Most philosophers and psychologists rely heavily on the visual when referring to images or 
mental representations. Coleridge deplored this and suggested we should wean children away 
from the 'despotism of the eye'. See Walsh, Uses of Imagination, p. 28, as well as Warnock's 
chapter on Coleridge and Wordsworth in Imagination.
159 Conway, Flashbulb Memories, p. 17.
160 This echoes the points made earlier regarding the field/observer characteristics of memory.
161 Warnock has argued that a successful act of imagination requires that: 'besides its visual 
appearance, we should also create, or revive, in ourselves some of the affective aspects of the 
scene, and feel in ourselves some of the emotions which the scene would produce in us if it were 
there in reality' (Imagination, p. 169). Surely, if, as Warnock suggests, we are representing to 
ourselves copies - or imitations - then the affective qualities are inherent in the imagined object. 
This is the problem Humphrey encounters with 'baby' - the quality of consciousness is 
incorporated in the word 'baby' .
162 In Allott, Novelists, there are some interesting insights into how writers feel about this. 
Charlotte Bronte described herself as having 'two selves', the woman and the writer; George Eliot 
described herself as 'not-self when she wrote; and Woolf referred to 'some sort of speaker' other 
than her being the person who wrote. All of them women . . , there's another doctoral thesis here. 
Allott, Novelists, pp. 141-60.
163 As John Irving said in an interview, you can be 'tyrannised by the authenticity of your 
memory', New York Times, 6 December 2001.
164 See Blue Earth, pp. 247-60.
165 Sinnot makes an interesting observation: 'the mind has a truly morphogenic quality about it. 
The patterns it makes are new things, not repetitions of something in the past' (quoted in Vernon, 
Creativity, p, 112). The patterns may be new but the material used is already known, surely, as 
semantic knowledge.
166 Some philosophers, Warnock, for example, consider empathy to be a universalising function 
of imagination, precisely so we can understand someone else's imagination. To muddy the 
waters, Colerige and Wordsworth both believed that we need reason, followed by imagination to 
arrive at universals (Imagination, p. 100).
167 Keats described this as the novelists capacity for 'filling some other body' - see Allott, 
Novelists, p. 203.
168 I should stress here that 'imagining' does not refer to the solving of problems to do with 
plotting, or tinkering with the construction of sentences, or editorial processes which correct 
imbalances of pace.
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169 See Cohen, Memory in the Real World, p. 146.
170 Freud, Delusion and Dream, pp. 75-77.
171 Davis, Resisting Novels, pp. 108-9.
It is an accepted fact that the scope and characteristics of novels themselves have changed 
over the centuries. For example, in the nineteenth century some European writers (Zola, Hardy, 
Dickens, Tolstoy etc.) were concerned with the novel as observations of social realism; their 
novels worked within open systems, revolving around incident and incoherence. Others (Austen 
Flaubert, Turgenev) wrote more from subjective experience, writing within closed systems of 
limited experience, striving towards order and harmony. More, over time 'individual experience 
begins to replace collective tradition as the ultimate arbiter of reality' and, possibly, cultural 
value, which has had the effect of consigning novels written within open systems to the 
metaphorical trash can labelled 'sagas'.
173 Davis, Resisting Novels, p. 119.
174 Bigsby, Writers in Conversation, pp. 153-54
Sebald as precursor of post-modernism? 
176 Cherry, On Human Communication, pp. 67-78.
R. L. Stevenson was accused of having 'performed psychical surgery on a valued friend' in 
order to create the character of Long John Silver.
It might be argued that this act of memorising is no different from learning the formulae of 
Physics for an examination. But I believe that there are fundamental differences between the 
memory of'density equals mass divided by volume' and somebody else's account of a 
miscarriage, not least the motive for memorising both. Certainly the principles of Physics cannot 
be morphed in the same way as my image of Billy-Ray Rickman.
179 Mlott, Novelists, p. 197.
180 Koehne, in Gentry and Stull, Carver, p. 8.
181 Weber, ibid., p. 95.
132 D. H. Lawrence wrote that 'great authors should not try to squeeze into small characters'.
Thank God Carver ignored the advice.
183 A good example of this would be Carver's short story, 'Why Don't You Dance?', in Where 
I'm Calling From. I would say, though, that just about any Carver story will illustrate this point.
184 Bruner, Making Stories, p.6.
185 Ibid., p. 16.
186 Cohen, Memory in the Real World, p. 100.
187 Ibid.
188 And now, in the third week of July, as I check this paper for errors, I see this paragraph, and 
since the last draft we have acquired memories of what has become known as 7/7 - the London 
bombings and following that event, the four failed London bombings. What is different, in terms 
of the sharing of experience, between 9/11 and 7/7 is that now people use the videos and cameras 
on their mobile phones to transmit images of what is happening even below ground, in real time; 
previously unseen, but perhaps not unimaginable.
189 Brown and Kulik, 'Flashbulb Memory', in Neisser, Memory Observed, pp. 89-99.
190 It should be said that there is no denying amongst psychologists that flashbulb memories exist. 
There is debate only about why they remain so unchanged and are encoded so vividly. Brown 
and Kulik, for example, argue that it a neural mechanism, triggered by factors such as fear, 
surprise and extreme emotion, which causes the memory to encode a 'printed' image of the whole 
event (ibid.). Conversely, Neisser argues that it because we 'rehearse' and repeat the event with 
others -the flashbulb effect occurs because of successive reconstructions.
191 Working title, to be published by Simon and Schuster, 2006.
192 More of this'making'later ...
193 Obviously, I am not claiming that these subsets are the same for everyone. The Aborigine in 
his plywood shack, the Taliban fighter in the hills of Afghanistan, the teenage Palestinian refugee 
in the camps will all have substantially different responses to my own. Yet it might be argued 
that they might share their own subsets with others in the same circumstances or of the same 
culture.
194 Again, the issue of the universalising function of memory and imagination arises.
195 This is a clear example of the universalising function of imagination, as described by 
Warnock in Imagination, pp. 79-84.
196 Let us not forget that there exists in America the VW Rabbit.
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Zola and other social realists placed landscape at the centre of their novels - indeed the 
narrative sprang from the interplay between the characters and the landscape; without the 
landscape (Wessex, the slums of Paris etc.) there would be no narrative. Many contemporary 
writers - despite working within closed systems - do the same: Annie Proulx, Elmore Leonard, 
Anna Tyler, Paul Auster, John Updike, etc. For many of these landscape becomes a character.
I would agree with Freud's assertion that 'the artist... understands how to elaborate his 
daydreams', Dreams and Delusions, p 156
IQQ _, . . ' "'
for an interesting account of these approaches, see Hughes, 'Narrative as Landscape'.199
200 rTM ' ' • ~ " " ""'This is an on-line article and pages cannot be referenced.
Perhaps some might argue that as a writer of fiction, I do the same. An interesting interface 
between reality and fiction is located precisely at the point of location. To reprise Spike Milligan, 
'everyone has to be somewhere', even homoflctus. In Altered Land the setting is Bristol and the 
southwest of England. The roads and urban areas, shops, pubs and restaurants are named, they 
exist and they are located where they should be. In Mr Candid, the highways are correctly 
numbered, the cities and towns are named, and are located where they should be. In Blue Earth 
the pipeline, the mountains, the Cotswold countryside are accurately named and described. But 
Jarman House does not exist, although Thurloe Square does; in Unlocked I have created an 
entirely fictitious but plausible (geologically, economically and racially speaking) republic. I 
would describe this location as virtual.
202 I am reminded here of Barthes' assertion that writerly texts have multiple entrances and exits. 
I realise that his theory refers to the potential for a non-linear reading of text but it struck a chord. 
Not least because of his dismissal of the plot triangle and his replacement of that triangle with a 
constellation, a '"nebulae" of signifieds' (S/Z, p. 79).
203 Smith, in his Writing and the Writer describes the processes of re-writing and editing as 
'covering the traces', making invisible the mistakes or changes of direction (pp. 35-49).
204 Blue Earth, p. 378.
205 Forster, A Room with a View, p. 134.
206 Jonathan Franzen wrote The Corrections wearing a blindfold, ear defenders and gloves, 
standing at a lecturn, touch-typing. Dashed uncomfortable I would have thought, but this neatly 
illustrates the argument that images are not copies.
207 As Lodge writes, 'the novelist works his effect partly by concealing the seams that join what 
he has experienced to what he has researched or invented', Practice of Writing, p. 31.
208 Eco says of The Island of the Day Before that he wished to write about 'nature and nothing 
else' and so he elected to write about a man shipwrecked on a deserted island. As he incubated 
this idea, Eco became intrigued by the international date line, and as he flicked through an atlas, 
he discovered that 'the line also passed through Fijian archipelago ... At this point other 
memories intervened, other trails opened up' (italics mine).
209 Eco, On Literature, p. 316.
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APPENDICES
Appendices 1 and 4 have been removed from this 
digitized thesis due to potential copyright issues. 
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APPENDIX 2: Dysnarrativia
I tried to unearth studies of this condition but was unable to find any precise 
information and so I consigned the search to my mental dustbin. However, I find 
myself thinking about it frequently and have spent time considering what it is, 
exactly, that the sufferers of dysnarrativia cannot understand. I turned to a 
childhood favourite of mine, the French cartoonist, Sempe, and leafed through a 
few of his books. I remembered that the reason I used to laugh like a drain, 
despite the fact the books were in French, was the simplicity, the dynamism of 
the 'stories' he framed (language was no impediment). On the following pages 
there are four cartoons, of which three are single frame - the starting line, the car 
crash and the library; the fourth is a panel of five frames, the bath.
Within the first three, there are differences - the starting line and the car 
crash rely for their narrative on events which have already happened, unseen, 
unexplained, descriptionless. The third panel, the library, is situated in the 'now'. 
If Sempe had elected to draw these three cartoons as panels, what would he have 
shown? Competitors gathering on the line? Two cars being driven along the 
same street? A man reading a book in a library? A moment's thought makes us 
realise that we do not need to know these things. We can infer what happened 
before from what is happening 'now', even though the precise locations of the 
runners and the drivers are integral to our understanding of the pico-narrative. In 
fact, the 'now' in the runners cartoon is fluid - it is still happening. However, the 
fourth cartoon requires that it is a five-frame panel; if we look only at the last 
then there is uncertainty, we cannot construct what has happened in the past. The
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woman may be in peril. It is essential for the 'story' that we know she is in a 
hotel and we know that she is secure in imagining herself alone.
So, how might those suffering from dysnarrativia view these images? 
Given that they have, apparently, no grasp of cause and effect, then perhaps they 
would not comprehend the pico-narratives at all? I am not interested in whether 
they find humour in the cartoons, but in the question of whether they can decode 
the signs of the smoking gun and the falling lamp, the crumpled car bonnets, the 
falling of the sign, and the unintended results? Or, like Clive Wearing (the total 
amnesiac) are they unable to comprehend 'now' as sandwiched between past and 
present? And even if they can decode these signs, do they 'forget' the signified? 
Is it that they cannot serially represent to themselves the events decoded? 
Obviously, the fourth cartoon is presented to the viewer serially, and Sempe 
assumes that the viewer will be constructing the narrative in parallel and 
empathising with the woman's desire for privacy (it doesn't matter whether there 
is someone in the woman's hotel room, only in the bathroom - even this 
assumption is value-laden). It would be interesting to know whether a patient 
suffering from dysnarrativia would find all Sempe's presentations equally 
difficult to decode and recede (that is, make deductions about what had happened 
before).
It might be that the answer lies in the phrase above: 'we cannot construct 
what has happened in the past'. Perhaps I should have written "reconstruct what 
has happened in the past'? Although in reality nothing has happened in the past 
to the non-existent runners and drivers, we effectively reconstruct - work 
backwards in a way - what probably happened. And this may be what a patient 
suffering from dysnarrativia cannot do - he or she cannot recede or decode the 
non-existent, the not-here.
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APPENDIX 3: excerpts from Imogen's Dream
Hyde Park. Reached by crossing a zig-zag of glittering, mazed roads. Thin, pointed 
corners pointing nowhere. People milling still - in the heat - following a pointed 
corner's pointing finger. Defiant verdant monster threatened by towering hotels. Rest a 
moment and listen to the whispering of the small, mouldering buildings dotted between 
hotels. 'How it might have been? This is how it might have been.' And it is just 
possible to imagine that the one - the One - is resting in a room near here. Dressed in a 
startling white shirt, sipping cold Rhine wine in a hotel room near here.
The One ... waiting.
(page 90)
And the One - in the hotel room - shifts more easily, as the heat moves still further 
away. A white splash on the old, deeply sprung bed. A cold splash on the finely downed 
arm as wine spills. The heat shies away from this room, in the small hotel, leaving room 
for the soft gloom of light-pools around the bed. The bedroom is waiting for dusk on a 
long summer day.
How it might have been? This is how it might have been.
(page 94)
And in the hotel room the light fades more quickly than on the sunny, littered streets. 
There is a chill breeze coming through an open window ...
Muslin on chintz, stroking walnut lines -
There is no sound in this room, but for the fading chinks of glass on glass. A flash of 
blinding white as someOne shifts on the creaking bed.
(page 103)
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On the bed the body stretches. Stretching to its longest length. The sound of ripping as 
the dazzling white shin tears and the sound of giggling as the body bunches to look at the 
flesh behind this tear.
(page 106)
Outside, cars, buses and neon light the streets. A kaleidoscope. Yellow, red, blue, white, 
green lights, moving and still, fight the night. Dazzling, blinding lights flickering 
everywhere. Except in one almost-silent room, where the soft hiss of a gas lamp can be 
heard above the sound of gentle snores.
It is cold now.
(page 108)
The vignette in the musty room is struggling for life. For the night has been within the 
room for a long time. The night for which it lives. The night for which it waited. The 
waiting so carefully, painstakingly played out in this room. Played out every night. The 
snores now quiet, milky sobs. This room has heard them before, has heard them every 
night. Perhaps it is the room that cries for the crumpled, white bundle on the old bed? 
Perhaps not. The room settles, the snores are heard once more. The bottle is empty, the 
glass turns silently on the table. The bedroom is waiting for morning through a dark, 
sultry night.
'How it might have been? This is how it might have been.' 
Waiting for the One who never comes.
(page 112)
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